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Abstract
Pastry is a structured P2P algorithm realizing a Distributed Hash Table (DHT ) over an
underlying virtual ring of nodes. Hash keys are assigned to the numerically closest node,
according to their Ids that both keys and nodes share from the same Id space. Nodes
join and leave the ring dynamically and it is desired that a lookup request from arbitrary
node for a key is routed to the responsible node for that key which then delivers the
message as answer.
Several implementations of Pastry are available and have been applied in practice,
but no attempt has so far been made to formally describe the algorithm or to verify
its properties. Since Pastry combines rather complex data structures, asynchronous
communication, concurrency, resilience to churn, i.e. spontaneous join and departure of
nodes, it makes an interesting target for verification.
This thesis formally models and improves Pastry’s core algorithms, such that they
provide the correct lookup service in the presence of churn and maintain a local data
structures to adapt the dynamic updates of neighborhood.
This thesis focuses on Join protocol of Pastry and formally defines different statuses
(from “dead” to “ready”) of a node according to its stage during join. Only “ready”
nodes are suppose to have consistent key mapping among each other and are allowed
to deliver the answer message. The correctness property is identified by this thesis to
be CorrectDelivery , stating that there is always at most one node that can deliver an
answer to a lookup request for a key and this node is the numerically closest “ready”
node to that key. This property is non-trivial to preserve in the presence of churn.
The specification language TLA+ is used to model different versions of Pastry al-
gorithm starting with CastroPastry, followed by HaeberlenPastry, IdealPastry
and finally LuPastry. The TLA+ model checker TLC is employed to validate the
models and to search for bugs. Validation ensures that the system has at least some
useful executions; model analysis helps to discover unexpected corner cases to improve
the model. Models are simplified for more efficient checking with TLC and consequently
mitigating the state explosion problem.
Through this thesis, unexpected violations of CorrectDelivery in CastroPastry
andHaeberlenPastry are discovered and analyzed. Based on the analysis, Haeberlen-
Pastry is improved to a new design of the Pastry protocol IdealPastry, which is first
verified using the interactive theorem prover TLAPS for TLA+. IdealPastry assumes
that a “ready” node handles one joining node at a time and it assumes that (1) no de-
parture of nodes (2) no concurrent join between two “ready” nodes closed to each other.
The last assumption of IdealPastry is removed by its improved version LuPastry.
In LuPastry, a “ready” node adds the joining node directly when it receives the join
request and does not accepts any further join request until it gets the confirmation from
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the current joining node that it is “ready”. LuPastry is proved to be correct w.r.t.
CorrectDelivery under the assumption that no nodes leave the network, which cannot be
further relaxed due to possible network separation when particular nodes simultaneously
leave the network.
The most subtle part of the deductive system verification is the search for an appro-
priate inductive invariant which implies the required safety property and is inductively
preserved by all possible actions. The search is guided by the construction of the proof,
where TLC is used to discover unexpected violations of a hypothetical invariant pos-
tulated in an earlier stage. The final proof of LuPastry consists of more than 10,000
proof steps, which are interactively checked in time by using TLAPS launching different
back-end automated theorem provers.
This thesis serves also as a case study giving the evidence of possibility and the
methodology of how to formally model, to analyze and to manually conduct a formal
proof of complex transition system for its safety property. Using LuPastry as template,
a more general framework on verification of DHT can be constructed.
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Zusammenfassung
Pastry ist ein P2P (peer-to-peer) Algorithmus, der eine verteilte Hashtabelle (DHT) u¨ber
einem als virtuellen Ring strukturierten Netzwerk realisiert. Knoten-Identifikatoren und
Hash-Schlu¨ssel entstammen derselben Menge, und jeder Knoten verwaltet die Schlu¨ssel,
die seinem Identifikator am na¨chsten liegen. Knoten ko¨nnen sich zur Laufzeit ins Netz
einfu¨gen bzw. es verlassen. Dennoch sollen Anfragen nach einem Schlu¨ssel von beliebigen
Knoten immer zu demjenigen Knoten weitergeleitet werden, der den Schlu¨ssel verwaltet
und der die Anfrage dann beantwortet.
Pastry wurde mehrfach implementiert und praktisch eingesetzt, aber der Algorith-
mus wurde bisher noch nie mathematisch pra¨zise modelliert und auf Korrektheit unter-
sucht. Da bei Pastry komplexe Datenstrukturen, asynchrone Kommunikation in einem
verteilten Netzwerk und Robustheit gegen churn, d.h. spontanes Einfu¨gen oder Ver-
lassen von Knoten zusammenkommen, stellt das Protokoll eine interessante Fallstudie
fu¨r formale Verifikationstechniken dar.
In dieser Arbeit werden die Kernalgorithmen von Pastry modelliert, die Anfragen
nach Schlu¨sseln in Gegenwart von churn behandeln und lokale Datenstrukturen ver-
walten, welche die jeweiligen Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen zwischen Knoten zur Laufzeit
widerspiegeln.
Diese Dissertation behandelt insbesondere das Join-Protokoll von Pastry zum Ein-
fu¨gen neuer Knoten ins Netz, das jedem Knoten seinen Status (von “dead” bis “ready”)
zuweist. Knoten mit Status “ready” mu¨ssen untereinander konsistente Modelle der Zu-
sta¨ndigkeit fu¨r Schlu¨ssel aufweisen und du¨rfen Anfragen nach Schlu¨sseln beantworten.
Als zentrale Korrektheitseigenschaft wird in dieser Arbeit CorrectDelivery untersucht,
die ausdru¨ckt, dass zu jeder Zeit ho¨chstens ein Knoten Anfragen nach einem Schlu¨ssel
beantworten darf, und dass es sich dabei um den Knoten mit Status “ready” handelt,
dessen Identifikator dem Schlu¨ssel numerisch am na¨chsten liegt. In Gegenwart von churn
ist es nicht einfach diese Eigenschaft sicherzustellen.
Wir benutzen die Spezifikationssprache TLA+, um verschiedene Versionen des Pastry-
Protokolls zu modellieren: zuna¨chst CastroPastry, gefolgt von HaeberlenPastry
und IdealPastry, und schließlich LuPastry. Mit Hilfe des Modelcheckers TLC fu¨r
TLA+ werden verschiedene qualitative Eigenschaften untersucht, um die Modelle zu va-
lidieren und Fehler zu finden. Dafu¨r werden die Modelle zum Teil vereinfacht, um das
Problem der Zustandsexplosion zu mindern und so die Effizienz des Modelchecking zu
verbessern.
Diese Arbeit konnte unerwartete Abla¨ufe von CastroPastry und Haeberlen-
Pastry aufdecken, bei denen die Eigenschaft CorrectDelivery verletzt wird. Auf der
Grundlage dieser Analyse und einiger Verbesserungen von HaeberlenPastry wird
das Protokoll IdealPastry entwickelt und seine Korrektheit mit Hilfe des interaktiven
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Theorembeweisers TLAPS fu¨r TLA+ gezeigt. Das Protokoll IdealPastry stellt sicher,
dass ein “ready” Knoten zu jeder Zeit ho¨chstens einen neuen Knoten ins Netz einfu¨gt,
und es nimmt an, dass (1) kein Knoten je das Netz verla¨sst und (2) keine zwei Knoten
zwischen benachbarten “ready” Knoten eingefu¨gt werden. Der Algorithmus LuPastry
verbessert IdealPastry und beseitigt Annahme (2) von IdealPastry. In dieser Ver-
sion nimmt ein “ready” Knoten den neu einzufu¨genden Knoten unmittelbar in seine
Nachbarschaft auf und akzeptiert dann solange keinen weiteren neu hinzukommenden
Knoten, bis der erste Knoten besta¨tigt, dass er Status “ready” erreicht hat. LuPastry
wird als korrekt bezu¨glich der Eigenschaft CorrectDelivery nachgewiesen, unter der An-
nahme, dass keine Knoten das Netz verlassen. Diese Annahme kann im allgemeinen nicht
vermieden werden, da der Ring in separate Teilnetze zerfallen ko¨nnte, wenn bestimmte
Knoten gleichzeitig das Netz verlassen.
Die gro¨ßte Herausforderung bei deduktiven Ansa¨tzen zur Systemverifikation ist es,
eine geeignete Invariante zu finden, die sowohl die angestrebte Sicherheitseigenschaft
impliziert als auch induktiv von allen Systemaktionen erhalten wird. Wa¨hrend der Kon-
struktion des Korrektheitsbeweises wird TLC benutzt, um unerwartete Gegenbeispiele
zu hypothetischen Invarianten zu finden, die zuvor postuliert wurden. Der Beweis des
LuPastry-Protokolls besteht aus mehr als 10000 Beweisschritten, die von TLAPS und
seinen integrierten automatischen Theorembeweisern verifiziert werden.
Die vorliegende Arbeit dient auch als Fallstudie, welche die Mo¨glichkeit der formalen
Modellierung, Analyse und Korrektheitsbeweises von komplexen Transitionssystemen
aufzeigt und die dabei notwendigen Einzelschritte und -techniken behandelt. LuPastry
kann als Vorlage benutzt werden, um einen allgemeineren Rahmen fu¨r die Verifikation
von DHT-Protokollen zu schaffen.
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Re´sume´
Pastry est un algorithme qui re´alise une table de hachage distribue´e (THD) sur un
re´seau pair a` pair organise´ en un anneau virtuel de nœuds. Chaque nœud ge`re les
informations dont les cle´s sont nume´riquement proches de son propre identifiant, sachant
que les espaces d’identifiants de nœuds et de cle´s sont confondus dans ce protocole. Le
protocole admet que des nœuds puissent rejoindre ou quitter l’anneau a` tout moment.
Il doit ne´anmoins faire suivre toute requeˆte pour une cle´, provenant de n’importe quel
nœud, au nœud qui est responsable pour cette cle´ et qui re´pondra par l’information
recherche´e.
Il existe plusieurs imple´mentations de Pastry qui ont e´te´ utilise´es en pratique.
Cependant, il n’y a pas encore eu de travaux qui visent a` de´crire formellement l’algorithme
ou a` ve´rifier son bon fonctionnement. Inte´grant des structures de donne´es complexes, de
la communication asynchrone dans un contexte d’un protocole re´parti et une robustesse
vis-a`-vis du churn, i.e. des nœuds qui rejoignent ou quittent le re´seau, ce protocole
repre´sente un inte´reˆt certain pour eˆtre analyse´ par des techniques de ve´rification formelle.
Dans cette the`se nous mode´lisons les algorithmes au cœur de Pastry et qui re´alisent
le service de recherche d’un nœud responsable d’une cle´ en pre´sence de churn. Ces
algorithmes maintiennent en particulier une structure locale de donne´es pour ge´rer les
e´volutions dynamiques de la relation de voisinage.
La the`se e´tudie en particulier le protocole Join de Pastry qui permet a` un nœud
de rejoindre le re´seau et qui associe un statut (variant entre mortet preˆt) a` tout
nœud. Les nœuds preˆtsdoivent avoir une vue du voisinage cohe´rente entre eux ;
ils sont autorise´s a` re´pondre a` des messages de recherche d’informations. La proprie´te´
principale de correction qui nous inte´resse ici, appele´e CorrectDelivery , assure qu’a` tout
moment il y a au plus un nœud capable de re´pondre a` une requeˆte pour une cle´, et que
ce nœud est le nœud le plus proche nume´riquement a` ladite cle´. Il n’est pas trivial de
maintenir cette proprie´te´ en pre´sence de churn.
Le langage de spe´cification formelle TLA+ est utilise´ pour mode´liser diffe´rentes ver-
sions du protocole Pastry, en commenc¸ant parCastroPastry, suivant parHaeberlen-
Pastry, IdealPastry, puis LuPastry. Le model checker TLC associe´ a` TLA+ sert
pour valider des mode`les et pour trouver des erreurs, en ve´rifiant des proprie´te´s qualita-
tives. Pour ce faire, nous utilisons parfois des mode`les simplifie´s pour pallier au proble`me
de l’explosion combinatoire du nombre d’e´tats.
Ce travail nous a permis de de´couvrir des violations inattendues de la proprie´te´
CorrectDelivery dans CastroPastry et HaeberlenPastry. Sur la base de cette
analyse et des ame´liorations apporte´es a` HaeberlenPastry, le protocole IdealPastry
et conc¸u et ve´rifie´ en utilisant l’assistant interactif a` la preuve TLAPS pour TLA+.
IdealPastry est conc¸u de fac¸on a` ce que tout nœud preˆtne ge`re qu’un nœud de´sirant
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rejoindre le re´seau a` la fois, et il suppose que (1) aucun nœud ne quitte le re´seau et (2)
il n’y a jamais deux nœuds qui rejoignent le re´seau en meˆme temps entre deux nœuds
preˆtsproches l’un de l’autre. Cette dernie`re hypothe`se du protocole IdealPastry est
leve´e dans sa version ame´liore´e LuPastry. Dans cette version, un nœud preˆtajoute le
nœud de´sirant rejoindre le re´seau imme´diatement dans son voisinage et n’accepte d’autre
requeˆte a` rejoindre le re´seau que si le premier nœud a` confirme´ qu’il est preˆt. Il est
montre´ formellement que LuPastry ve´rifie CorrectDelivery sous l’hypothe`se qu’aucun
nœud ne quitte le re´seau. Cette hypothe`se ne peut eˆtre relaˆche´e a` cause du risque de
perte de connexion du re´seau dans le cas ou` plusieurs nœuds spe´cifiques quittent le re´seau
en meˆme temps.
La taˆche la plus ardue en ve´rification de´ductive est de trouver un invariant inductif
ade´quat qui a` la fois implique la proprie´te´ de suˆrete´ que l’on souhaite de´montrer et est
pre´serve´ par toute action du protocole. Cette taˆche est guide´e par la construction de la
preuve formelle, et l’utilisation de TLC permet de de´couvrir des violations inattendues
d’invariants hypothe´tiques postule´s au pre´alable. La preuve finale de LuPastry consiste
en environ 10000 e´tapes de preuve qui sont ve´rifie´es par TLAPS et ses diffe´rents outils
automatiques de preuve.
Par le biais d’une e´tude de cas conse´quente, cette the`se met en e´vidence la possibilite´
et e´tudie la me´thodologie pour la mode´lisation d’un syste`me de transitions complexe
et pour son analyse et ve´rification de´ductive formelle en vue d’e´tablir une proprie´te´
de suˆrete´. En se servant de LuPastry comme une calque, un cadre plus ge´ne´ral de
ve´rification de THD peut eˆtre envisage´.
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摘要
Pastry 是一个将分布式哈希表（DHT）实现在虚拟环结构上的点对点协议的结构化算
法。在这类算法中，哈希密匙（Hash Key）和网络节点共享一个ID域，而密匙被则被
分配在和它ID距离最近的网络节点上。网络节点可能随时加入或离开，而该协议正确的
预期效果之一就是能够为任意的寻址操作提供正确的路由以便得到正确的答案。
Pastry 有很多版本并且已经被广泛应用了，但迄今为止，对其算法及正确寻址等性
质的形式化描述或验证尚未有任何进展。Pastry 综合了复杂的数据结构、异步通讯、并
发性、抗震荡性（震荡, churn, 这里指由节点的动态加入和离开所带来的网络拓扑结构
的改变）等多种性质，因而对它的形式化验证成为了很有科学价值的研究课题。
本博士论文对Pastry的核心算法进行了建模，并改善了协议的设计，最终证明了改
善的模型在网络震荡的环境下能够正确寻址。
论文重点分析了算法中节点的加入协议并定义了节点在加入的流程中从断连
（dead）到准备就绪（ready）的不同状态。仅有准备就绪的节点才能保证一致的
哈希映射，并且只有它们能答复寻找密匙的请求。协议的正确性被形式化的描述
为CorrectDelivery, 即在网络运行的任意时刻，最多有一个节点能够向寻址操作提供结
果，且该点应当是所有完备节点中离密匙最近的节点。在网络震荡频发的状态下，这个
性质是很难维持的。
TLA+是一种规约语言，在本文中用于对不同版本的Pastry算法进行建模，其中
包括初始的 CastroPastry, 到后继的 HaeberlenPastry，和 IdealPastry以及
LuPastry。 TLA+的模型检测工具TLC被用来确认模型符合设计初衷。为了更高效的
使用该工具，模型被进一步简化，这样以来就避免了模型检测中常见的状态爆炸的问
题。
本论文描述了在形式化分析 CastroPastry和 HaeberlenPastry时发现的的
潜在问题，并基于对它们的改进，设计了第一个被形式化验证的Pastry协议 Ideal-
Pastry。该协议的设计建立在两个理想状态的假设上：（1）没有节点离开（2）没
有并发节点在两个相邻准备就绪的节点间加入网络。第二条假设在 LuPastry中被
去除了。LuPastry协议中的节点一旦收到加入请求就马上将相应节点加入本节点的
邻居信息里，并不再处理之后的所有加入请求，直到收到该加入节点准备就绪的通
知。LuPastry在没有节点离开的前提下最终被形式化验证为符合Pastry所期待的协
议，该协议被验证为能够完全抵抗并发节点加入网络带来的震荡。
课题论证最大的挑战就是寻找并证明那些不变量，即网络在所有节点执行任意操作
时保持其正确性的那些可以全局归纳的性质。寻找过程实际上是和证明过程同步进行
的，这里 TLC用来对寻找过程中发现的备选不变量进行预期检测。最终的证明包含了
一万多步骤，每一步骤都通过 TLAPS系统后台的自动证明机进行了验证。
本课题也可被看做是一次对使用形式化建模、分析并论证一个复杂网络协议之正确
性的可行性及方法论的探索实例，这标示着目前的形式化验证技术已经可以应用在真实
世界的分布式复杂算法中了。LuPastry可以用作模板，构建更通用的框架，以对其他
分布式哈希表算法（DHT）进行验证。
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1 Introduction
Pastry (Rowstron and Druschel (2001), Castro et al. (2004), Haeberlen et al. (2005)) is
a structured P2P algorithm realizing a Distributed Hash Table (DHT , by Hellerstein
(2003)) over an underlying virtual ring of nodes. Several implementations of Pastry
are available and have been applied in practice, but no attempt has so far been made
to formally describe the algorithm or to verify its properties. Since Pastry is a typical
realization of a DHT which combines rather complex data structures, asynchronous
communication, concurrency, resilience to churn, i.e. concurrent join and departure of
nodes, it makes an interesting target for verification.
This thesis models Pastry’s core algorithms, which provide the correct lookup ser-
vice in the presence of churn and maintain a local data structures to adapt the dynamic
updates of neighborhood. This chapter starts with the motivation of the research inter-
ests, then states explicitly the research goals and explains how these goals are achieved
by the work. At the end, a structural guidance will be given for reading the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
In our day-to-day life, disruptions of software systems such as Skype (Microsoft (2013))
directly disturb everyone’s daily life when people cannot make calls, or calls are dropped
in the middle of a conversation. Skype is known and used world-wide by billions of
users for making phone-calls over Internet. On Thursday, 16th August 2007, the Skype
peer-to-peer (P2P) network became unstable and suffered a critical disruption despite
of its peer-to-peer network with an inbuilt ability to self-heal. “This event revealed a
previously unseen software bug within the network resource allocation algorithm which
prevented the self-healing function from working quickly.” as reported in Arak (2007).
Unfortunately on 23rd December 2010, millions of users could not make phone calls again
due to the departure of several “super nodes”. Is there any fundamental problems of
such network design that causes unexpected outage again and again? If not, is there a
fundamental proof of its correctness?
Although it is not published how Skype uses the idea of P2P algorithm in its deploy-
ments of services, there is no doubt that the scalability of Skype benefits significantly
from the adoption of P2P networks, making it feasible to provide billions of phone calls
simultaneously world-wide, according to Microsoft (2013). P2P systems have become
popular since beginning of 21st century with their self-organization and decentralization
properties. In particular, structured P2P systems implement Distributed Hash Tables
(DHTs), which are supposed to provide
• efficient and dependable routes;
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• distributed maintenance of structure with low costs;
• and resilience to concurrent joins and departures of network members.
For these reasons, DHT is typically used in large-scale distributed systems such as
Dynamo (DeCandia et al. (2007)), a storage substrate that Amazon uses internally for
many services. Skype may implement DHT for its peers to find each other correctly
and efficiently.
However, the correctness of a DHT system relies heavily on its realizing algorithms.
Pastry is one of the successful realization1 of DHT . It realizes DHT by mapping object
keys (e.g. identifier for a piece of distributed data) to overlay nodes (e.g. the computer
connected to the Internet) and offers a lookup primitive to route a message to the node
responsible for a key.
Questions About Pastry
Since Pastry implements all properties of a DHT , it is interesting and crucial to under-
stand the fundamental mechanisms of Pastry and to analyze and prove its correctness
properties. Castro et al. (2004) introduces Pastry on the message level using pseudocode.
Starting from this paper, it will be interesting to know the insights of Pastry:
• How does Pastry work, in particular, how does the protocol realized the DHT?
• What does “dependable routing” formally mean? Does Pastry guarantee depend-
able routing? If so, to what extent, and how? Is there any fundamental design
flaw in Pastry, in particular Castro et al. (2004), with respect to its correctness
properties, such as dependable routing? If yes, how does the problem occur? If
not, is there a formal proof?
• Are there other interesting properties of such a system implementing a DHT? Are
they interrelated?
How does Pastry Work
In Pastry, the overlay nodes are assigned logical identifiers from an Id space of naturals
in the interval [0, 2M − 1] for some M . The Id space is considered as a ring as shown in
Figure 1.1, i.e. 2M − 1 is the neighbor of 0.
The Ids are also used as object keys, such that an overlay node is in particular
responsible for keys that are numerically close to its Id, i.e. it provides the primary
storage for the hash table entries associated with these keys. Key responsibility is divided
equally according to the distance between two neighbor nodes. If a node is responsible
for a key we say it covers the key, as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
1This thesis distinguishes the level of abstraction of an algorithm. Therefore, “realization” is used
to described the refinement from DHT to a real algorithm Pastry and “implementation” is used to
describe different versions of this algorithm. Both of the words describe different level of details of
design and neither of these two words are used in the meaning of executable software.
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Figure 1.1: Pastry ring.
The most important sub-protocols of Pastry are join and lookup. The join protocol
eventually adds a new node with an unused network Id to the ring. The lookup protocol
delivers the hash table entry (the responsible node) for a given key. Pastry maintains
its correct key mapping and it is supposed to provide the correct lookup service in the
presence of churn, i.e. spontaneous join and departure of nodes.
Since neighbors of a Pastry node are changing all the time due to churn, they are
locally decided based on the leaf sets of the node, a local state that each Pastry node
maintains. Leaf sets, as shown in Figure 1.1, consist of a left set and a right set of the
same length which is a parameter of the algorithm. The nodes in leaf sets are updated
when new nodes join or failed nodes are detected using maintenance protocol. In order
to achieve efficient routing, a Pastry node also maintains a routing table to store more
distant nodes. In the example of Figure 1.1, node a received a lookup message for key k .
The key is outside node a’s coverage and furthermore, it doesn’t lie between the leftmost
node and the rightmost node of its leaf sets. Querying its routing table, node a finds
node b, whose identifier matches the longest prefix with the destination key and then
forwards the message to that node. Node b repeats the process and finally, the lookup
message is answered by node c, which is the closest node to the key k , i.e. it covers
key k . In this case, we say that node c delivers the lookup request for key k .
Result of This Thesis
This thesis separates different statuses (“dead”, “waiting”, “ok” and “ready”) of an
overlay node according to its stage during join and readiness for delivering a key. Only
“ready” nodes are supposed to have consistent key mapping among each other and
are allowed to deliver a message. This thesis defines the “dependable routing” as the
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correctness property CorrectDelivery , requiring that there is always at most one node
that can deliver a lookup request for a key. This property is non-trivial to obtain in the
presence of churn. Using formal method, this thesis proves that Correct Key Delivery
holds for all “ready” nodes under assumption that no nodes leave the network, despite
concurrent joins of new nodes in arbitrary region. The assumption is not further relaxed
due to possible separation of network problem caused by particular departure of nodes.
1.2 Methodology
Formal methods (Clarke and Wing (1996)) provide a systematic and rigorous way to
specify and verify the design of a software system. Using mathematics and logic ex-
pressions, they can reveal inconsistencies, ambiguities and incompleteness that are often
undetected by people writing the requirements. With the development of model checking
and automated theorem proving techniques which then improved the interactive theo-
rem proving method, it is now the time to benefit from their improved efficiency and
expressive power to see if it is now feasible to formally analyze a complex real world
distributed system such as Pastry.
Questions About Methodology
Besides the deeper understanding of Pastry, this thesis illustrates also how formal meth-
ods can be applied to analyze distributed systems beyond only finding bugs in abstract
toy examples:
• How to formally model Pastry? What is a proper abstract level of modeling?
• How to express the correctness properties of Pastry in TLA+? Is it at all feasible
to prove their invariance considering the intricacies of message interleaving and
complex data structures of Pastry, and how?
• To what extent can the formal verification of such a system be conducted auto-
matically?
Why TLA+
This thesis employs TLA+ by Lamport (2002) to analyze and verify the correct deliver-
ing and routing functionality of Pastry, because TLA+ provides a uniform logic frame-
work for specification, model-checking and theorem proving. Besides, it fits protocol
verification quite nicely, because its concept of actions matches the rule/message-based
definition of protocols.
TLA+ by Lamport (2002) is a high-level specification language that has been used
to specify and check the correctness of several hardware protocols, it is now widely
used for specifying and verifying concurrent and distributed algorithms. The necessary
foundations of TLA+ are introduced in Chapter 2.
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TLC, introduced in Yu et al. (1999) is the model checker implemented for TLA+
using explicit state exploration techniques to help finding errors in a TLA+ specification.
TLC is in particular helpful for validating TLA+ models for small finite instances, for
understanding the detailed behavior of the system modeled using TLA+, and for discov-
ering properties and, more frequently, non-properties as explained later in Chapter 5.
TLC can be launched either by command line on a server or within a user-friendly IDE,
the Toolbox, which integrate an editor for writing TLA+ and relevant languages for
modeling algorithm and its tools such as TLC to debug the model. A first version of
Toolbox for TLA+ based on Eclipse2 was released in February 2010.
TLA+ contains a declarative language for writing hierarchical proofs. Its syntax and
semantics are explained in detail in Chaudhuri et al. (2010) and Cousineau et al. (2012).
An example of a proof in TLA+ is illustrated at the end of Chapter 6 to demonstrate
its syntax and usage for proving Pastry.
TLAPS in Lamport (2012a) is an interactive theorem proving system for deductively
verifying properties of TLA+ specifications and automatically checking TLA+ proofs.
It is built around a Proof Manager (PM) to interpret this proof language, to expand the
necessary module and operator definitions, to generate corresponding proof obligations,
and to pass them to back-end automated verifiers. The initially supported back-ends
are the tableau prover ZENON (Bonichon et al. (2007)) and ISABELLE/TLA+, an
axiomatization of TLA+ in ISABELLE/pure (Wenzel et al. (2008)). Since 2012, SMT
back-end is also available by TLAPS to launch SMT solvers, such as Yices (Dutertre and
De Moura (2006)), CVC3 (Barrett and Tinelli (2007)) and Z3 (De Moura and Bjørner
(2008)).
TLA+ fits protocol verification quite nicely, because its concept of actions matches
the rule/message-based definition of protocols. Besides, the specification language is
straightforward to understand with basic mathematics and classical first-order-logic.
Furthermore, the convenient toolbox available in Lamport (2012a) includes now both
the TLC model checker and the TLAPS PM. Therefore, this thesis uses TLA+ to
specify a distributed system, to analyze its properties and to verify its correctness.
The TLA+ Framework for Verification
Figure 1.2 illustrates the complete process of this framework which includes modeling,
model checking and theorem proving.
Starting with an informal description of a distributed system, the first task is to
model the requirements, data structures, behavior and environment of the system to
the TLA+ model. This thesis distinguishes different kinds of TLA+ model as proper-
ties that specifies requirements using logic formula, the static model that defines the
data structures using the TLA+ primitives such as arrays, lists, functions and records,
and the dynamic model that describes the behavior using actions of TLA+. In this
thesis, environment of the system corresponds to assumptions; they are formulated and
implemented as preconditions of the actions in the model.
2www.eclipse.org
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Informal Description
Modeling in TLA+
Static
model
Properties
Dynamic
model
Counter
Examples
Model Checking
using TLC
Valid in
small instances
Theorem Proving
using TLAPS
Relax
Assumptions
Proof
Figure 1.2: Verification approach using TLA+.
Using TLC to debug and validate this model is an iterative process coming as
the next step. Model analysis helps to discover unexpected corner cases to improve
the model and validation ensures that the system has at least some useful executions,
e.g., accessibility properties are model-checked by checking that the negation is false.
Note that only a restricted number of instances can be verified using TLC in order to
avoid the state explosion problem. By counterexamples, the model will be analyzed
and reformulated. By successful validation or no counterexamples after running it for
considerably long time, the model will then be verified by TLA+ proofs.
The proof for distributed systems typically contains an induction part, where in-
variants need to be found and formulated. The model checker can be applied again to
debug the formulation errors or discover invalid hypothetical invariants in a early stage.
Usually the invariant is extended during the process of being proved. TLAPS is used to
write the proof manually and sometimes break it down into small enough pieces so that
it can be checked automatically using back-end prover. The final verification result is a
TLA+ proof, of which each proof step is automatically verified using TLAPS.
1.3 The Story of Verifying Pastry
This section gives a general overview of the challenges encountered and lessons learned
throughout this thesis.
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The analysis of Pastry starts with modeling the static and dynamic behavior of
Pastry. The formal model of Pastry, CastroPastry based on Castro et al. (2004),
is analyzed using model checker TLC and improved to the formal model Haeberlen-
Pastry inspired by Haeberlen et al. (2005). In order to verify that Pastry conforms
CorrectDelivery in arbitrary number of instances, TLAPS is used for theorem proving
approach. The Pastry protocol is first verified in version IdealPastry with two strong
assumptions that (1) no concurrent joins occur in the coverage regions among a “ready”
node and its neighbors and (2) no nodes leave the network. The assumptions are relaxed
by version LuPastry to the assumption that no nodes leave the network. Based this
assumption, LuPastry is also verified using TLAPS. All the different versions of Pastry
are validated to be able to perform successful lookup and join.
The algorithms, problems and improvements of Pastry are explained in detail in
Chapter 3. Different challenges are confronted during these approaches, which are sum-
marized here as a story of verifying Pastry. The results are then unfolded in later
Chapters of the thesis in detail.
1.3.1 Challenges of Modeling CastroPastry and HaeberlenPastry
The first challenge was to determine an appropriate level of abstraction. For example,
time thresholds are used to restrict the waiting time for a reply in a network protocol
such as Pastry, so that a node can assume the loss of message and repeat the request or
suspect the other side to be faulty. In order to simplify the formal model for tractability
of model checking, timing-dependent actions are represented in TLA+ as occurring non-
deterministically. However, details of sending and receiving messages together with the
necessary message content cannot be abstracted away due to the analysis on the effect
of all possible message interleaving in a network.
The second challenge was to fill in unstated details in the description of the Pastry
algorithm, based on the counterexamples revealed by model checking. For instance, it
was not explicitly stated what it means for a local data structure to be “complete”,
which is crucial for a node to decide if it can proceed to the next stage of join.
Explicit assumptions are made on how corner cases should be handled, sometimes
based on an exploration of the source code of FreePastry (2009). For example, the leaf
sets of a node can be overlapping and not complete if there is only one node on the
network. No specific description can be found in Castro et al. (2004). Thus, precise def-
inition of completeness of leaf sets is formally defined together with rigorous description
of handling the corner cases. In other cases, different models are established describing
alternatives based on different assumptions that appeared reasonable.
A further challenge was to formulate the correctness properties themselves because
they are not explicitly stated in Castro et al. (2004). A notion of nodes being “ready”
is introduced to distinguish nodes with a consistent local view of the distributed hash
table from those without. Therefore, only “ready” nodes handle lookup messages. The
mainly focused correctness property CorrectDelivery states that the lookup message
for a particular key is always answered by the numerically closest “ready” node. This
property is expressed as a temporal formula in TLA+.
7
1 Introduction
The model checker TLC was employed to help debug and improve the model
CastroPastry. The formal model with some model checking examples are published
in Lu et al. (2010). The pseudocode of CastroPastry with filled details is illustrated
in Section 3.1.3 and its formal model is available online at VeriDis (2013).
1.3.2 Model Checking CastroPastry and HaeberlenPastry
After modeling Pastry in TLA+ as CastroPastry based on Castro et al. (2004), the
model checker TLC is applied to analyze the properties of it, which gives more insights
of Pastry.
A counterexample of CastroPastry is discovered by TLC which violates the de-
sired property CorrectDelivery . In that case, two nodes joining concurrently between
two “ready” nodes fail to know each other by the end of the join process. More details
of the counterexample can be found in Section 3.2.1.
An obvious reason is the interleaving of the messages exchanging local states of
nodes, which is inevitable for a distributed system. A solution inspired by Haeberlen
et al. (2005) and FreePastry (2009) is to extend the join protocol with further sub-
protocol that includes a confirmation of neighborhood by lease granting process, which
leads to the Pastry model HaeberlenPastry, explained in detail in Section 3.2.2. The
formal model of HaeberlenPastry is available online at VeriDis (2013).
Similar to the counterexample of CastroPastry discussed above, several other
counterexamples are discovered automatically through model checking CastroPastry
and HaeberlenPastry using TLC, which guides the improvements of the Pastry mod-
els. The analysis and improvements of join protocol of Pastry is explained in Section 3.2.
Further details of model checking analysis are shown in Chapter 5.
1.3.3 Reduction Proof
After the model checker cannot find any more counterexamples on analyzing Haeberlen-
Pastry with four nodes for a day, enough confidence is gained to move on to see if the
correctness can be proved for arbitrary number of nodes thoroughly. This is achieved by
theorem proving using the proof language of TLA+ and the interactive theorem prover
TLAPS, a platform for the development and verifications of TLA+ proofs. A first result
published in ? reduces the global Pastry correctness property CorrectDelivery to the
invariants of the underlying data structures of Pastry (Section 6.1).
1.3.4 Design and Modeling IdealPastry
Further analysis of the counterexample of CastroPastry leads to the discovery of
the crucial reason for the violation discussed above: the design decision of exchanging
updated information rather than “outdated” one. Since a node only improves its local
state with the knowledge from the received message during an action, the update of this
local state does not bring new information back to the sender of the message, but may
erase some useful one previously stored there. Hence, a solution to this problem is to
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send back the previous state of the node in reply to the received message, introduced in
Section 3.2.4.
Anyway, the lease granting protocol of HaeberlenPastry has been shown to be
necessary to prevent the problem of ignored “ok” nodes, where node completes the
probing process with help of joining nodes, but without being added into the closest
“ready” node. More details are illustrated in Section 3.2.4.
Combining all improvements from model checking approach, the formal model Ideal-
Pastry is designed and modeled in TLA+. The formal model is available online
at VeriDis (2013).
IdealPastry assumes no concurrent join between two “ready” nodes close to each
other. This assumption is realized by blocking the node from receiving further join
request when it starts handling a join requests from nearby node. The blocking node
also “block” its neighbors such that no join requests can be handled by them either.
Since blocking other nodes needs network communication, this version describes only an
abstract and ideal protocol, which needs to solve further problem by realization.
1.3.5 Validation of IdealPastry
The formal model IdealPastry is validated using TLC and the result can be found
on the Web together with the model in VeriDis (2013). Here the validation ensures that
the system has at least some useful executions. For instance, accessibility properties are
model-checked by checking that the negation is false.
1.3.6 Verification of IdealPastry
IdealPastry is verified through the inductive proof of invariants, under the assumption
that no nodes leave the network and no concurrent join occur within the coverage region
of a “ready” node and its direct neighbors.
The most subtle part of the verification approach is the search for an appropriate
inductive invariant which implies the required property and is inductively preserved by
all possible actions. The search is guided by the construction of the proof, where TLC
is used to discover the unexpected violations of hypothetical invariant in a earlier stage.
More precisely, the following challenges are confronted during the proof of inductive
invariants.
Firstly, Lemmas on the static data structure must be carefully separated from in-
variants of the dynamic behavior of the system. Since the model that Pastry implements
contains many complex data structures such as ring, leaf set and routing table with com-
plicated operators, properties of these data structures and operators are proved aside
from the induction proof, in order to leave the induction proof with more focus on the
dynamic aspect. The separation relies on checking if a formula only talks about an in-
stance of data structure or about a state variable, which implements a data structure.
For example, a property states that adding a new node into a leaf set can only make the
direct neighbor of that node become closer to it. Although this property talks about the
modification of a leaf set, it does not talk about the leaf set of a particular node in a
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state, therefore, this is only a lemma about the leaf set data structure, not an invariant.
Another property states that if a node i is a member of the leaf set of another node j ,
which is not currently helping i to join, then the leaf set of the node i is not empty. This
property is then an invariant, because the emptiness of a leaf set of a particular node is
a dynamic property.
Secondly, it is subtle to find the appropriate generalization of invariants, which needs
to be inductively proved throughout the transition system modeling Pastry algorithm.
In fact, the set of invariants can only be finalized together with their proofs, because new
ones might be discovered by proving some corner case of one particular invariant. A proof
sketch for the complete invariant proof must be conducted a priori to make the global
picture clear, such that one does not get lost in the formulation details. Corner cases
and counterexamples may help to construct the invariant. Using model checker is not
enough, because one important corner case was discovered manually during the search
for invariants. This counterexample violating the correctness property CorrectDelivery
only occurs when more than five nodes are involved and three of them are concurrently
joining with specific positions on the ring. More details are explained in Section 6.4.2.
Thirdly, it is not trivial to find the appropriate proof arguments, including necessary
lemmas and previous proof results. Many “obvious” steps with implicit logical reasoning
for a human become a complicated proof with explicit enumeration of trivial but neces-
sary lemmas. Sometimes, there are indeed important flaws in proof sketch that need to
be taken care of. In this case, new proof sketch needs to be constructed. There can be
even errors in the proof, which lead to reconstruction of the proof, or even modification
of the invariant. For this reason, an automated back-end theorem prover plays a crucial
role to aid the construction and verification of the proof. The prover can sometimes be
unable to prove certain obligations, which must then be broken down in an additional
level of interaction.
In the end, a complete proof was constructed in TLA+ proof language consisting
of about 10000 proof steps, which are interactively checked in time by using TLAPS
launching different back-end automated theorem provers. More details are explained in
Section 6.3.
1.3.7 Relaxing the Assumptions
A counterexample of CorrectDelivery of IdealPastry is discovered manually when the
assumption of concurrent join is relaxed. More precisely, when three or more nodes with
particular identifiers join simultaneously into the network, a newly joined “ready” node
may be ignored by the nearby “ready” nodes. More details are explained in Section 6.4.2.
The assumption that no nodes leave the network cannot be relaxed due to net-
work separation when particular nodes in the important position in the network departs
simultaneously. More details are explained in Section 6.4.1.
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1.3.8 Design and Modeling of LuPastry
The analysis of the concurrent join problem leads to an improved design of Pastry,
LuPastry, in which a “ready” node adds the joining node directly when it receives the
join request and the “ready” node does not accept any new join request until it gets the
confirmation that the current joining node is “ready”. The formal model of LuPastry
is shown in Chapter 4.
1.3.9 Validation of LuPastry
LuPastry is validated using TLC and the results are summarized in Table 5.3.
1.3.10 Verification of LuPastry
LuPastry is also verified to conform to the desired property CorrectDelivery under the
assumption that no nodes leave the network. Its invariants are introduced in Section 6.5.
It is not easy to adapt the proof from IdealPastry to LuPastry. TLAPS has a
command for status checking, which shows which steps have been broken by a change.
However, TLAPS cannot automatically recheck the proof by one click. It reports failures
at many places, which then need to be carefully analyzed. Details of modification of the
Proof and Invariants are explained in Section 6.4.4.
An example of proof in TLA+ is illustrated at the end of Chapter 6, in order to
explain its syntax and usage. The complete formal proof is too large to be included in
the thesis and therefore put on the Web in VeriDis (2013).
1.4 Contributions of the Thesis
This thesis has mainly contributed in analyzing and improving a real world DHT algo-
rithm Pastry, and demonstrating and extending the usage of formal methods of verifi-
cation of distributed algorithms. This section summarizes these contributions which are
in fact all mentioned in the previous sections.
• The Pastry algorithm of Castro et al. (2004) is formally modeled on the message
exchange level in CastroPastry (Section 3.1.3), which is the first formal model
of such a complex real world P2P algorithm. Its improved version of Haeberlen
et al. (2005) is also formally modeled as HaeberlenPastry.
• A correctness property of Pastry is identified and formulated as CorrectDelivery
(Section 4.3.2), stating that there is at most one node responsible for delivering a
key.
• The join protocol of Pastry is intensively analyzed and violations of CorrectDe-
livery in CastroPastry and HaeberlenPastry are discovered and analyzed
(Sections 3.2 and 5.2).
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• HaeberlenPastry, IdealPastry and LuPastry assign different statuses (“dead”,
“waiting”, “ok” and “ready”) to an overlay node according to its stage during join
and readiness for delivering a key (Section 3.3.2). Only “ready” nodes are sup-
posed to have consistent key mapping with each other and are allowed to deliver
a message.
• IdealPastry summarizes the improvements based on analysis of CastroPastry
and HaeberlenPastry and it is verified against the property CorrectDelivery
through inductive proof of invariants, under the assumption that no nodes leave
the network and no concurrent joins occur within the coverage region of a “ready”
node and its direct neighbors.
• A formal specification of Pastry algorithm LuPastry (introduced in pseudocode
in Section 3.3.3) is designed based on IdealPastry. The improvement is that
a “ready” node adds the joining node as soon as it receives the join request and
does not accept any new join request until it gets the confirmation that the current
joining node is “ready”. LuPastry is proved to be correct w.r.t. CorrectDelivery
under the assumption that no nodes leave the network. The relevant invariants are
introduced in Section 6.5. The safety property CorrectDelivery cannot be proved
under any more relaxed assumption, due to possible counterexamples caused by
network separation when particular nodes simultaneously leave the network.
• The model checker TLC is intensively used on analyzing and validating the Pastry
models with three, four or five nodes. Simplified versions are designed to overcome
the state explosion problem. Together with analysis details, best practices and
experiences of using TLC are provided in Section 5.
• The interactive theorem prover TLAPS is used to complete the formal proof of
IdealPastry and LuPastry that they conform to the property CorrectDelivery
all the time. The proof serves at the same time as evidence of correctness of the
formal model w.r.t. the verified property CorrectDelivery as well as a real world
example demonstrating the possibility of using TLAPS for a large scale proof
consisting of more than 10,000 proof steps.
• The case study proving that the protocols IdealPastry and LuPastry conform
to CorrectDelivery gives evidence of possibility and the way to manually conduct
the proof of a complex transition system for its correctness property. Chapter 6
introduces this approach showing step by step to what extent the assumptions hold
and how the proof is completed.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides some necessary background on
structured P2P systems and formal verification as preliminaries for understanding the
rest.
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In Chapter 3, Pastry is explained on the design level, from CastroPastry based
on Castro et al. (2004) using pseudocode, to HaeberlenPastry inspired by Haeberlen
et al. (2005) using flow charts, to IdealPastry as a first verified model and finally to
LuPastry together with pseudocode and some introduction of its proof.
Chapter 4 represents the formal model of LuPastry together with the desired
properties. Chapter 5 illustrates how model checker TLC is employed to analyze the
correctness property, with selected counterexamples which are explained in detail. It
also gives the validation results of model checking. Chapter 6 explains the theorem
proving approach for analyzing HaeberlenPastry and LuPastry and the verification
approach to IdealPastry and LuPastry.
In Chapter 7, other systems realizing P2P are introduced and other formal ver-
ification approaches on network protocols are compared with the work of this thesis.
Chapter 8 summarizes the thesis with its contribution and gives an outline of possible
further research.
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2 Foundations
2.1 Peer-to-peer System
In recent decades, the concept peer-to-peer (P2P) and its supporting techniques and
services on the Web have brought about an evolution in the usage of the Internet.
Compared to Client/Server systems, a P2P system has a low barrier to deployment, large
scalability of participating nodes, and resilience to faults and attacks. These properties
lead to a wide application of P2P systems in current information and communication
technologies.
Above all, P2P systems (Schollmeier (2001), Oram (2001)) are widely used for
sharing resources. Napster1 was the first successful business to use a P2P system for
sharing music, with a central web page maintaining the entries. In contrast to Napster,
Gnutella (Chawathe et al. (2003)) has no centralized components operated by any
single entity. Subsequently, P2P services such as BitTorrent (Cohen (2003)) gained
the most popularity for allowing downloads of bulk data.
P2P techniques have also raised a huge challenge to traditional TV and movie indus-
tries with media streaming by PPTV2 and PPStream3. The Chinese company Xun-
Lei4 has combined bulk data downloading with media streaming to provide a wide range
of services to more than 80 million users. According to Commission (2012), EU-funded
research is helping content providers stream video to millions of viewers simultaneously
using a fraction of the bandwidth of traditional methods.
There has been debate over changes brought to the Internet by P2P systems. On
the one hand, legal issues including copyright infringement and child exploitation cause
many countries to restrict the use of P2P services. On the other hand, the P2P con-
cept is supported with the argumentation that it can protect personal data, since users
store their private data only on their local computer and share the data only in prede-
fined circles, as implemented in Diaspora5 and then also adopted by Google+6 (Boeing
(2012)).
Besides the challenges from legal issues, P2P systems may offer new opportunities
and at the same time face new challenges surveyed in (Fersi et al. (2013)), especially when
combined with mobile networks and wireless sensor networks, due to their promising
scalability and self-stabilization.
1http://www.napster.de/
2http://www.pptv.com
3http://www.pps.tv
4http://www.xunlei.com
5http://diasporaproject.org/
6http://plus.google.com
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Other applications of P2P systems include Dynamo (DeCandia et al. (2007)), used
internally by Amazon for many of its services and applications. Dynamo provides a
storage substrate using distributed hash tables (DHT) which will be explained later.
At present, one of the most successful applications of P2P is Skype (Microsoft
(2013)), one of the largest voice-over-IP service providers. According to Gillett (2012),
Skype is privileged to “serve 250 million active users each month and support 115
billion minutes of person to person live communications in a quarter alone”. Its super-
node mechanism gained attention after an outage of the service on December 23, 2010,
when millions of users could not make phone calls according to marketerterryb (2010).
Different possible reasons for this disruption are discussed in York (2010) and Heichler
and Newman (2010). However, it remains unclear what the real reason was for the
unavailability or why the subsequent huge numbers of log-ins made the system unstable
for such a long time. This outage together with the one in Arak (2007) motivated this
thesis to formally analyze and verify the correctness of P2P network protocols, with a
particular focus on churn, i.e. concurrent joining and departure of peer nodes.
2.1.1 History, Concept and Definition
The idea of using the P2P concept to share files and resources can be traced back to
the emergence of the Internet in late 60s, since the goal of the original ARPANET was
to integrate different kinds of existing networks in such a way as to allow every host
to exchange information equally. In addition, peer-to-peer file sharing can also find its
implementation in the still used Domain Name System (DNS), initially designed in 1982
to share the file hosts.txt.
With the development of the World Wide Web, which promotes intensive use of
web browsers, HTTP protocol and Client/Server architecture, and the business models
provided by ADSL and cable modems, users of the Internet have become more familiar
with browsing and downloading than exchanging information with others on the network.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, peer-to-peer applications like Napster,
BitTorrent, PPTV and Skype have become popular due to the heavy load on servers
of streaming data for billions of users.
Schollmeier (2001) in the first international conference on peer-to-peer computing
defined peer-to-peer as follows:
“A distributed network architecture may be called a Peer-to-Peer (P-to-P,
P2P, . . . ) network, if the participants share a part of their own hardware re-
sources (processing prower, storage capacity, network link capacity, printers,
. . . ). These shared resources are necessary to provide the service and content
offered by the network (e.g. file sharing or shared workspaces for collabora-
tion). They are accessible by other peers directly, without passing through
intermediary entities. The participants of such a network are thus resource
(service and content) providers as well as resource (service and content) re-
questors (server-concept).”
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This definition can be interpreted as a comprehensive introduction to P2P systems
in the early 21st century, with its most popular applications to file, hardware and service
sharing.
In Oram (2001), a P2P system is defined as:
“A self-organizing system of equal, autonomous entities (peers)”, which
“aims for the shared usage of distributed resources in a networked environ-
ment avoiding central services.”
This definition gives the essence of P2P system: self-organization and decentraliza-
tion, later refined in Steinmetz (2005).
2.1.2 Classification
P2P systems are always compared with Client/Server distributed systems due to their
opposite focus and topologies. In a Client/Server architecture, a server stands in the
middle and provides resources to all of the clients. Clients are not aware of each other.
In contrast to Client/Server system, P2P systems allow the peers to communicate
with each other. However, according to the degree of centralization, they are further
classified into two categories: hybrid systems and pure P2P systems.
In pure P2P systems, all peers are equal and exchange information and resources
cooperatively rather than being coordinated. Pure P2P systems can again be further
classified into unstructured and structured systems as shown in the ontology in Fig-
ure 2.1.
Networks
Client/Server P2P Systems
Hybrid P2P Systems Pure P2P Systems
Unstructured Structured
Figure 2.1: Ontology of networks.
In contrast to an unstructured P2P system, where nodes are connected in an ad-
hoc way without any regulation, a structured P2P system normally relies on a virtual
ring structure, where the identifiers of the nodes are ordered and nodes maintain their
connections with their virtual neighbors according to their numerical identifiers. Hence
“unstructured overlays are good at finding ‘hay’, while structured overlays are good at
finding ‘needles”’, as pointed out by Rodrigues and Druschel (2010).
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A hybrid P2P system is a compromise between Client/Server and a pure P2P
system. It preserves the servers to some extent (some are called Super Nodes), so that
they still stand in the middle of many peers to coordinate them, mainly helping them
find each other, whereas the real communication and content exchange happens among
the peers without intermediation from the server.
Since this thesis focuses on Pastry, a structured P2P system, the following sections
give more details about this type. Comparison with other types will be summarized in
Section 7.1. Other classifications with different perspectives and degrees of detail can be
found in Milojicic et al. (2002), Androutsellis-Theotokis and Spinellis (2004) and Risson
and Moors (2006).
2.1.3 Structured Decentralized System and DHT
Structured overlays provide efficient search (routing) functionality due to their structured
identifier space and distributed data structures, which are also called distributed hash
tables (DHTs), that provide data-centric routing, as discussed in Hellerstein (2003).
DHTs are designed to allow requests for a key to be correctly routed to the machine
(referred to as a node) currently managing the value associated with the key, under
the assumption that no global knowledge is available, nor permanent assignment of the
mapping of keys to nodes.
Nodes in the DHT are assigned unique identifiers in a large numeric key space, say
from 0 to 2M − 1, where 2M is the capacity of the network. Such M can be chosen to be
arbitrarily large in order to provide scalability. It is assumed that the nodes are assigned
fairly and randomly enough (e.g. uniform distribution) with the identifiers from that
space. The basic idea, as pointed out in Rodrigues and Druschel (2010), is to use a
specific structure such that the identifier of a node determines its position within that
structure and constrains its connections to other nodes.
Identifiers are used as addresses of nodes in the network as well as keys of the
distributed content, which are divided by the participating nodes which take respon-
sibility for the keys, such that the mapping from keys to nodes is a total functional
mapping. This functional mapping is called a placement function in Rodrigues and Dr-
uschel (2010). The DHT has the same put/get interface as a conventional hash table,
whereas the key/value pairs are distributed among the participating nodes in the struc-
tured overlay using a simple placement function. For example, a key can be mapped to
the node whose identifier is the key’s closest counter-clockwise successor in the key space.
In this case the key space is interpreted to be a ring (i.e. the identifier zero succeeds the
highest identifier from the space) to avoid the case that a key might be greater than all
node addresses.
Various routing algorithms realize DHT , such as CAN by Ratnasamy et al. (2001),
Tapestry by Zhao et al. (2004), Chord by Stoica et al. (2001) and Pastry by Rowstron and
Druschel (2001). The algorithms have been introduced and compared in Androutsellis-
Theotokis and Spinellis (2004) and Risson and Moors (2006). According to Hellerstein
(2003), they all have the following properties:
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• Small numbers of neighbors (low degree)
Each node maintains information about the number of its neighbors. Typically this
number is M = log(2M ), where 2M is the capacity of the key space as mentioned
before, meaning that up to M update messages need to be sent upon arrival and
departure of any node among the M nodes previously maintained by the node.
• Converging routes
Each node should be able to find the appropriate next hop autonomously based on
the locally maintained information (e.g. the neighbors) without help from other
nodes. Moreover, the next hop should be always closer to the key than the current
node.
• Minimal route hops (low diameter)
The number of routing steps is not linear but logarithmic in the number of nodes on
the ring, typically M = log(2M ). For example, a node n receives the route request
for a given key k and produces a route via a sequence of nodes whose identifiers
share increasingly longer prefixes with the key. When the request lands at a node
r , determined to be responsible for the target key according to its knowledge of
neighboring nodes, then the request is answered by node r directly to node n. An
example of such a routing algorithm, Pastry Castro et al. (2004), will be illustrated
in detail in Figure 3.2 in Section 3.1.
• Resilience to churn (robustness)
Churn refers to frequent arrival and departure of nodes. In the context of DHT ,
resilience against churn is crucial for making robust and reliable P2P systems.
From the static point of view (without consideration of churns), all the DHTs
with logarithmic degree (number of neighbors maintained by each node) and di-
ameter (number of hops to find a key) w.r.t. total identifier space have comparable
“dependability”. In other words, they have more or less on the same level of ro-
bustness of routing according to Loguinov et al. (2003) and Gummadi et al. (2003).
From the dynamic perspective, DHT dependability is sensitive to the underlying
overlay maintenance algorithms. Risson and Moors (2006) compares different ways
of handling DHT primitives of nodes (join, departure, maintenance, gossip, route
etc.) and categorizes them based on the comparison. A conclusion of Rhea et al.
(2003) claims that existing DHT systems suffer from high churn rates, which is
refuted by Castro et al. (2004) by showing that the implementation MSPastry pro-
vides consistent joining and maintains dependability by continuous detection and
repair.
Although DHTs facilitate finding the needle in a structured network, there are
also drawbacks to these systems. First of all, DHT can only use key-based routing:
no advanced search criteria can be used, such as the conjunction of keywords used in
some unstructured P2P system. Besides, maintaining a correct DHT in a high-churn
environment is expensive due to network traffic and local updates. In some applications,
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finding the needles may not be worth the cost. For this reason, large data values are
typically not inserted directly into a DHT but linked by indirect pointers which are
inserted as the value corresponding to the hash key. In addition, many systems as
mentioned before use precise key-based routing on a DHT layer only for coordination,
and the dissemination of content is handled by other layers. Therefore, it would make
sense to implement Pastry on the super nodes of a hybrid system such as Skype.
2.2 Formal Verification
Together with the growth of hardware, software and Internet technologies in their scale,
functionality and ubiquitous application, the likelihood of subtle errors increases in-
evitably. Moreover, errors in critical systems may cost catastrophic loss of money, time
or even human lives, as pointed out in Clarke and Wing (1996). Web pages Neumann
(2013) and Dershowitz (2013) summarize those horror stories caused by software. Al-
though IT projects fail due to combinations of various reasons, “badly defined system
requirements”, “unmanaged risks” and “sloppy development practice” are three of the
most important listed in Charette (2005).
One way of avoiding such problems is to apply formal methods to specify and verify
the design of the software, as described in Clarke and Wing (1996). Use of formal meth-
ods does not guarantee correctness for all possible implementations. However, they can
greatly increase the understanding of a system by revealing inconsistencies, ambiguities,
and omissions that are often undetected by people writing the system requirements and
developing the system without regard for some sloppy risks. In fact, formal methods
are applied in various advanced industrial sectors, in particular in cost intensive or life
critical systems such as avionics, air traffic control and medical devices, as summarized
in Hinchey and Bowen (1999).
Formal verification in the context of software systems is similar to the concept used
in relation to hardware systems defined in Seger (1992). It can be understood as the act
of proving or disproving the intended correctness property of an algorithm underlying
a system with respect to a formal specification or an implementation, using formal
methods of mathematics. In the following, the basic taxonomies and relevant techniques
are discussed in detail.
2.2.1 Specification, Validation and Verification
The concepts specification, validation and verification (often referred to as SV&V) are
widely used in hardware and software verification communities as defined in IEEE (2011),
where executable code is verified against an abstract design specification.
Verification and validation can be distinguished by two questions as explained in Baier
et al. (2008). Verification is asking if we have made “the thing right”, i.e. does the prod-
uct conform to the desired requirements? Validation is asking if we are making “the right
thing”, i.e. if the product is adapted to the user’s actual needs. As pointed out in Baier
et al. (2008), validation amounts to judging “whether the formalized problem statement
(model + properties) is an adequate description of the actual verification problem”.
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The verification process consists of static (structural) and dynamic (behavioral)
aspects. For example, for a software product one can inspect the source code (static)
and run against specific test cases (dynamic). Validation is usually conducted only
dynamically, i.e. the product is analyzed by putting it through typical and atypical use
case scenarios.
The framework of the formal verification approach of this thesis is illustrated in
Figure 2.2. Generally speaking, formal verification is a complementary approach to the
design of a software system. Given a list of requirements the system is supposed to fulfill
and the predefined environment that the system is supposed to operate in, a designer
describes the basic components of a system and their internal and external behaviors.
In Figure 2.2, the system components (static) and their behaviors (dynamic) are mod-
eled as a formal specification, the environment as assumptions, and the requirements
as properties. The verification approach takes the formal model and assumptions as a
starting point and verifies that the properties hold for the model under the assumptions.
Modeling and validation as illustrated in Figure 2.2 are treated as complementary pro-
cesses. Validation takes a formal model as input and checks if it models the informal
description in terms of (its) intended functionality and properties.
Informal Formal
Requirements Properties
Environment Assumptions
System Model
modeling
validating
modeling
validating
modeling
validating
d
esign
ve
ri
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ti
on
Figure 2.2: Framework of formal verification.
In the context of this thesis where formal verification is applied on a P2P sys-
tem, these concepts (SV&V) play the same role. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, (formal)
model (or formal specification) refers to the formal description of the system including
the static model describing the data structures and the dynamic model describing the
behaviors. Formal verification starts with modeling. According to Clarke and Wing
(1996), modeling (or specification) is the process of “describing a system and its desired
properties using a language with a mathematically defined syntax and semantics”. The
formal specification of a P2P system is given in Chapter 4, together with its properties
describing the desired requirements of the system.
Formal validation in this thesis is conducted through model checking with con-
structed assertions of impossibility of desired functionalities of the system, such as lookup
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and join services of a key-based routing algorithm. By finding violations of these asser-
tions, the model checker shows that the formal model is able to “do the right thing”.
Formal verification in this thesis is carried out through both model checking analysis
and a theorem proving approach. The goal of model checking is to find possible evalu-
ations of the formal specification that violate the properties. Section 5.2 demonstrates
some counterexamples found through model checking. The theorem proving approach
aims to prove that the specification of the system does conform to the properties. Chap-
ter 6 describes the theorem proving approach to verifying a P2P system against its
safety properties. In contrast to model checking, a formal verification through theorem
proving is more rigorous and precise and usually covers all possible evaluations rather
than restricted instances. In the context of distributed systems, in particular P2P sys-
tems where an infinite transition system is used as a formal model, a theorem proving
approach is necessary because model checking is no longer feasible due to state explo-
sion, and is also challenging because the nature of message passing and distribution of
data makes the construction and proof of global invariants subtle. For this reason, the
following sections give some necessary background knowledge for better understanding
the model checking and theorem proving approaches used in this thesis.
2.2.2 Model Checking and Theorem Proving
Model checking and theorem proving are the two predominant methods of verification,
which “go one step beyond specification” (Clarke and Wing (1996)); they are used to
analyze a system for desired properties. In the following, their principles and selective
state-of-the-art approaches are introduced and a combined framework using TLA+ is
illustrated at the end as the methodology developed in this thesis to verify the P2P
system at hand.
Model Checking
According to Clarke and Wing (1996), model checking is a technique that relies on
building a finite model of a system and checking that a desired property holds in that
model via an exhaustive state space search that is guaranteed to terminate since the
model is finite. In the case of verification of distributed systems, the model can become
infinite but model checking techniques still find their application.
Relatively straightforward definitions of model checking are given in Clarke (2008)
and the book Grumberg and Veith (2008):
“ Let M be a Kripke structure (i.e. state-transition graph). Let f be a
formula of temporal logic (i.e. the specification). Find all states s of M such
that M , s |= f . ”
According to Baier et al. (2008), a typical model-checking process consists of three
phrases: modeling, running and analysis, as illustrated in Figure 2.3.
In the modeling process illustrated in Figure 2.3, informal descriptions of the require-
ments, environment and system are coded in a formal specification language suitable for
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Figure 2.3: The model checking process.
23
2 Foundations
mechanical model checking. The given system is typically modeled as a state-transition
system (or automaton) consisting of a set of states and a set of transitions. States com-
prise information about the current values of variables. Transitions describe how the
system evolves from one state to another.
Properties are typically modeled using temporal logic, a form of modal logic ex-
tending the traditional propositional logic with operators that refer to the behavior of
systems over time. As discussed in Lamport (1980), properties are typically modeled
by two kinds of temporal logic: linear-time logic (LTL) and branching-time logic (such
as computation tree logic, CTL, later generalized by Emerson and Halpern (1986) as
CTL*). Using either one of them, one can easily express the functional correctness
properties (i.e. “does the system ever / always do what it is supposed to do?”), reacha-
bility (i.e. “is it possible to end up in a deadlock state?”), safety properties (i.e. “nothing
bad ever happens”), and liveness (i.e. “something good will eventually happen”). Using
LTL one can further express the fairness property (i.e. “does an event occur repeatedly
under certain conditions?”). Using CTL one can further express the possibility of a
certain event occurring sometime in the future along some computation path. CTL* is
a logic that encompasses both CTL and LTL.
Running a model checker as illustrated in Figure 2.3 typically takes the state tran-
sition system M and a temporal formula f and determines whether the formula holds
for all states s (either reachable states in the case of CTL or all sequences of executions
in the case of LTL). If the formula is satisfied in every state by termination of the model
checking, then the next property can be checked. When all properties have been checked
the model is concluded to possess all desired properties.
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, on violation, the model checker typically provides a
counterexample which can then be analyzed and reproduced by simulation. The analysis
often leads to refinement of the model because the reason for this violation can be
modeling error, design error or property error according to Baier et al. (2008).
A modeling error may occur when the formal model does not really reflect the design.
Discovering a modeling error often improves our understanding of the design. Since the
model had to be refined, the verified properties on the erroneous model may no longer
be valid and the verification needs to be repeated.
Design error means that the counterexample corresponds to an intended run of the
algorithm (or system) but violates a desired property. In such case, the design needs
to be improved. The remodeled design will start a new modeling process, while the
previous model and properties can be partially preserved.
Sometimes a property error occurs when the formal property does not reflect the
informal requirement. In such case, only the corresponding property needs to be refor-
mulated. As a result of the model checking analysis presented in Chapter 5.2, only design
errors are reported and the other two types of error have already been corrected on the
way to the final model. During model checking one typically analyzes finite instances of
algorithms or systems, so even a successful run of the model checker does not mean that
the system is correct under all circumstances, but only in that particular instance.
If the model checking process exceeds the threshold of running time or memory,
usually due to state-space explosion, then the model checker is typically interrupted and
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the model is supposed to be reduced. A typical technique is Partial Order Reduction.
Partial order reduction is incorporated in different approaches, such as the stubborn sets
of Valmari (1991), persistent sets of Godefroid (1991), or ample sets of Peled (1994).
They differ in their actual details, but exploit independent events that are executed
concurrently. The idea is to execute only one sequence of independent events because
any other permutation would lead to the same overall result state. Two events are inde-
pendent if all permutations of their executions result in the same global state. Further
techniques can also be applied, such as abstraction in Clarke et al. (1994) or symmetry
reduction in Clarke et al. (1993), among others. Another approach to model checking is
the Symbolic Model Checking. Symbolic model checking, as shown in McMillan (1993),
is based on ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs), which provide a canonical form
for Boolean formulas that is often substantially more compact than conjunctive or dis-
junctive normal forms, and efficient algorithms have been developed to process them.
In order to overcome the exponential growth of BDDs, Biere et al. (1999) introduces
bounded model checking, which uses a propositional SAT solver in place of BDD ma-
nipulation techniques. As surveyed in Biere et al. (2003), bounded model checking is
widely perceived as a complementary technique to BDD-based model checking.
Grumberg and Veith (2008) collects the dominant developments in model check-
ing techniques through the 25 years till 2008. As pointed out in Baier et al. (2008),
“model checking is an effective technique to expose potential design errors”. The great
advantage of model checking is that the verification process is fully automatic and the
counterexamples are very useful for debugging purposes. Therefore, it is easy to un-
derstand, easy to integrate and hence widely adopted in industry. However it also has
many limitations. Its primary disadvantage is that it does not in general scale to large
systems due to its state-space explosion problem in state-exploration approach and it
can never check generalizations (i.e. systems with an arbitrary number of components,
or infinite-state systems) or reason about abstract data types. These drawbacks can be
compensated by theorem proving, which will be introduced in the next section.
Theorem Proving
As introduced in Clarke and Wing (1996), theorem proving is a technique by which both
the system and its desired properties are expressed as formulas in some mathematical
logic given by a formal system defining a set of axioms and a set of inference rules.
Theorem proving has already seen several decades of development alongside different
logics and their tools. Approaches vary not only in their choice among different classes of
logics, such as classical logics (including propositional logic, first-order logic and higher-
order logic) and modal logics (e.g. temporal logic, description logic, etc.) but also
in the homogeneous reasoning techniques applied on them. Only machine-assisted (or
automated) theorem proving approaches will be discussed in this thesis. According to the
degree of automation, automated theorem proving approaches can be further classified
as “interactive” or “fully automated”. Since the verification approach of this thesis is
based on first-order logic and set theory, only the relevant preliminaries are introduced
in this section and some introduction of temporal logic will be given together with TLA+
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in the next. Further details of theorem proving approaches together with their logical
foundations can be found in Fitting (1996) and Ben-Ari (2012).
The principle of applying methods of formal logic is to use unambiguous and precise
mathematical description to model an ideal world where truth is unqualified and “there
are no shades of grey”, as mentioned in Fitting (1996). In the logical model, reasoning
is carried out with sentences that are built up from primitive assertions about the world
using connectives like and (∧), or (∨), not (¬), implies (⇒), every (∀), some (∃), equals
(=) and so on to connect and construct the primitive assertions. Sentences are valid
if all interpretations are true. They are provable when “by logic alone” (i.e. purely
syntactically, without evaluation of any possible interpretation as semantics) they can
be derived from axioms by applying basic inference rules on this particular logic. The
derivation (proof) steps are also called logical consequences according to Fitting (1996).
The task of theorem proving is to find a proof (a sequence of logical consequences) of a
property, stated as a sentence g using the axioms of the system (the predefined set of
valid sentences S ), rules, and possibly derived definitions and intermediate lemmas as
arguments.
In a fully automated theorem proving approach, a proof procedure (Automated
Theorem Prover, ATP) typically proves a sentence if it finds the proof by mechanical
manipulation of the formulas. Depending on the logic applied, a proof procedure is
called sound by Fitting (1996) if it proves only valid sentences (i.e. if a proof is found
for sentence g , then g is valid) and complete if it proves every valid sentence (if the
sentence g is valid, the prover will find a proof).
Many of the state-of-the art first-order automated theorem provers are based on
superposition, a powerful extension of resolution techniques for first-order-logic with
heuristics such as ordering and selection. Superposition is explained in Bachmair et al.
(1992) and one of the most successful implementations is SPASS Weidenbach et al.
(2009), introduced in Weidenbach et al. (1996). For the time being, many first-order
ATPs such as Weidenbach et al. (2009), Schulz (2002), Riazanov and Voronkov (2001)
and Prevosto and Waldmann (2006) are based on this calculus.
Recently, the Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) approach described in Nieuwen-
huis et al. (2006) successfully combined first-order reasoning with decision procedures
for theories such as equality, integer and real arithmetic, arrays and bit-vectors. State-
of-the-art systems include Yices by Dutertre and De Moura (2006), CVC3 by Barrett
and Tinelli (2007) and Z3 by De Moura and Bjørner (2008).
The framework for using fully automated system provers for verification is in fact
more or less the same as model checking approach illustrated in Figure 2.3 with the model
checker itself replaced by an ATP. The process of interactive theorem proving is then
slightly different because it allows human guidance in the search for the proof. Figure 2.4
illustrates the framework employed by an interactive theorem prover to construct a
mechanically verified hierarchical proof. For each proof goal, an automatic step and a
human-interacting step are conducted consecutively.
An interactive proof process starts with manual construction of the proof, which
involves describing the proof goals g and providing their corresponding lemmas S that
are either proved or hypothetically assumed. Given the proof goals g and a set of lemmas
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Figure 2.4: The interactive theorem proving process.
S as prerequisites written in a compatible formal specification language, an ATP and/or
SMT solver can be launched as shown in Figure 2.4 to automatically deduce the proof
using the embedded rules or calculi implemented in these provers. Here the lemmas can
include axioms as well as derived formulas that can be applied to prove the current local
proof obligation (goal).
If the proof goal g is mechanically derivable from the set of lemmas S as illustrated
in Figure 2.4, the prover will reply with a proof verifying it. Then the next proof goal
can be processed.
On the one hand, first-order-logic is in general semi-decidable; on the other hand, the
theorems involved in the model make the problem more complex. Therefore, a threshold
proving time is set on launching the prover. In the event that no proof is found within this
limit, the input proof obligation, proof structure and supporting arguments (lemmas)
need to be analyzed.
Sometimes it is necessary to modify the lemmas, i.e. to add more lemmas or to make
some of the lemmas stronger or weaker. Afterward, the process shown in Figure 2.4 is
repeated.
Sometimes the search space is simply so large that it is hard for the theorem prover
to find the proof even if all needed lemmas are given. In this case, the proof goal will be
changed by breaking it down into sub-proof steps using different proof structures such
as case analysis, induction, backward reasoning or proof by contradiction. Then the
sub-proof steps are verified recursively using the same loop in Figure 2.4. Sometimes the
proof goal is invalid, normally discovered when the proof obligation has a very simple
structure and it is easy to construct a counter example manually. In this case, the proof
goal needs to be changed and the next proof sketch level needs to be modified, i.e. this
invalid proof goal cannot be used as a lemma for higher level proofs. New proof sketches
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are designed and corresponding sub-proof goals and lemmas are again to be verified
using the same loop in Figure 2.4. The last two cases are summarized in Figure 2.4 by
change the proof goal step.
Most interactive theorem proving (ITP) systems are based on higher-order-logic
(HOL). State-of-the-art ITPs based on HOL include ISABELLE, introduced in Paulson
(1989) and Nipkow et al. (2002), as well as Coq , introduced in Bertot and Caste´ran
(2004).
Other ITPs based on first-order-logic with set theory include TLAPS, the proof
system of TLA+, which will be introduced in more details in the next section.
2.3 TLA+ Specification Language
TLA+, by Lamport (2002), is a formal specification language based on untyped Zermelo-
Fraenkel (ZF) set theory with choice for specifying data structures, and on the Temporal
Logic of Actions (TLA) for describing dynamic system behavior. Chapter 4 demonstrates
the usage of TLA+ as a formal specification language to specify a distributed algorithm.
A summary of all language constructs of TLA+ can be found in Lamport (2000). This
section introduces only those parts of the TLA+ language needed to understand this
thesis. For more background on TLA+, it is recommended to read Lamport (2002),
Merz (2008) and Cousineau et al. (2012).
2.3.1 Constant Operators
Logic
First of all, TLA+ inherits the syntax and semantics of standard first-order logic. Ta-
ble 2.1 summarizes the syntax and the meaning. Here all the occurrences of x are bound
in the expression p. TLA+ requires that an identifier be declared or defined before it is
used, and that it cannot be reused, even as a bound variable, in its scope of validity.
boolean {true, false}
∧,∨,¬,⇒ and, or, not, implies
∀x : p for all interpretation of x , formula p holds
∃x : p there exists an interpretation of x , s.t. formula p holds
∀x ∈ S : p for all element x of set S , formula p holds
∃x ∈ S : p there exists an element x of set S , s.t. formula p holds
Table 2.1: Syntax of First-Order Logic in TLA+
Sets
Elementary set theory is based on a signature that consists of a single binary predicate
symbol ∈ and no function symbols. Nevertheless, TLA+ provides some syntactic sugar
for set expressions, operations and comparisons as summarized in Table 2.2.
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=, 6=, ⊆ equal, not equal, subset or equal
∈, /∈ a member of, not a member of
∪, ∩, \ union, intersection, set difference
{e1, . . . , en} Set consisting of elements ei
{x ∈ S : p} Set of elements x in S satisfying p
{e : x ∈ S} Set of elements e such that x in S
subset S Set of subsets (the power set) of S
Table 2.2: Syntax of Set Theory in TLA+
For a finite set S , TLA+ provides a standard module introducing the expression
Cardinality(S ) to denote the number of elements in S . The expression Cardinality(S )
is abbreviated to |S | in this thesis.
Naturals and Arithmetic
There are several standard modules written in TLA+ to provide the primitives of com-
mon modeling tasks. The standard module Naturals of the TLA+ library provides
operators representing natural numbers and arithmetic operators.
Table 2.3 summarizes the symbols and definitions in these modules. Here the vari-
ables a and b are natural numbers.
a + b, a − b, a ∗ b, ab binary operators plus, minus, multiplication and exponents
a < b, a ≤ b, a > b, a ≥ b binary comparisons
a..b {n ∈ N : a ≤ n ≤ b}
a%b a mod b, such that 0 ≤ a%b < b
a ÷ b division, such that a = b ∗ (a ÷ b) + (a%b)
Table 2.3: Syntax of Arithmetic in TLA+
Since the symbol ÷ is defined for Naturals and the symbol / (divisions) is defined
for Reals in TLA+, this thesis uses only ÷ for division as defined in Table 2.3.
The Choose Operator
TLA+ heavily relies on Hilbert’s choice operator. An expression choose x : p means
taking some arbitrary value x that makes the expression p true, or in other words,
satisfies the property p. If no such value exists, choose will simply pick an arbitrary
unspecified value. In practice, reasoning about expressions involving choose requires
proving that there exists some x satisfying p. Note that all occurrences of x in the
term p are bound. As syntactic sugar, the TLA+ expression choose x ∈ S : p means
choose x : (x ∈ S )∧p, which means take value x , which is at the same time an element
of S and satisfies the property p, if such a value exists.
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Functions
Besides set and logic operations, functions are a convenient way to represent different
kinds of data structures. In contrast to certain traditional constructions of functions
within set theory, which construct functions as special kinds of ordered pairs, TLA+
assumes functions to be primitive and assumes tuples to be a particular kind of function.
The application of function f to an expression e is written as f [e]. The set of
functions whose domain equals X and whose co-domain is a subset of Y is written as
[X → Y ]. The expression x ∈ domain f denotes that the element x is an instance of
the domain of the function f . The expression [x ∈ X 7→ e] denotes the function with
domain X that maps any x ∈ X to e; again, the variable x must not occur in X and
is bounded to e. In fact, this expression can be understood as the TLA+ syntax for a
lambda expression λx ∈ X : e.
TLA+ introduces the notation: [f except ![e1] = e2]. It means that the resulting
function, say fnew , is equal to the function f except at the point e1, where its value is
replaced with e2, namely fnew [e1] = e2. Here both e1 and e2 are expressions.
Tuples
A tuple is a function with domain 1..n, for some natural number n. Hence, the expression
〈e1, . . . , en〉 denotes the n-tuple whose i th component is ei . The function application e[i ]
here denotes the i th component of tuple e. The cross product of n sets S1 × · · · × Sn
represents the set of all tuples with i th component in Si .
String and Records
TLA+ provides records to facilitate access to components of tuples by giving them
“names” as strings. In fact, strings are defined as tuples of characters and records are
represented as functions whose domains are finite sets of strings. Since tuples, strings
and records are all based on functions, the update operation on functions can be applied
to them as well. Furthermore, TLA+ offers more abbreviations for record operations.
e.h denotes the h-component of record e. [h1 7→ ei , . . . , hn 7→ en ] denotes the record
whose hi component is ei . [h1 ∈ S1, . . . , hn ∈ Sn ] denotes the set of records with field
names hi and whose respective values are in Si .
2.3.2 Modules
For modeling large systems, specifications in TLA+ can be organized in separate modules.
A module is a basic unit of a TLA+ specification, which typically contains declarations,
definitions and assertions.
In TLA+, an identifier must be declared or defined before it is used, and it cannot
be reused, even as a bound variable, in its scope of validity. Every symbol must either
be a built-in operator of TLA+ (like ∈) or it must be declared or defined. The scope
of its validity is normally within the module, say M1, where it is defined, but it can be
extended to other modules, say M2, by declaration of that module using statements of
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the form extends M1 in the module M2. A module could also be an instantiation of
another module, but this feature is not used in this thesis. Form and details can be
found in Lamport (2002).
Declarations
A module may extend other modules, importing all their declarations and definitions,
constant parameters and variables. Constant parameters represent entities whose values
are fixed during system execution, although they are not defined in the module because
they may change from one system instance to the next. Note that there are no type
declarations because TLA+ is based on set theory and all values are sets.
Variable parameters represent entities whose values may change during system exe-
cution. They correspond to program variables in this sense.
A specification of a distributed system can be modularized to static and dynamic
modules. The static modules declare the constant parameters as primitive data struc-
tures. Then these static modules are extended to the dynamic modules where variable
parameters are declared.
Definitions
In TLA+, definitions are given in the form:
Op(arg1, . . . , argn)
∆
= exp
Here, Op is defined to be the operator such that Op(e1, . . . , en) equals exp, where
each argi is replaced by ei . In case no arguments are given, i.e. n = 0, it is written as
Op
∆
= exp. This shows the essence of a definition: it assigns an abbreviation (syntactic
sugar, synonym) to an expression, which will never change its meaning (semantics) in
any context. For example, x
∆
= a + b means that x is syntactic sugar for “sum of
a and b”. Therefore, the expression x ∗ c is equal to (a + b) ∗ c, instead of a + b ∗ c
(= a + (b ∗ c)).
For modeling distributed systems, complex data structures and their operators are
typically introduced using definitions without or with arguments respectively. Note that
argument argi is declared locally within the definition and its scope is only within exp.
Although definitions are used to define system operations in a way which appears
similar to common programming languages, these operations have no “side effects”, they
are all functional. In TLA+, a symbol or an identifier can only be declared or defined
once. From then on, it will never change its meaning. Therefore, TLA+ language is
more assertional than operational. From the programming language perspective, it is
declarative but not imperative.
Assertions
In TLA+, assertions include assumptions, lemmas and theorems. For modeling dis-
tributed systems, assumptions can be either explicitly stated or implicitly encoded as
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preconditions of the actions. The explicit way helps the model checker to constrain the
number of explorable states. The implicit way helps to give a more plausible implemen-
tation of the real system. Therefore, the thesis tries to avoid using explicit assertions
for assumptions.
Lemmas and theorems typically assert causal relationships between definitions. There
is no formal distinction in TLA+ between a system specification and a property: both
are expressed as formulas of temporal logic. Hence, asserting that specification S has
property F amounts to claiming validity of the implication S ⇒ F . In this thesis, lem-
mas and theorems are typically written in this form. The proof language of TLA+ also
introduces the notion of sequent for stating assertions, which will be introduced later.
2.3.3 Other TLA+ Syntax
TLA+ uses syntactic sugar to extend the primitive functionality, which facilitates the
readability, in particular for software engineers who are used to conventional program-
ming language.
if p then e1 else e2
The expression is equivalent to (p ∧ e1) ∨ (¬p ∧ e2)
let d1
∆
= e1 . . . dn
∆
= en in e
The expression let defines local operators, while in encloses the region where these
are used.
∧ p1
∧ ...
∧ pn
conjunctions and disjunctions∨ p1
∨ ...
∨ pn
Conjunctions and disjunctions in TLA+ typically start with a conjunction symbol
or disjunction symbol, which is in fact cruft in a conventional logical expression. But
this kind of expression gives a better overview of the hierarchical structure of the logical
formula. For example, instead of writing (d1 ∨ (b1 ∧ b2)) ∧ c1 ∧ c2, it is preferable in
TLA+ to use the following expression:
∧ ∨ d1
∨ ∧ b1
∧ b2
∧ c1
∧ c2
2.3.4 Transition System
A distributed system is typically specified as a transition system with initial state Init
and its transitions, which are called actions in TLA+.
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Variables
The variables for modeling a distributed system are typically defined as functions whose
domain are the processes (or nodes) of the system and values are the local instances of
specific data structures. Recall that TLA+ does not have types. Type invariants are
typically introduced with proofs. They normally have the following form:
TypeCorrectness
∆
= ∧ var1 ∈ [Node → S1]
∧ . . .
∧ varn ∈ [Node → Sn ]
Here vari is the variable name such that vars = 〈var1, . . . , varn〉. Node is typically the
data structure of distributed entities in the system. Si is the set of particular data
structures.
Different Levels of Formulas
In TLA+, formulas have different levels. A constant formula describes the properties of
constants and constant parameters but they do not contain state variables. For example,
I ∈ subset Nat is a constant formula assuming that I does not contain state variables,
which expresses that the data structure I is a subset of the natural numbers.
A state formula describes the properties of state variables. For example, x ∈ I
(where x is a state variable) is a state formula expressing that this variable is an instance
of the data structure I .
An action formula describes the changes of state variables after a transition. For ex-
ample, x ′ = x +1 is an action formula expressing that the state variable x is incremented
by 1 after this transition.
In an action formula, the primed variable refers to the variable after change and the
unprimed variable refers to its original value.
A temporal formula describes the properties of state variables throughout the se-
quence of executions of transitional actions. For example, (x ∈ I ) forms a temporal
formula out of a state formula, which states that x is always a member of I . [A]e
forms a temporal formula out of an action formula A, specifying that every transition
either satisfies the action formula A or leaves the expression e unchanged. The index
e is an expression stating the set of stuttering variables (whose values are not changed
by transition) if no actions are executed. Typically the e is a sequence of variables vars
such that vars = 〈var1, . . . , varn〉.
Initial States
The formula Init consists of the initial assignments of all variables, and typically takes
the following form.
Init
∆
= ∧ var1 = [d ∈ Node 7→ v1]
∧ . . .
∧ varn = [d ∈ Node 7→ vn ]
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Here the vari is the variable name such that vars = 〈var1, . . . , varn〉. The expression vi
in each assignment is the initial value for the particular variable.
Transition Rules as Actions
The formula Next defines the transition rule, which is typically a disjunction of all the
actions. Each action formula is a first-order formula containing unprimed as well as
primed occurrences of the state variables, which refer respectively to the values of these
variables in the states before and after the action.
An action for modeling distributed systems in TLA+ typically has the form:
ActionName(arg1, . . . , argm)
∆
= ∧ precondition
∧ var ′1 = [var1 except ![argi ] = v1]
∧ ...
∧ var ′k = [varn except ![argi ] = vk ]
∧ unchanged 〈vark+1, . . . , varn〉
An action may or may not have arguments which can be used only in the scope of its
definition. An action typically consists of conjunctions of formulas which have different
purposes. The formula preconditions can be a conjunction of several formulas, which
serve as preconditions for the action, or so-called enabling conditions.
The formulas below the enabling conditions are the post-conditions of the actions,
which define how state variables (vari , i from 1 to k) of the transition system are altered
using the update mechanism of function introduced before. Note that the value of the
variable is a function mapping each element of the domain to a certain value. The
mechanism changes the variables of only one element, argi , which is a parameter of the
action definition. The expression vi is the new functional value of that variable assigned
to that particular element argi .
Suppose the total number of variables is n, then the rest of the variables, which are
not modified by this action, should be summarized in unchanged 〈vark+1, . . . , varn〉,
which is shorthand for the formula 〈vark+1, . . . , varn〉′ = 〈vark+1, . . . , varn〉.
Note that making subsequent changes to a state variable in an action logically means
that this variable is equal to different values, which is obviously a false statement. A
false formula in an action which is a conjunction means that this action is in fact by
definition false and therefore will never be enabled. For this reason, modifications of
one variable are always defined using one statement as shown in the formula above.
Temporal Formulas
A specification of the system can be written in the form:
Init ∧[Next ]vars
This form of system specification is sufficient for specifying the safety part of a
system. The symbol  is a temporal operator meaning that the formula following it is
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“always” true, i.e. in all states of an infinite sequence of states. Here the overall formula
means that all runs start with a state that satisfies the initial condition Init , and that
every transition either does not change vars (defined as the tuple of all state variables:
vars
∆
= 〈var1, . . . , varn〉) or corresponds to a system transition as defined by Next . In
general, the index f of a formula [N ]f can be any state formula, not just a tuple of
variables. This is important for refinement proofs but not used in this thesis.
2.3.5 Property, Inductive Invariant and Proof
In TLA+, properties of a system (i.e. Prop) are also described as formulas. The state-
ment that a system has a property is expressed as theorem Spec ⇒ Prop and this
asserts that the implication is valid. This assertion is normally assigned a name, in
order to be referenced as a lemma in proof arguments. The names of such theorems,
invariants and lemmas do not have “arguments” because they have implicitly the com-
plete state variables as arguments. This thesis distinguishes system properties from data
structure properties. Data structure properties are normally facts (lemmas or theorems)
whose assertion is a constant formula, i.e. that does not contain state variables.
On the contrary, a system property describes the system behavior with respect to the
state variables. It can be a state property expressed by a state formula, which describes
particular relationships between different state variables in a state; it can be also a
temporal property expressed by a temporal formula. Temporal properties can express
safety or liveness property, but here in this thesis, only safety properties are considered.
A particular state formula
enabled A
for an action formula A is obtained by existential quantification over all primed state
variables occurring in A. It is true at a state s whenever there exists some successor
state t such that A can be executed at state s, which leads to state t , more precisely,
such that the action formula A holds when all unprimed state variables are evaluated at
state s and all primed state variables are evaluated at state t .
If a temporal operator  is added in front of a state formula p, it is turned into a
temporal formula. p means that the state formula p holds for all reachable states. In
such cases, property p is also called an invariant.
Invariants characterize the set of reachable states during system execution. In order
to prove p, for a state formula p, the invariant p must be preserved by every possible
system action. It is usually necessary to strengthen the assertion and find an “induction
hypothesis” that makes the proof go through. This idea is embodied in the following
invariant rule.
Init ⇒ Inv Inv ∧ [Next ]vars ⇒ Inv ′ Inv ⇒ p
Init ∧[Next ]vars ⇒ p Invariant Rule
Here Init stands for the initial state, Next is the disjunction of all actions. In order
to prove that the invariant p holds in all reachable states of the system starting from the
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initial state Init , it is sufficient to show that the initial state conforms to an inductive
invariant Inv and any system step (that either corresponds to action Next or does not
change the system variables vars) preserves Inv . The prime here stands for the primed
variable as introduced in the action formula. Besides, the invariant Inv implies p. The
subtle step is to find this inductive invariant Inv . Typically, inductive invariants contain
interesting “design” information about the model and represent the overall correctness
idea. This thesis will illustrate how inductive invariants can be discovered for a non-
trivial algorithm.
2.3.6 Basics of the TLA+ Proof Language
TLA+ uses different notions to construct the proof. In the following, the basic notions
are introduced via a simple proof of Cantor’s theorem.
Given the definitions
Range(f )
∆
= {f [x ] : x ∈ domain f }
Surj (f ,S )
∆
= S ⊆ Range(f )
of the range of a function and the notion of a function f being surjective for set S ,
Cantor’s theorem can be stated as
theorem Cantor
∆
= ∀S : ¬∃f ∈ [S → subset S ] : Surj (f , subset S )
Figure 2.5 shows a hierarchical proof of that theorem. Proof steps may have labels of
the form 〈d〉n, where d is the depth of the step and n is a freely chosen name (numbers
as in this example). The depth is also indicated by indentation in the presentation of
the proof. A proof can be conducted in different ways. In TLA+, users choose how to
decompose a proof, starting a new level of proof that ends with a qed step establishing
the assertion of the enclosing level. Assertions at the leaves of the proof tree are passed
to the automatic provers of TLAPS. Here in this example it proves by contradiction.
TLA+ uses sequent in the form of assume . . .prove . . . to describe the proof. Step
〈1〉1 reformulates Cantor’s theorem as a sequent that assumes existence of a surjective
function from S to subset S , in order to prove a contradiction. Step 〈1〉2 deduces the
assertion of the theorem from that sequent.
The level-2 proof starts by picking some such surjective function f and then shows
that it cannot be surjective. Hence 〈2〉3 deduces a contradiction. The main argument
of the proof is shown in the level-3 step, which defines the diagonal set D ⊆ S , which
by definition cannot be in the range of f .
The keywords obvious, by and def state that the proof step can be automatically
verified by the back-end prover either directly, or by using the lemmas listed after by
and unfolding the definitions listed after def.
An alternative to assume . . .prove . . . is to use suffices assume . . .prove . . . ,
which provides the backwards chaining proof tactic. In this example, using the latter
expression will lift the proofs on the level of 〈2〉 to sequential proof steps after 〈1〉1 in
order to decrease the depth of the proof tree.
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theorem Cantor
∆
= ∀S : ¬∃f ∈ [S → subset S ] : Surj (f , subset S )
proof
〈1〉1. assume new S ,
∃f ∈ [S → subset S ] : Surj (f , subset S )
prove false
〈2〉.pick f ∈ [S → subset S ] : Surj (f , subset S )
obvious
〈2〉2.¬Surj (f , subset S )
〈3〉1.define D ∆= {x ∈ S : x /∈ f [x ]}
〈3〉2.D ∈ subset S
obvious
〈3〉3.D /∈ Range(f )
by def Range
〈3〉4.qed by 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3 def Surj
〈2〉3.qed by 〈2〉2
〈1〉9.qed by 〈1〉1
Figure 2.5: Proof of Cantor’s Theorem in TLA+.
A skeleton TLA+ proof is shown in Section 6.6 to demonstrate how the constructs
are used for proving invariants. More details about the TLA+ proof language can be
found in Lamport (2012b) and Cousineau et al. (2012).
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3 Pastry Protocol
As introduced in Section 1.1, Pastry Rowstron and Druschel (2001) is an overlay network
protocol implementing a scalable distributed hash table on a ring structure, where an
active Pastry node is responsible to the keys numerically close to it. Since nodes can
dynamically and concurrently join as well as leave the network without notification, it
is not trivial to show the safety property CorrectDelivery , which states that there can
never be two different Pastry nodes that consider themselves responsible for any single
key.
This chapter illustrates the analysis of Pastry w.r.t. CorrectDelivery on an abstract
level for a network protocol designer to understand the existing problems and the way
to improve the network protocol through verification.
Section 3.1 explains the basic idea of Pastry, together with the algorithms in pseu-
docode. The pseudocode presents CastroPastry in an imperative way, which is an
improved version of Pastry in Castro et al. (2004) with some necessary details added
and bugs found during model validation fixed.
Section 3.2 focuses on analyzing the join protocol of Pastry, which is supposed to
maintain a consistent local view of each node, and at the same time route and eventu-
ally deliver a message, despite concurrent joining of nodes. The improvement of lease
granting protocol proposed by Haeberlen et al. (2005) is illustrated as flow charts and
model checked as part of another version of Pastry, the HaeberlenPastry. Unfortu-
nately, HaeberlenPastry cannot guarantee the safety property. More details of model
checking the safety properties and beyond will be illustrated later in Chapter 5.
After that, Section 3.3 presents the final version of Pastry, the LuPastry, which
solves all the problems discussed in Section 3.2, together with pseudocode in the same
notation as CastroPastry in Section 3.1 for a better comparison. The detailed formal
model of LuPastry will be illustrated in Chapter 4. LuPastry is formally verified
against the safety property CorrectDelivery , under the assumptions that no nodes leave
the network and an active node can help at most one node to join. Section 3.4 explains
the motivation for these assumptions. More details of the formal proof are found in
Chapter 6.
Finally, the contributions to the Pastry protocol are summarized in Section 3.5.
3.1 Algorithms of Pastry
3.1.1 Basic Idea of Pastry
Pastry (Rowstron and Druschel (2001); Castro et al. (2004); Haeberlen et al. (2005)) is
an overlay network protocol implementing distributed hash tables (DHTs). A network
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node in Pastry is assigned a logical identifier from an ID space (I ) of natural numbers in
the interval [0, 2M − 1] for some natural number M . The ID space constructs a virtual
ring topology, where the neighbors of a node are those with the numerically closest
Pastry identifiers. That is, 2M − 1 is the neighbor of 0. The IDs serve two purposes.
First, they are the logical network addresses of nodes. Second, they are the keys of the
hash table. In particular, an active node is responsible for delivering the keys that are
numerically close to its network ID, i.e. it provides primary storage for the hash table
entries associated with these keys. Key responsibility is divided equally according to the
distance between two neighbor nodes. If a node is responsible for a key, it is said to
cover the key.
The most important sub-protocols of Pastry are join and lookup. The join protocol
eventually adds a new node with an unused network ID to the ring. The lookup protocol
delivers the hash table entry for a given key. An important correctness property of Pastry
is CorrectDelivery , requiring that there is always at most one (active) node responsible
for a given key. Guaranteeing this property in the presence of spontaneous arrival and
departure of nodes is non-trivial. Nodes may concurrently join the network or simply
drop off, and Pastry is expected to be robust against such changes, i.e. churn. For this
reason, every node holds two leaf sets of size L containing its closest neighbors to either
side (L nodes to the left and L to the right). A node also holds the hash table content of
its leaf sets neighbors. If a node detects, e.g. by a ping, that one of its direct neighbors
dropped off, then the node takes actions to recover from this state. So the value of L is
relevant for the amount of “drop off” and the fault tolerance of the protocol.
The Routing Algorithm
A lookup request must be routed to the node responsible for the key. Routing using the
leaf sets of nodes is possible in principle, but results in a linear number of steps before
the responsible node receives the message. Therefore, on top of the leaf sets of a node
a routing table is implemented that enables routing in a number of steps logarithmic in
the size of the ring.
The routing table contains M ÷B rows and 2B columns, where M denotes the initial
cardinality of the identifier space of Pastry. B is a configurable parameter, defining the
base of the digits representing the identifier of a node. Node identifiers are thought of
as a sequence of digits with base 2B . The entry in row r and column c in the routing
table is either empty (null) or a node identifier, which shares its first r digits with the
node which this routing table belongs to, and whose (r + 1)th digit equals c. A more
detailed explanation of the structure of the routing table and its influence on efficient
routing can be found later in Section 4.1.3 or directly from Castro et al. (2004).
Pastry routes a message by forwarding it to nodes that match progressively longer
prefixes with the destination key. The routing mechanism is demonstrated here with an
example and will be explained in detail later in Section 3.1.3 with pseudocode.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the process of routing a message. Assume that there are 6
nodes in the ring: 1030, 1032, 1110, 2310, 3131 and 3200, located according to their
numerical order. The identifier 3203 in italics represents a key. The length of each
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side of the leaf sets is 1 (L = 1). All nodes are connected to their neighbors (solid
bidirectional arrows). The dotted arrow represents the route step. The white sectors
around 1032 and 3200 demonstrate the coverage ranges of these two nodes, which are
illustrated explicitly for later reference. Together with the figure, Table 3.1 illustrates
how the entries of the routing table of node 1032 should look, while Table 3.2 shows
an example of the routing table of node 1032. In all the examples, the base is set to 4
(B = 2) and the cardinality of the identifier space is 216.
0000 |3333
3203
3200
3131
2310
1110
1032
1030
Figure 3.1: Pastry routing example.
In this example, node 1032 receives a lookup message for the key 3203. It first checks
if it covers the key itself, so that it can answer the lookup request directly. Otherwise,
it checks if it is within its coverage, such that a member of its leaf set could deliver
it. As shown in Figure 3.1, the key 3203 lies outside the coverage of node 1032 and
furthermore, it does not lie between the leftmost node and the rightmost node of its leaf
sets, which are 1110 and 1030 respectively. The second step is to find the appropriate
next hop from the routing table entries that share one more digit with the key than the
node itself. Querying its routing table as shown in Table 3.2, node 1032 finds a more
distant node 3131, which shares one more digit with the key than itself, and forwards
the message to it. Node 3131 repeats the same steps and forwards the message to node
3200. Finally, the lookup message is answered by node 3200, which covers the key 3203.
In this case, node 3200 delivers the lookup request for the key 3203.
The Join Protocol in CastroPastry
In Figure 3.2 and later flowcharts, node shapes are used in their standard sense: a
rounded rectangle represents an action; a rhombus represents a decision; an ellipse rep-
resents a state, containing state variables with their values.
This flowchart presents the join protocol of CastroPastry, based on Rowstron
and Druschel (2001) and Castro et al. (2004). An inactive node j announces its interest
in joining the ring by performing the action Join(j , i). Action RouteJReq(i , j ) will then
route its join request to the closest active node k0 just like a “Lookup” message, via
intermediate nodes i , treating j as the key. Upon receiving a request in the form of
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0* 1* 2* 3*
10* 11* 12* 13*
100* 101* 102* 103*
1030 1031 1032 1033
Table 3.1: Mask of routing table of node 1032 in base 4 (B=2)
null 1032 2310 3131
1032 1110 null null
null null null 1032
null null 1032 null
Table 3.2: Example of routing table of node 1032 in base 4 (B=2)
activej = false
Join(j, i)
RouteJReq(i, j)
RecJReq(k0, j)
RecJReply(j)
RecProbe(k1, j) RecProbe(k2, j) RecProbe(kn , j)
RecPRply(j, k1) RecPRply(j, k2) RecPRply(j, kn)
repair(j)
leaf sets of j
is completed
activej = true
yes
no
Figure 3.2: Overview of the join protocol of CastroPastry.
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action RecJReq(k0, j ), node k0 replies to j with its current leaf sets to enable node j
to construct its own leaf sets. Then in action RecJReply(j ), node j probes all nodes
in its leaf sets in parallel, in order to confirm their presence on the ring. Receiving a
“ProbeReply” message, in action RecPRply(j ), signals to j that the corresponding node,
say k0, in its leaf sets received the “Probe” message from j in action RecProbe(k0), and
updated its local leaf sets with j . A “ProbeReply” or a “Probe” message contains the
updated leaf sets. Each time node j receives a “ProbeReply” message, it updates the
local information based on the received message and checks if there are outstanding
probes. If no outstanding probe exists anymore or a timeout occurs, it checks whether
its leaf sets are complete.1 If so, it finishes the join phase and it status active turns
to true. Otherwise, it repairs its leaf sets (see action repair(j )) by probing the most
distant nodes (leftmost and rightmost) in its leaf sets to get more nodes, retrying to
complete its leaf sets.
The system periodically triggers a process of constrained gossiping to detect faulty
neighbors. In the process, each node will probe nodes in its leaf sets to see if they are
still alive. When a node n leaves the network, other neighboring nodes, for example node
i , can detect its absence by invoking the function probe(i) periodically. If the probe is
not answered within the time threshold, it invokes the action TimeOut(i , j ) to repeat
probing several times. In case no reply comes back anymore, it starts to repair its leaf
sets. Message loss was not mentioned in Castro et al. (2004). Since it is not crucial for
the safety property, it is also assumed in CastroPastry that message loss is possible,
but no mechanism is especially designed to treat this kind of fault.
3.1.2 Notation
In the following, the algorithm of CastroPastry is illustrated with pseudocode, which
is also used as the notation for describing the improved proposal for solving the existing
problems of the original version.
The status of a node is described by the Boolean value active in CastroPastry
based on pseudocode in Castro et al. (2004), whereas intermediate statuses between
active and ¬active are introduced later in HaeberlenPastry based on description
in Haeberlen et al. (2005) and implementation in FreePastry (2009). The operations
on leaf sets and routing tables are mentioned on an abstract level without details. For
example, lseti .add({. . . }) means adding a set of nodes into the left and right leaf sets of
node i and keeping the closest L nodes on both sides as the new leaf set members. It
is important to understand how this operation is implemented in order to understand
whether the leaf sets of a node are complete. Therefore, more details in Section 3.2.4 will
be illustrated with a formal definition of this operation in Definition 4.1.2. Overloading
notation will be used. rtable will stand for a function giving the table entry rtable(r , c) in
row r and column c. Formulas involving operators ∪, ∩, \ (set minus), | . . . | (cardinality)
denote operations on these structures. The notation 〈“type”, . . . 〉 denotes a message of
some type.
1It is not defined in Castro et al. (2004) what it means for a leaf set to be complete. I interpret it as
the cardinality of both left and right leaf sets of a node being L.
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In the following pseudocode, the imperative commands within the procedure block
will be executed by node i only when the corresponding prerequisites stated as a boolean
expression after the keyword Require are fulfilled. Similar to the original pseudocode
represented in the paper Castro et al. (2004), here the algorithms can describe proac-
tive actions, (reactive) actions or auxiliary functions. Proactive actions are executed
when lookup or join services are required by the Pastry application (e.g. Lookup(i , k)
and Join(i , j )), or when Pastry nodes suspect other faulty nodes by periodic probing
(e.g. SuspectFaulty(i , j )). (Reactive) actions (e.g. RouteLookup(i)) are executed when
a node i receives a message. The auxiliary functions (e.g. probe(i , j )) are the sub-
procedures repeatedly called by different actions. They are explicitly described in order
to make the pseudocode concise and easy to understand. For simplicity, “send 〈m, j 〉”
denotes that the node executing the action sends the message m directly (without rout-
ing) to another node j . The function deliver(i , x , k) means a node i directly responds
to x ’s lookup request for k .
3.1.3 Pseudocode of CastroPastry
The overall state variables in the pseudocode of Castro et al. (2004) are lset for leaf sets
of nodes, active for the statuses of nodes, rtable for routing tables, probing for the set
of appending probes of nodes, failed for the set of known faulty nodes, and probe-retries
to remember the times of probing retries.
Note that the TLA+ model CastroPastry of this Pastry model differs in its rep-
resentations and also does not include probe-retries, because retries in the formal model
are abstracted as non-deterministic execution of actions. Instead, CastroPastry has
a state variable receivedMsgs to model the current message pool of the global network.
The following pseudocode represents Pastry model CastroPastry according to the
original algorithms from Castro et al. (2004). The formal model of CastroPastry is
not shown in the thesis but is available online at VeriDis (2013).
Algorithm 1 initiates the lookup protocol by sending a “Lookup” message to some
node i in the network, which node x got from the user operation.
Algorithm 1 Proactive Action: Lookup (i, x, k)
Require: Initiated by user operation at the user node x
1: procedure
2: send 〈〈“Lookup”, x , k〉, i〉
3: end procedure
The action RouteLookup(i , k) in Algorithm 2 calls the auxiliary function route to
handle a received “Lookup” message.
Algorithm 3 illustrates in detail how node i routes the received message m to the
node responsible for the key k . Algorithm 4 is an explicit description of a sub-procedure
of Algorithm 3, which focuses on how a node delivers the message.
In each routing step (see Algorithm 3), a node first checks if the key lies within its
leaf sets range, i.e. k lies between the leftmost node and rightmost node of the leaf sets
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Algorithm 2 Action: RouteLookup (i, k)
Require: Node i receives 〈“Lookup”, x , k〉
1: procedure
2: route(〈“Lookup”, x , k〉, k , i)
3: end procedure
Algorithm 3 Auxiliary Function: route(m, k , i) from Castro et al. (2004)
Require: Called by Action RouteLookup(i , j ) and RouteJReq(i , j )
1: procedure
2: if k between lseti .leftmost and lseti .rightmost then
3: next := pick j ∈ lseti such that |k − j | is minimal
4: else
5: r := shared -prefix -length(k , i)
6: c := r -th-digit(k)
7: if rtablei(r , c) = null then
8: next := pick j ∈ lseti ∪ rtablei : |k − j | < |k − i |
9: ∧shared -prefix -length(k , j ) ≥ r
10: else
11: next := rtablei(r , c)
12: end if
13: end if
14: if next 6= i ∧ next 6= null then
15: send 〈m,next〉
16: else
17: receive-root(m, k , i)
18: end if
19: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Auxiliary Function: receive-root(〈“Lookup”, x , k〉, k , i) from Castro et al.
(2004)
Require: activei (Called by Auxiliary Function route(m, k , i))
1: procedure
2: deliveri(m, k)
3: end procedure
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of node i (line 2). In this case, the next hop is to the closest node to the key k chosen
from the leaf sets (line 3). Otherwise, it first calculates the length of the prefix match
between the key k and node i (line 5). Then, it chooses from Ri , the routing table of
node i , the entry in row r and column c (which is returned as a value from the function
r -th-digit(k) in line 6). The entry in this position has the property that it shares with
the key a prefix that is at least one digit longer than the prefix that the key shares with
the present node’s identifier, because the routing table is constructed specifically to serve
this purpose.
If no node is known in this entry (next = null in line 7), the next hop is set to be a
node from either routing table or leaf set, whose identifier shares a prefix with the key
as long as the current node, but is numerically closer to the key than the present node’s
identifier (line 8). In the end, if the next hop is not the node itself and not null , then
the message is forwarded to that node, otherwise it executes the procedure receive-root
(Algorithm 4). In this procedure, the node delivers the message if it is active.
When a new node wants to join the network it invokes the action Join(j , i) in
Algorithm 5, whereby it sends a “JoinRequest” message to some node in the network.
The new node initially gets a nearby Pastry node i as given by a user operation.
Algorithm 5 Proactive Action: Join (j, i)
Require: Initiated by user operation at node j with given initial node i
1: procedure
2: send 〈〈“JoinRequest”, {}, j 〉, i〉
3: end procedure
The node i receives the “JoinRequest” message and routes it to its destination node
j (see Algorithm 6) by sending it on the appropriate next hop. The routing continues
until the message reaches the nearest node to j . Along the way, each node adds the
contents of their routing tables into the message’s routing table (line 2 of Algorithm 6).
In response to the “JoinRequest” in action RecJReq(i) in Algorithm 7, the active
root node i (the nearest active node to j ) adds its own leaf set state for j to the message
and returns a “JoinReply”. An inactive node receiving such a “JoinRequest” message
will simply do nothing and wait until it becomes active to handle the queued messages.
Algorithm 6 Action: RouteJReq (i, j)
Require: Node i receives 〈“JoinRequest”, rtable, j 〉
1: procedure
2: rtable.add(rtablei)
3: route(〈“JoinRequest”, rtable, j 〉, j , i)
4: end procedure
The node j receives a “JoinReply” message in action RecJReply(j ) in Algorithm 8.
It updates its routing table with the node identifiers from the gathered routing table and
the leaf sets. Meanwhile, it builds up its leaf sets with the leaf set identifiers from the
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Algorithm 7 Auxiliary Function: receive-root(〈“JoinRequest”, rtable, j 〉, j , i)
Require: activei (Called by Auxiliary Function route())
1: procedure
2: send 〈〈“JoinReply”, rtable, lseti〉, j 〉
3: end procedure
“JoinReply” message too, which includes the sender itself as part of its leaf set members.
Finally it probes its leaf set nodes .
Algorithm 8 Action: RecJReply (j)
Require: Node j receives 〈“JoinReply”, rtable, lset〉
1: procedure
2: rtablej .add(rtable ∪ lset)
3: lsetj .add(lset)
4: for all k ∈ lsetj do
5: probe(j , k)
6: end for
7: end procedure
In Algorithm 9, a node probes its leaf set members, which then reply with their leaf
sets in action RecProbe(i) (Algorithm 10). Initially, both probingj and failedj of a node
are empty. They will be extended as soon as probing messages are sent from j or node j
notices failure from some nodes, which will be shown later. As soon as i has completed
its leaf sets on both sides in action RecPRply (Algorithm 11), it has successfully joined
the network. Meanwhile, when a node probes its leaf set members, the leaf set members
will then probe their leaf set members, and so on. This triggers a chain of probing
processes to propagate the updated information (see Algorithms 9, 10, 11).
If the leaf sets are not complete but no new candidate members of the leaf sets are
currently being probed (lines 15 and 19 in Algorithm 11), the node invokes function
repair(j ) (Algorithm 12) to probe its leftmost and rightmost leaf set members in order
to get complete leaf sets. In Castro et al. (2004), the protocol implicitly assumes that
there are at least L+1 “ready” nodes on the ring. Because otherwise, nodes would never
have complete leaf sets and go into deadlock perpetually attempting to repair them.
In the actions RecProbe(i) and RecPRply(i), the failed nodes are also propagated as
described in Castro et al. (2004). A node will first check if the received failed nodes in its
leaf sets are really faulty by probing them (line 5-7 in both Algorithms 10 and 11) and at
the same time remove them from the leaf sets. In this case, the complete leaf sets of an
active node might become incomplete, which could lead to a situation of inconsistency.
This problem is solved in a later version of the actions RecProbe(i) and RecPRply(i)
(Algorithms 20 and 21), where the node does not remove any nodes from its leaf sets
when receiving “Probe” or “ProbeReply” messages.
The action SuspectFaulty(i ,n) in Algorithm 13 handles the case of node departure.
The node i periodically checks the liveness status of its leaf set members by invoking
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Algorithm 9 Auxiliary Function: probe (j, k)
Require: k /∈ probingj ∧ k /∈ failedj (Called by action RecJReply , RecProbe, RecPRply ,
repair and SuspectFaulty)
1: procedure
2: send 〈“Probe”, j , lsetj , failedj 〉 to k
3: probingj := probingj ∪ {k}
4: end procedure
Algorithm 10 Action: RecProbe (i)
Require: Node i receives 〈“Probe”, j , lset , failed〉
1: procedure
2: failedi := failedi \ {j}
3: lseti .add({j}) . here lseti may be changed
4: rtablei .add({j})
5: for all n ∈ (lseti ∩ failed) do
6: probe(i ,n)
7: end for
8: lseti .remove(failed)
9: lsetprime := lseti
10: lsetprime.add(lset \ failedi)
11: for all n ∈ (lsetprime \ lseti) do
12: probe(i ,n)
13: end for
14: send 〈“ProbeReply”, i , lseti , failedi〉 to j
15: end procedure
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Algorithm 11 Action: RecPRply (j)
Require: Node j receives 〈“ProbeReply”, i , lset , failed〉
1: procedure
2: failedj := failedj \ {i}
3: lsetj .add({i})
4: rtablej .add({i})
5: for all n ∈ (lsetj ∩ failed) do
6: probe(j ,n)
7: end for
8: lsetj .remove(failed)
9: lsetprime := lsetj
10: lsetprime.add(lset \ failedj )
11: for all n ∈ (lsetprime \ lsetj ) do
12: probe(j ,n)
13: end for
14: probingj := probingj \ {i}
15: if probingj = {} then
16: if lsetj .isComplete() then . both sides of leaf sets have L members
17: activej := true
18: failedj := {}
19: else
20: repair(j )
21: end if
22: end if
23: end procedure
Algorithm 12 Auxiliary Function: repair (j)
Require: Called by action RecPRply
1: procedure
2: if |lsetj .left | < L then
3: probe(j , lsetj .leftmost)
4: end if
5: if |lsetj .right | < L then
6: probe(j , lsetj .rightmost)
7: end if
8: end procedure
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the action SuspectFaulty(i ,n).
Algorithm 13 Proactive Action: SuspectFaulty (i, n)
Require: Initiated by node i periodically
1: procedure
2: probe(i ,n)
3: end procedure
The action TimeOut(i , j ) in Algorithm 14 is initiated when node i does not receive
the expected “ProbeReply” message from a particular node j it has probed within some
time limit. It first retries the node j several times (max -probe-retries). Finally, after
the failure of the last trial, node i removes node j from its leaf sets and routing table
and invokes Algorithm 12 to repair the leaf sets.
Algorithm 14 Proactive Action: TimeOut (i, j)
Require: Initiated by the timer at i for expected “ProbeReply” message from j
1: procedure
2: if probe-retriesi(j ) < max -probe-retries then
3: probe(i , j )
4: probe-retriesi(j ) := probe-retriesi(j ) + 1
5: else
6: lseti .remove(j )
7: rtablei .remove(j )
8: failedi := failedi ∪ {j}
9: probingi := probingi \ {j}
10: if probingi = {} then
11: if lseti .isComplete() then
12: statusi := “ready”
13: failedi := {}
14: else
15: repair(i)
16: end if
17: end if
18: end if
19: end procedure
3.2 The Join Protocol of Pastry
This section starts with a violation of the safety property CorrectDelivery of the join
protocol in CastroPastry according to Castro et al. (2004). Then, an extension of
this join protocol, HaeberlenPastry, is illustrated, which takes its inspiration from
the later publication Haeberlen et al. (2005) and the implementation FreePastry (2009).
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However, not all the problems are resolved by HaeberlenPastry. Enhancements
beyond HaeberlenPastry are explained in the last part of this section.
3.2.1 Concurrent Join Problem and CastroPastry
When verifying the CorrectDelivery property, the model checker produced a counterex-
ample, which is illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, and Table 3.3. In Figure 3.3, the arrows
represent neighbor-relationships between node pairs. For example, an arrow from b to
c means node b considers node c as its neighbor. According to the calculation of key
coverage of nodes, key responsibility is divided equally according to the distance between
two neighbor nodes. Therefore, the sector within the circle represents the coverage over-
lap of nodes a and b (lcb is the left bound of node b’s coverage w.r.t. its left neighbor
node c, and rca is the right bound of node a’s coverage w.r.t. its right neighbor node
d). Key k lies within this overlap and it will be shown in what follows how this state
of the system is reached from an initial state with just two active nodes c and d (see
Figure 3.3) that contain each other in their respective leaf sets (the actual size of the
leaf sets being 1). In Table 3.3, each row illustrates the leaf sets’ configuration following
the simultaneous execution of the actions illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Two nodes a and b concurrently join between nodes c and d . According to their
locations on the ring, the join request from node a is handled by node c, and the join
request from node b is handled by node d . Both nodes a and b learn about the presence
of c and d , and add them to their leaf sets, then send probe requests to both c and d
in order to update their leaf sets. Now, suppose that node d is the first node to handle
the probe message from node a, and that node c first handles the probe from node b.
Learning that a new node has joined, which is closer than the previous entry in the
respective leaf sets, nodes c and d update their leaf sets with b and a, respectively (cf.
Figure 3.4), and send these updated leaf sets to nodes b and a. Based on the reply
from node d , node a will not update its leaf sets because its closest left-hand neighbor
is still found to be c, while it learns no new information about the neighborhood to the
right. Similarly, node b maintains its leaf sets containing c and d . Now, the other probe
messages are handled. Consider node c receiving the probe message from a: it learns of
the existence of a new node to its right, which is closer to the one currently in its leaf
sets (node b) and therefore updates its leaf sets accordingly, then replies to a. However,
node a still does not learn about node b from this reply and its leaf sets remain c and
d . In spite of this incorrect information about neighborhood, node a becomes active.
Symmetrically, node d updates its leaf sets to contain b instead of a, but node b does
not learn about the presence of a, even though it also becomes active. In the end, the
leaf sets of the old nodes c and d are correct, but nodes a and b do not know about each
other and have incorrect entries in their leaf sets.
Eventually, a “Lookup” message arrives for key k (see Figure 3.3), which lies between
a and b, but closer to a. This lookup message may be routed to node b, which incorrectly
believes that it covers key k (since k is closer to b than to c, and b considers c as b’s
left-hand neighbor), and since it is already active, it delivers the key.
This counterexample shows that the join protocol may lead to inconsistent views
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a
b
c
d
k
lcb
rca
Figure 3.3: The ring configuration for the counterexample.
1 Join (a, c) Join (b, d)
2 RecJReply (c, a) RecJReply (d , b)
3 probe (a, c) probe (a, d) probe (b, c) probe (b, d)
4 RecProbe (d , a) RecProbe (c, b)
5 RecProbe (c, a) RecProbe (d , b)
6 RecPRply(a, c) RecPRply (a, d) RecPRply (b, c) RecPRply (b, d)
Lookup (d , d , k) Deliver (b, d , k)
Routing . . .
Figure 3.4: Counterexample leading to a violation of CorrectDelivery .
Row Action lseta lsetb lsetc lsetd
1 Join (a, c) || Join (b, d) N/A N/A {d} {c}
2 RecJReply (c, a) || RecJReply (d, b) {c, d} {c, d} {d} {c}
3 probe (a, c) || . . . || probe (b, d) {c, d} {c, d} {d, b} {c, a}
4 RecProbe (d, a) || RecProbe (c, b) {c, d} {c, d} {d, b} {c, a}
5 RecProbe (c, a) || RecProbe (d, b) {c, d} {c, d} {d, a} {c, b}
6 RecPRply (a, c) || . . . || RecPRply (b, d) {c, d} {c, d} {d, a} {c, b}
Table 3.3: Collision analysis of the leaf sets
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by active nodes of their neighborhoods on the ring, and therefore the protocol does not
guarantee CorrectDelivery .
3.2.2 Lease-Granting Protocol and HaeberlenPastry
Indeed, following the initial publication of Pastry, Haeberlen et al. (2005) presented a
refined description of Pastry’s join protocol, which repairs the problem illustrated in the
counterexample shown above. This improvement is modeled as HaeberlenPastry.
In contrast to the join protocol in CastroPastry, described in Section 3.1.1, the
refined join protocol in HaeberlenPastry requires an explicit “transfer of coverage”
from the active neighbor nodes before a joining node can become active and answer
lookup requests, which will be explained in what follows.
In fact, HaeberlenPastry is also inspired by the implementation in FreePastry
(2009), where leases expire periodically and are requested from the neighboring nodes.
HaeberlenPastry is not illustrated with pseudocode here, but its TLA+ code can be
found on the Web in VeriDis (2013). Instead, a final version of Pastry, LuPastry, will
be shown later in Section 3.3.3 with pseudocode.
leaf sets of j
is completed
statusj = “ok”
RequestLease(j )
RecLReq(ln, j ) RecLReq(rn, j )
RecLReply(j , ln) RecLReply(j , rn)
both granted?
statusj = “ready”
yes
yes
no
Figure 3.5: Extending the join protocol by lease granting.
Figure 3.5 depicts the extension to the join protocol as described in Section 3.1.1
(compare Figure 3.2). After node j has built complete leaf sets, it reaches an intermediate
status between active and inactive, which is modeled as a status “ok” in action RecPRply
(see also Algorithm 21). As soon as it becomes “ok”, it starts to request the leases from
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its direct neighbors by sending “LeaseRequest” messages to its neighbors ln and rn (the
two closest nodes in its current leaf sets), requesting a lease for the keys it covers. A
node receiving a lease request from another node that it considers to be its neighbor
grants the lease (see also Algorithm 23). Only when both neighbors grant the lease will
node j become active, modeled as “ready” in this and later models of Pastry (see also
Algorithm 24 for details).
From here on, state variable active is replaced with status, in order to maintain a
compatible notation of the statuses of a node. There are four different statuses of a node:
“dead”, “waiting”, “ok” and “ready”, where “dead” stands for inactive nodes as before,
“ready” stands for active nodes as before, “ok” is the intermediate status introduced by
HaeberlenPastry, and “waiting” is introduced to fill the gap for formal verification
purposes, to describe a node’s status when it starts to join and can route messages, but
is not yet “ok”. More details of statuses will be explained later in Section 3.3.2, when
the final model of Pastry is introduced.
The node j could have incomplete leases from both of its neighbors due to different
reasons:
• The “LeaseReply” message may still be on its way (delayed) or lost. In this case,
node i could invoke the action RequestLease after some time limit. to resend the
“LeaseRequest” message.
• The direct neighbor of node j considers some other freshly joined node as its direct
neighbor and therefore declines to grant the lease. In this case, the inconsistent
view of the neighborhood needs to be first fixed by having node j or its neighbors
invoke the action SuspectFaulty to probe each other and detect new nodes. Then
node j can send a “LeaseRequest” message to the correct direct neighbor, which
will then grant the leases. The “LeaseRequest” messages to the wrong neighbors
during the probing process will simply be ignored in action RecLReq .
In HaeberlenPastry, departure of nodes is handled together with the lease grant-
ing mechanism (see Figure 3.6). Starting from the top right of Figure 3.6, a “ready”
node periodically requests refreshed leases from its direct left and right neighbor, in
order to ensure the correctness of its neighborhood information. When a lease of one
of the neighbors (ln stands for left neighbor, rn stands for right neighbor in Figure 3.6)
expires, the node goes back to the status “ok” and requires a renewal of its lease from
that neighbor. When a node j detects another node n to be faulty and node j has probed
the node n several times without any success, then node j does not remove node n from
its leaf sets at once, neither does it report this failed node to its neighbors. Unlike in
Algorithm 14 (here a star * is added after the action name TimeOut in Figure 3.6), it
first checks if it still holds the grant of that node, in order to know if the lease of n has
expired. If not, it only marks node n as failed by adding it into the variable failedj ,
waits until the local grantj of the node n expires, which must happen after node n has
lost its lease of node j . Then node j declares node n to be “dead” and removes it from
its local leaf sets. After removal, it will try to repair its leaf sets by probing its farthest
remaining leaf set members to complete the leaf sets.
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statusj = “ready”
LeaseExp(i , ln|rn)
SuspectFaulty(j ,n) statusj = “ok”
TimeOut*(j ,n)
n ∈ granti repair(j)
lseti .remove(n) statusj = “waiting”
yes
no
Figure 3.6: Node departure handling.
3.2.3 Related Work on Pastry
Although the Pastry version published in Castro et al. (2004) and the later publica-
tion Haeberlen et al. (2005) are the major focus of this thesis, relevant publications
about Pastry are also explored to gain deeper understanding of the protocol.
The initial idea of the Pastry routing algorithm was published in Rowstron and
Druschel (2001), where the basic idea of using a virtual ring overlay is introduced. More
details are illustrated later in Castro et al. (2003). In addition, the paper Rowstron
and Druschel (2001) also illustrates how the routing can be performed efficiently, in a
logarithmic number of steps around a ring structure. This aspect is then explained in
detail in a later publication Caesar et al. (2006). Furthermore, the paper Rowstron
and Druschel (2001) introduced the leaf sets structure for a network node to maintain a
consistent local view of its neighboring nodes w.r.t. its Pastry identifier. The purpose of
this kind of data structure is to provide dependable routing; in other words, to provide
correct routing and prevent “routing anomalies”. A later publication Castro et al. (2004),
focuses more on dependability of routing.
As a first verification approach on such a real world complex overlay network pro-
tocol, the focus has been set to verifying its correctness property, rather than its perfor-
mance property. On the one hand, the evaluation results shown in Castro et al. (2003)
and Castro et al. (2004) for its performance are already promising. Besides, the adop-
tion of this kind of network protocol in various peer-to-peer applications affords a high
degree of confidence in its performance. On the other hand, applying formal methods to
problems relating to small distributed system is already a non-trivial research topic in
its own right. It is challenging enough to verify the correctness of such network protocols
with dynamic membership, even when real time and performance issues are abstracted
away.
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Focusing on the correctness property, the approach starts with the most rigorous
description of Pastry available to date which is the pseudocode illustrated in Castro
et al. (2004). This paper focuses more on the leaf sets data structure, which is called a
virtual neighbor set in Caesar et al. (2006). It will emerge later that this data structure
plays a dominant role of the correctness property of Pastry.
After modeling Pastry in TLA+ as CastroPastry and employing the TLC model
checker to find bugs, several problems with the consistency of Pastry were discovered as
illustrated later in Section 3.2.4. With all these open questions, discussions were held
with one of Pastry’s original designers, and another publication Haeberlen et al. (2005)
with many improvements towards consistency was pointed out.
To ensure greater security against path failure, in particular asymmetric connectivity
among nodes and network partition, the paper Haeberlen et al. (2005) has given a more
detailed description of the leaf sets. It assumes that each pair of leaf set members is
connected. Under this assumption, virtual links and route recovery are introduced to
update the one-way routing path from a node to its local leaf set nodes. Since the routing
path mechanism is beyond the scope of this thesis, and is not of the essence of virtual
ring overlay network protocols, no assumptions on the paths are made for the verified
Pastry model. The only interesting improvement relevant to the verification task of this
thesis is how the routing mechanism deals with the problems which arise when one node
has just joined the network while the other nodes are not yet aware of its presence. The
techniques used in Haeberlen et al. (2005) are periodic probing, maintaining a different
liveness status for each node locally in their leaf sets, and adding an additional key
coverage transfer protocol after a node has completed its join protocol.
The source code of FreePastry (2009) is also explored to see if and how different
techniques mentioned in Castro et al. (2004) and Haeberlen et al. (2005) are implemented
in real systems. In fact, the liveness check and key coverage agreement are implemented
by a periodic lease granting mechanism with expiring leases which represent how long
the current network node believes its local liveness statuses of other nodes. The periodic
lease requesting protocol is modeled with non-determinism as the enabling condition of
a TLA+ action, as formally illustrated in Definition 4.2.13 in Section 4.2.
3.2.4 Enhancements of the Protocol in IdealPastry and LuPastry
The lease granting protocol in HaeberlenPastry solves the problem described in Sec-
tion 3.2.1. But as discovered later during our theorem proving process, there is a more
efficient solution to the concurrent join problem shown before; moreover, there are other
problems that will be illustrated in this section, which the lease-granting protocol cannot
solve. In the following some of the problems and their solutions will be demonstrated on
an abstract level. More details about how the problems were detected will be illustrated
in Chapter 5.
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Unclear Completeness of Leaf Set
In both CastroPastry and HaeberlenPastry, checking the completeness of leaf
sets is a crucial step before a node upgrades its status. But after gaining a deeper
understanding of the protocol through formal verification, another problem occurred: it
turns out that it is not trivial for a node to decide whether its leaf sets are complete or not,
due to the fact that its left and right leaf sets might overlap even though the cardinality
of each set is already L, which is the maximal length of each leaf set. Furthermore, a
node might never upgrade its status at this step if less than L nodes are available (i.e.
not “dead”) on the entire ring.
To solve these two problems, checking the length of the leaf sets is abandoned as a
precondition for a status upgrade in IdealPastry and LuPastry. Instead, whether
the variable probing is empty becomes the sole focus of the check. This change makes
sense because on one hand, if probing is empty, all expected probing messages have been
answered and the node has no further new nodes to probe. Then the node should either
already have enough nodes in both its leaf sets, or there are less than L active nodes
in total on the ring. In both cases, the node should upgrade its status. On the other
hand, a node does need to check if there are any new candidates for its leaf sets before it
upgrades its status, even if it has already collected a sufficient number of them, in order
to ensure a more consistent local view of its neighborhood. This change is also preferable
because checking the emptiness of the variable probing relies only on the information a
node could obtain from the protocol, whereas checking completeness of leaf sets makes
the join protocol more vulnerable to the number of active nodes on the ring and the
parameter L.
Updated vs. Previous Leaf Set
Another possible solution to the concurrent join problem shown in Section 3.2.1 is to
reply with the previous leaf sets instead of the updated leaf sets (see Algorithm 10)
before adding the probing node. This improvement prevents the event that an incoming
“Probe” message should cause the recipient to remove a neighbor from its local leaf
set, and then also omit that neighbor in its reply to sender. Details of the solution
are described in Algorithm 20, which is also model checked (in Chapter 5) without any
further violation caused by the concurrent join problem. Hence this improvement is
adopted in IdealPastry and LuPastry.
Since the problem can be solved efficiently without the lease granting protocol as
shown above in Section 3.2.1, intuitively one would like to optimize away altogether the
lease granting protocol and the intermediate “ok” status. The following Section, 3.2.4,
shows that using the lease granting protocol to distinguish the status “ok” from “ready”
is crucial, because otherwise an “ok” (likewise a “ready”) node which has exhausted
all probings (i.e. it has no new node to probe) does not always have a key mapping
consistent with other such nodes. For this reason, the lease granting protocol is preserved
in IdealPastry and LuPastry.
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The Ignored “ok” Node
In Figure 3.7, there are four different nodes involved. Two nodes (kl , kr) try to join
between other “ready” nodes l and r . The node kl is closer to l and node kr is closer to
r . Assume that kl probes r after it got a “JoinReply” from node l , and then kr tries to
join through r . Then node kr might probe kl and r , becoming “ok”, while l still believes
r is its direct right neighbor. Now if node kr could skip the lease granting protocol and
directly become “ready”, it would have coverage conflict with node l for some region
between kl and kr .
“waiting”
“ok”
“ready”
“ready”
kl kr
l
r
Figure 3.7: The ignored “ok” node.
It is obvious that if kr has to run the lease granting protocol, it will never become
“ready” before node kl has become “ok”, as this relies on the “ProbeReply” message
from l to kl , which is sent only after l has handled the “Probe” message from kl . By
that time, kl should have replaced r in the right neighbors leaf set of l to prevent the
case demonstrated in Figure 3.7.
Rejoin Problem
When model checking the HaeberlenPastry with its mechanism for recovering from
node departure illustrated in Figure 3.6, the model checker TLC discovered a counterex-
ample. A short explanation will be provided here and more explanations will be given
in Chapter 5.
Initially, only node b is ready and all the other three nodes are dead. Nodes a,
c and d concurrently join around b. The “JoinReply” message sent from b to d is
delayed, while nodes a and c successfully stabilize their states via the consistent join
protocol and lease granting protocol. After the 3 nodes (a, b, c) have connected to each
other, node b leaves the network silently. By this time, the delayed message from the
previously “ready” node b to the awaiting node d is received by node d , leading node d
to believe that b was the only “ready” node in the network. So node d probes b. Node
b now rejoins the network by sending a “JoinRequest” message to node a. Then, node b
receives the probing message from d and replies to it because its status is now “waiting”.
The node d receives the “ProbeReply” message and hence becomes “ok”. Till now, none
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“ok”
“ready”“ready”
“ready” to “waiting”
a
b
c
d
Figure 3.8: Rejoin counterexample.
of the direct “ready” neighbors of d (nodes a and c) are aware of the node d . In case
message delay is allowed, b might no longer try to wait for a probe reply from a and
starts probing d to repair its leaf sets and these two nodes will stabilize themselves and
become “ready”. Hence, there is a separation in the network.
In this counterexample, a joining node waiting for a “JoinReply” message has
stopped waiting upon receiving a “Probe” message, which leads to completion of the
join process. A final fix in IdealPastry and LuPastry to prevent this case is to add
a precondition for handling any incoming “Probe” message, that only “ready” nodes or
nodes with non-empty leaf sets can receive a “Probe” message, as illustrated in Algo-
rithm 20.
The problems discussed above are found already with four nodes involved in the
network, more problems will occur when more nodes are involved as demonstrated in
the following examples.
Separation of Networks Due to Departure of Nodes
In order to relax the assumption that nodes do not leave the network, possible viola-
tions of CorrectDelivery is analyzed, which leads to the following counterexample and
motivates the preservation of this strong assumption.
Starting from the initial state that all nodes (a, b, c, d , e and f ) are “ready”, suppose
that two particular nodes a and d simultaneously leave the network. The neighboring
nodes detect faults by invoking the action SuspectFaulty(i , j ) and when the leases expire,
use action TimeOut(i , j ) to remove them from their leaf sets.
Subsequently, node c probes the only left leaf set member b and gets the “ProbeReply”
message to become “ok”. Respectively, node b probes c and also gets a “ProbeReply”
message from c, such that it believes b and c are the only nodes on the network and also
becomes “ok”. They can then grant each other and become “ready”. Simultaneously,
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“dead”
“ready”
“ready”
“ready” “ready”
“dead” 3 a
c b
d
e f
Figure 3.9: Separation of the network due to simultaneous departures of nodes.
nodes e and f complete the same process to build a separate network as illustrated in
Figure 3.9.
Hence, two separate networks exist on the ring, such that neither is aware of the
other. When a “Lookup” message comes to nodes c and e for looking up the key d ,
both of the actions Deliver(c, d) and Deliver(e, d) are enabled to deliver the “Lookup”
message.
This counterexample illustrates how network separation occurs when nodes in cer-
tain positions leave the network simultaneously, which is also mentioned in Haeberlen
et al. (2005). Since no solution is known which solves this problem thoroughly, the
repair protocols are no longer included among the possible actions as targets of verifica-
tion. Moreover, this counterexample motivates the assumption that no nodes leave the
network (Assumption 3.4.3) in LuPastry.
More Concurrent Join Nodes
As Section 3.2.2 introduced, the lease granting protocol of HaeberlenPastry does
not place any restriction on how many joining nodes a “ready” node can take care
of. Since the assumptions of IdealPastry disallow concurrent joins among nearby
“ready” nodes, this is not a problem. But as this assumption is relaxed in LuPastry,
the following counterexample will illustrate that the safety property CorrectDelivery can
be violated when more than two nodes concurrently join between neighboring “ready”
nodes, even without any node departure.
Assume the network contains five nodes l , s, ln, i , rn as shown in Figure 3.10. Both
nodes l and rn are initially “ready” nodes. All the rest are initially “dead”. The leaf
set length L is one, meaning each node has only one node in each of its left and right
leaf sets.
First, node s joined the network through node rn and received a “JoinReply” mes-
sage from node rn. But the probing message sent out from node s to node l was delayed:
only node rn received the “Probe” message from s. Node rn now has a new left neigh-
bor, node s. Then node ln joined the network through rn. It got a “JoinReply” message
from node rn containing node s. It probed both node s and node rn and became “ok”
after nodes s and rn replied to both “Probe” messages. Note that node s can reply
to such “Probe” messages when it is in state “waiting”. Now node i joins the network
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“ready”
“ready”
“ok”
“waiting”
“ready”
“dead” rn
i
ln
s
l
k
Figure 3.10: Concurrent join with 5 nodes.
through rn. It got a “JoinReply” message from node rn containing node ln. Then node
i probed nodes ln and rn and became “ok”. After that, node i requested the leases from
both its direct neighbors ln and rn. Finally, node i receives leases from both sides and
becomes “ready”.
Now node l still believes that there is only one “ready” node rn as its left and right
neighbor. There is a region covered by both ln and l . If then a “Lookup” message is
sent to node l , which looks up the key k within this region, then both node l and node
ln can deliver it.
In this counterexample, no node has left the network and only pure joining of nodes
is allowed. In conclusion, HaeberlenPastry cannot ensure the safety property Cor-
rectDelivery even without departure of nodes.
This problem is solved in LuPastry by restricting the number of concurrent joining
nodes that any “ready” node may allow at any given time. To implement this restriction,
the toj variable is introduced in the solution (see Algorithm 18), to keep track of whether
a “ready” node has replied to the “JoinRequest” message of a joining node, in order to
make sure that it can help at most one node to join at a time. If the “ready” node does
not have such a joining node assigned to it, this variable has the value of the “ready”
node’s own identifier.
A final solution of this problem is to allow nodes to add joining nodes to their leaf
sets on receiving a “JoinRequest”. The node should be in charge of only one node which
it is currently letting join. More detailed illustration of this kind of problem will be
shown in Chapter 5.
3.3 The Verified Pastry Join Protocol LuPastry
Starting from the analysis and discussion in Section 3.2.4, an improved consistent join
protocol IdealPastry has been developed and verified, assuming that no node leaves
the network and no concurrent join occurs in the region of nearby “ready” nodes. Details
of IdealPastry are explained in Section 6.3. After that, the assumptions are further
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relaxed to no departure of nodes and the protocol is improved to LuPastry.
This Section focuses on the introduction of the final version LuPastry. The parts
handling node departure are omitted, because only the verified protocol is demonstrated
and those parts of the protocol are not verified due to Assumption 3.4.3 that no node
leaves the network. The reason for making such an assumption is a long story, which
will be explained in Section 3.4. In the following, this final version of Pastry with all
improvements will be illustrated, much like the algorithms shown in Section 3.1.1. This
protocol can be directly implemented in any programming language. Later in Section 4,
this protocol will be described with more details in a formal language TLA+, to which
the verification approach in Chapter 6 will refer.
3.3.1 Introduction with Flow Chart and Running Example
Here the join process of the improved Pastry will be illustrated as a flow chart in Fig-
ure 3.11. The whole join process consists of three main steps: from “waiting” to “ok”,
from “ok” to “ready”, and the last announcement of being “ready”.
• The first step starts from the initial state, when a node is “waiting” and starts to
join the network. It describes how a node upgrades from “waiting” to “ok”. This
step implements the consistent join protocol described in CastroPastry, which
has already been illustrated in the flow chart shown in Figure 3.2. In this flow
chart, the state variable active is replaced with status to maintain compatibility
with HaeberlenPastry.
• The second step starts from the “ok” status of a node, and describes how it up-
grades to “ready”. This step implements the lease granting protocol developed
by HaeberlenPastry, which is also demonstrated in the flow chart shown in
Figure 3.5.
• In the last step, the newly joined node is completely “ready”, meaning fully-
functional in the sense of being capable of of executing all the actions other “ready”
nodes can perform. But it still needs to grant leases to its left and right neighbors
in order to inform them that it has become “ready” so that one of the neighbors
who has been helping it to join and blocking all other join requests can now release
the block and process further join requests.
In this final big picture, the relevant protocols for handling node departure illustrated
in Figure 3.6 are not included, because in the final verification protocol, node departure
is excluded by a strong system assumption. It is explained later in Chapter 6 how node
departure will destroy the desired property CorrectDelivery and why it is not possible
to work around this problem.
To better understand the complete join process of a node, a running example will
now be introduced (compare Table 3.4 and the sequence of the figures illustrated below).
In the running example, the routing table is ignored because it does not have any
effect on joining, as can be seen from Chapter 6. Therefore, only the variables with
altered values are demonstrated here. The variable toj is introduced as a solution to
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statusj = “waiting”
Join(j, seed)
RouteJReq(i, j)
RecJReq(i, j)
RecJReply(j)
RecProbe(k1, j) RecProbe(k2, j) RecProbe(kn , j)
RecPRply(j, k1) RecPRply(j, k2) RecPRply(j, kn)
repair(j)
leaf sets of j
is completed
statusj = “ok”
RequestLease(j )
RecLReq(ln, j ) RecLReq(rn, j )
RecLReply(j , ln) RecLReply(j , rn)
both granted?
statusj = “ready”
RecLReply (ln, j ) RecLReply (rn, j )
yesno
yes
no
Figure 3.11: Flow chart of complete join process of LuPastry.
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the concurrent join problem with five nodes illustrated in Figure 3.10. It is used to
keep track of whether a “ready” node has replied to any “JoinRequest” message (from
a joining node).
“ready” “dead”Initial Statea d “ready” “waiting”After Step 1a d
“ready” “waiting”After Step 2a d “ready” “waiting”After Step 3a d
“ready” “ok”After Step 5a d “ready” “ready”After Step 7a d
Figure 3.12: Join example: upgrades of the status.
Initially there is a single “ready” node a on the ring at Step 0 shown in Figure 3.12.
According to the assumption that a “ready” node can handle at most one joining node at
a time (derived by consideration of the concurrent join problem in the previous Section),
only one new node is able to join. In the following it will be illustrated how node d can
go through different statuses (“waiting”, “ok”, “ready”) and finally join the network.
Meanwhile, it is also shown how the status of a node affects its behavior.
Step 0 Initially as shown in Figure 3.12, node a is “ready” and d is “dead”. The leaf sets
and probing sets are all empty. Their toji point to themselves; their grants and
leases contain only themselves.
Step 1 The new node d joins by executing the action Join(d , a).
Step 2 Node a executes the action RecJReq(a). Routing is not applicable here because
there are no other nodes to route to and node a covers the whole ring.
It adds d into its leaf sets. Now its left and right neighbors are both node d . It
has now a node to join (toja := d) and sends a “JoinReply” message back to node
d containing its own previous leaf sets (the empty leaf sets).
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Step Actions lseta lsetd probingd granta grantd leasea leased toja
0 {} {} {} {a} {d} {a} {d} a
1 Join (d, a) {} {} {} {a} {d} {a} {d} a
2 RecJReq (a, d) {d} {} {} {a} {d} {a} {d} d
3 RecJReply (d, a) {d} {a} {a} {a} {d} {a} {d} d
4 RecProbe (a, d) {d} {a} {a} {a} {d} {a} {d} d
5 RecPRply (d, a) {d} {a} {} {a} {d} {a} {d} d
6 RecLReq (a, d) {d} {a} {} {a, d} {d} {a} {d} d
7 RecLReply (d, a) {d} {a} {} {a, d} {a, d} {a} {a, d} d
8 RecLReply (a, d) {d} {a} {} {a, d} {a, d} {a, d} {a, d} a
Table 3.4: State variables in the join example
Step 3 The node d executes action RecJReply(d).
It initiates its leaf sets with a as both its left and right neighbor. It probes a and
adds a to the probing set (probingd := {} ∪ {a}).
Step 4 The node a receives a “Probe” message from node d as precondition of action
RecProbe(a) and replies.
Step 5 Node d receives the reply from a’s reply in action RecPRply(d).
It deletes node a from its probing set, then it has no nodes to probe, and hence
becomes “ok”. Then node d sends a “LeaseRequest” to its left and right neighbors:
node a.
Step 6 Node a grants the lease in action RecLReq(a) (Algorithm 23).
Node a adds node d into its granted nodes (granta = {a, d}) and sends a “LeaseReply”
message back to d containing local leaf sets and a granting bit (isNeighbor =
true).
Step 7 Node d receives the “LeaseReply” from node a in action RecLReply(d).
It adds node a into its set of leases (leased = {a, d}) and then becomes “ready”.
From now on, the newly joined node d can deliver and answer “JoinRequest”
messages from other new nodes. But node a cannot reply to “JoinRequest” mes-
sages. Therefore, node d sends a “LeaseReply” to both of its neighbors (a) with
a granting bit (grant = true) and adds the neighbors to its set of granted nodes
(grantd = {a, d}).
Step 8 Node a receives a “LeaseReply” from node d in action RecLReply(a).
It adds d into its set of leases (leasea = {a, d}). It now sets the (state) variable toja
back to itself. From now on, the “ready” node a can again answer “JoinRequest”
messages from other nodes.
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3.3.2 Statuses of a Node
Together with the illustrated workflow in Section 3.3.1, I give more details of the statuses
of a node here: their prerequisites, applicable actions (compare the definitions of the
actions above) and invariants.
• The “dead” nodes
– All of its keys can be interpreted as “dead”. It turns from “dead” to “waiting”
when it is assigned to a node to join the network in action Join(j , i).
– As soon as a node leaves the network, its status turns to “dead”.
– A “dead” node can execute the action Join(j , i).
– All dead nodes have empty leaf sets.
• The “waiting” nodes
– A node can only becomes “waiting” in action Join(j , i) (compare Algorithm 15).
– As soon as a node has no more candidates in its leaf sets to probe and all
outstanding “Probe” messages have been answered, it turns from “waiting”
to “ok” in action RecPRply(j ). It turns from “waiting” to “dead” when it
leaves the network.
– During the time a node is “waiting”, it can handle “JoinReply” messages in
action RecJReply(i); it answers “Probe” messages in action RecProbe(i);or
handles “ProbeReply” messages in action RecPRply(i);
– For the “waiting” nodes we can state the following invariants:
∗ If there is only one “ready” or “ok” node i in the network, then all the
“waiting” nodes can only have themselves and node i in their leaf sets.
∗ The sender of any “JoinRequest” message must be of status “waiting”.
∗ The destination of any “JoinReply” message must be of status “waiting”.
• The “ok” nodes
– The status “ok” is the next stage after “waiting” in the consistent join pro-
tocol. A node turns to “ok” under the conditions described above in action
RecPRply(i).
– A node turns from “ok” to “ready” when it receives leases from both its left
and right neighbors in action RecLReply(i). It turns from “ok” to “dead”
when it leaves the network.
– Similar to “waiting” nodes, an “ok” node can answer a “Probe” messages in
action RecProbe(i) and handle “ProbeReply” messages in action RecPRply(i).
It can also request leases from its direct neighbors in action RequestLease(i),
answer a “LeaseRequest” message in action RecLReq(i) or handle a “LeaseReply”
message in action RecLReply(i).
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– For the nodes which are at the “ok” or “ready” stage of the joining process
we can state the following invariants:
∗ If a node i has granted another node j , then both of them must be either
“ok” or “ready”.
∗ The sender of “LeaseReply” messages is either “ok” or “ready”.
∗ The sender of “LeaseRequest” messages is either “ok” or “ready”.
∗ If there is more than one “ok” or “ready” node in the network, then they
must have different neighbors (meaning their leaf sets are not empty).
In case there is only one node in the network that is either “ok” or
“ready”, then that node must have empty leaf sets, all the “waiting”
nodes will have that node in their leaf sets. In that case no “ProbeReply”
or “LeaseReply” can occur. If there is a “Probe” message, its destination
must be that “ok” or “ready” node. If there is a “JoinReply” message,
the leaf sets sent within the message must be empty.
• The “ready” nodes
– A node can only become “ready” in action RecLReply ,by which an “ok” node
receives leases from both its left and right neighbors.
– A “ready” node can execute all the actions that “ok” nodes can execute.
Furthermore, it can deliver a “Lookup” messages in action RouteLookup(i)
and answer a “JoinRequest” messages in action RecJReq(i).
– The following invariants are relevant only for “ready” nodes:
∗ There is no “ready” node between a “ready” node and its immediate
neighbor.
∗ Only “ready” nodes can let other nodes join.
∗ If a “ready” node i covers the identifier of another node k , then no other
node j has allowed that node k to join through j .
∗ Given a “JoinReply” message to node j , there can never be a “ready”
node between the initial left and right neighbors of node j , after it has
used the received leaf sets to built up its own leaf sets.
∗ If a “LeaseReply” message is sent by a node that has joined through
the destination of the “LeaseReply” message, then the sender must be
“ready”.
∗ The sender of a “JoinReply” message must be “ready”.
3.3.3 Pseudocode of LuPastry
The same variables lset , rtable, probing and failed are used as in Section 3.1.3. The
variable active is replaced with status as introduced in Section 3.2.2 and explained in
Section 3.3.2. New variables lease and grant were introduced in connection with the
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lease-granting protocol in Section 3.2.2. The variable toj was introduced as a solution
to the concurrent join problem in Section 3.2.4.
The pseudocode for the action Lookup(i , k) in LuPastry is omitted because it is
exactly the same as in Algorithm 1 for CastroPastry. In contrast with the action
Join(i , j ) in CastroPastry shown in Algorithm 5, the new action in LuPastry in
Algorithm 15 ensures that only “dead” nodes can join, which prevents rejoining by
nodes which have already started the joining process. With the exception of this action,
all other actions may only be executed by nodes which are not “dead”. Since node j was
already in the network and should be publicly known, it should be a “ready” node.
Algorithm 15 Proactive Action: Join(i , j )
Require: statusi = “dead” ∧ j = “ready”
1: procedure
2: statusi := “waiting”
3: send 〈〈“JoinRequest”, {}, i〉, j 〉
4: end procedure
Lookup Request Handling
Unlike the same action RouteLookup(i) in CastroPastry described in Algorithms 2, 3
and 4, more preconditions must be met before a node can handle the “Lookup” request
in Algorithm 16. For example it should be explicitly written in a formal model that
“dead” nodes do not react to any message.
Here a node delivers a “Lookup” message when it is “ready” and covers (see Sec-
tion 3.1.1) the key j , which means that j is closer to i than any other member in lseti .
If it does not cover j , it searches for a candidate closer to j for its next hop by invoking
the function findNext (i, j). In case no such node exists, it reports an error to the user
application.
Besides, there is an explicit separation of correct key delivery and faulty delivery
(reportError 〈“NoLegalRoute”, i , j 〉), such that if a node delivers a key, it must cover it.
This separation makes it possible to reduce the property CorrectDelivery to properties
of correct coverage of leaf sets in the later approach to verification.
The precondition of action RouteLookup(i , j ) shown in Algorithm 16 invokes the
function covers(lseti , j ), to decide if node i can deliver it or has to forward the message
to another node. In the latter case, if it finds the next hop, then it will forward the
“Lookup” message to that node. Otherwise (if the returned value is the identifier of the
node itself) it will send a “NoLegalRoute” message to report a routing error.
The error reporting case can never occur as long as the function findNext(i , j ) and
covers(lseti , j ) are correctly implemented. Intuitively, covers(lseti , j ) is only false when
one of the neighbors of node i , say the left neighbor ln, is closer to the key j than i
itself. The function findNext(i , j ) as implemented in Algorithm 17 is designed to find a
closer node, at worst ln, to forward the message, instead of returning i itself.
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Algorithm 16 Action: RouteLookup(i , j )
Require: receivei(〈“Lookup”, user , k〉) ∧ statusi 6= “dead”
1: procedure
2: if statusi = “ready” ∧ covers(lseti , j ) then
3: deliver(i , user , j )
4: else if ¬covers(lseti , j ) then
5: if findNext(i , j ) 6= i then
6: send 〈〈“Lookup”, user , j 〉,findNext(i , j )〉
7: else
8: reportError 〈“NoLegalRoute”, i , j 〉
9: end if
10: end if
11: end procedure
The reason for introducing this error message is to detect erroneous implementa-
tions of findNext(i , j ) at a earlier stage, because the idea is to leave the freedom of
implementing findNext(i , j ), so that another implementation could be adopted with a
simplified routing table structure. In fact, simplified versions of the routing table and
findNext(i , j ) were indeed used in the early stages of model checking Pastry, in order to
prune the unnecessary state space and make it feasible to find bugs in the model and
essential counterexamples to the protocol design.
Besides, it is not specified in action RouteLookup(i , j ) here in Algorithm 16 what a
node should do if it is not “ready” but covers the key j . In this case, it does not fulfill
the prerequisites of the action RouteLookup(i , j ) and therefore should do nothing. This
means that the node will either wait until its neighborhood changes and at the same
time its coverage of the keys, so that it does not cover the key anymore and will then
route the message to another node or it should first complete its join process and then
deliver the “Lookup” message when it is “ready”.
Algorithm 17 demonstrates an implementation of the auxiliary function findNext (i,
j). Another simplified implementation is adopted for model checking purpose to prune
the unnecessary state space caused by the routing table structure.
In Algorithm 17, node i first tries to find the closest node to the key j as the next
hop from its leaf sets, when the key j lies within the range covered by its leaf set nodes,
or when its leaf sets overlap (lines 2 and 3). Otherwise, it will try to find the next hop
from the corresponding position in its routing table (lines 5 and 6), where the value at
this position, if not null , should share one more digit (r + 1) of its prefix than the key
shares with the node. If no such value exists, it will try to combine all known node
identifiers from its leaf sets and routing table and choose the closest one which shares
the same length r or a longer prefix with the key j (lines 8 and 9). The result is either a
different node closer to the key j , or node i itself, if no such node could be found. Note
that if the leaf sets are not empty, the returned value can never be i itself.
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Algorithm 17 Auxiliary function: findNext(i , j )
1: function
2: if
 overlaps(lseti) ∨(CwDist(lseti .leftmost , j )
≤ CwDist(lseti .leftmost , lseti .rightmost))
 then
3: n := pick k ∈ lseti such that |k − j | is minimal
4: else
5: r := shared -prefix -length(j , i)
6: n := rtablei(r , r -th-digit(j ))
7: if n 6= null then
8: return n
9: else
10: can := {k ∈ lseti ∪ rtablei : |j − k | < |j − i |
11: ∧shared -prefix -length(j , k) ≥ r}
12: if can 6= {} then
13: n := pick k ∈ can such that |k − j | is minimal
14: return n
15: else
16: return i
17: end if
18: end if
19: end if
20: end function
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Join
Only “ready” nodes can answer a “JoinRequest” message and one “ready” node can
only let one node join at any time (see Assumptions 3.4). This restriction is made to
prevent the problem illustrated in Section 3.2.4. To ensure this restriction, the variable
toji is introduced to denote the joining node that is currently being handled by i (see
Algorithm 18).
The precondition of action RecJReq(i) states that a “ready” node i only answers a
“JoinRequest” message from another node j when it covers the node identifier and it is
not letting any other node join the network. Unlike the action RecJReq(i) in Algorithm 6
in CastroPastry, the joining node j is added into the leaf sets of node i in order to
solve the problem illustrated in Section 3.2.4. At this moment, node j is closer to node
i than i ’s neighbor due to the properties of coverage calculation.
Algorithm 18 Action: RecJReq(i)
Require:
(
receivei(〈“JoinRequest”, rtable, j 〉)
∧ (statusi = “ready”) ∧ covers(lseti , j ) ∧ (toji = i)
)
1: procedure
2: toji := j
3: lseti := lseti .add({j})
4: send 〈〈“JoinReply”, rtable, lseti〉, j 〉
5: end procedure
When node i does not cover j , then it executes action RouteJReq . It tries to find
the next node closer to j and forward the “JoinReply” message to it. When no such
next hop can be found, it reports an error.
Algorithm 19 Action: RouteJReq(i)
Require:
(
receivei(〈“JoinRequest”, rtable, j 〉)
∧ (statusi 6= “dead”) ∧ ¬covers(lseti , j )
)
1: procedure
2: if findNext(i , j ) 6= i then
3: send 〈〈“JoinRequest”, rtable.add(rtablei), j 〉,findNext(i , j )〉
4: else
5: reportError 〈“NoLegalRoute”, i , j 〉
6: end if
7: end procedure
In the event that node i covers the joining node j but has already started helping
another node to join or in case node i is not yet “ready”, then the “JoinRequest”
message to node i will simply be delayed and handling postponed until these conditions
are fulfilled.
The action RecJReply(i) in LuPastry is the same as the one in CastroPastry
described in Algorithm 8, except that it adds one more precondition to the action, that
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only “waiting” nodes receive “JoinReply” messages. Hence the pseudocode is omitted
here. The reason for this requirement is that the arrival of a “JoinReply” message at
a “dead” node obviously has no effect. Besides, after it becomes “ok” or “ready”, it
should not expect any “JoinReply” message, because it has already joined the network.
Probe
Unlike the action RecProbe(i) illustrated in Algorithm 10, a node can handle “Probe”
messages in action RecProbe(i) only when it is active (i.e. not “dead”) in the improved
version illustrated in Algorithm 20, because the alternative makes no sense. Furthermore,
if the node receiving a “Probe” message is not yet “ready”, then it must have non-empty
leaf sets. Conversely, if its leaf sets are empty, the node in question should be “ready”.
This condition ensures that a “waiting” node j which has just sent its “JoinRequest”
will not react to any “Probe” messages from any node n neighboring a potential replier
i to its “JoinRequest” message. This is because message delay might cause j to receive
the probing message from node n before i ’s expected “JoinReply” message. This might
disturb the desired order of execution of the actions.
Another difference with Algorithm 10 in CastroPastry is that the reply to the
sender contains the previous leaf sets of the probed node. Observe that in Castro-
Pastry, the node returns the updated leaf sets, which might cause key coverage incon-
sistency (see Section 3.2.1).
In Algorithm 20, it is emphasized by means of the function clone() that the lsetprime
is a freshly cloned, distinct object from lseti , so that changes in the value of the local
variable lsetprime will never affect the state variable lseti .
Algorithm 20 Action: RecProbe(i)
Require:
 receivei(〈“Probe”, j , lset , failed〉)∧ statusi 6= “dead”
∧ (statusi = “ready” ∨ ¬lseti .isEmpty())

1: procedure
2: failedi := failedi \ {j}
3: rtablei := rtablei .add({j})
4: send 〈〈“ProbeReply”, i , lseti , failedi〉, j 〉 . lseti is not changed yet
5: lseti := lseti .add({j})
6: lsetprime := lseti .clone() . lseti will not be modified any more.
7: lsetprime := lsetprime.remove(failed)
8: lsetprime := lsetprime.add(lset \ failedi)
9: for all n ∈ ((lseti ∩ failed) ∪ (lsetprime \ lseti)) \ (probingi ∪ failedi) do
10: probe(i ,n)
11: end for
12: end procedure
Unlike the precondition to action RecProbe(i) described in Algorithm 20, a node
executing RecPRply(i) in Algorithm 21 should expect a “ProbeReply” message after
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performing the probe, therefore none of the other cases described in action RecProbe(i)
could occur here in the action RecPRply(i). The procedure of action RecPRply(i)
(lines 3 to 11 in Algorithm 21) is similar to the action RecProbe(i) (lines 3 to 12 in
Algorithm 20), except that it does not send the “ProbeReply”. In contrast to Castro-
Pastry Algorithm 11 illustrated in Section 3.2.4, Algorithm 21 basically only checks if
the probing process is complete. In this case, a “waiting” node becomes “ok” and starts
the lease granting protocol by sending “LeaseRequest” messages to its direct left and
right neighbors, to confirm that its direct neighbors are either “ok” or “ready”.
Algorithm 21 Action: RecPRply(i)
Require: receivei(〈“ProbeReply”, j , lset , failed〉) ∧ statusi 6= “dead”
1: procedure
2: failedi := failedi \ {j}
3: rtablei := rtablei .add({j})
4: lseti := lseti .add({j})
5: lsetprime := lseti .clone()
6: lsetprime := lsetprime.remove(failed)
7: lsetprime := lsetprime.add(lset \ failedi)
8: for all n ∈ ((lseti ∩ failed) ∪ (lsetprime \ lseti)) \ (probingi ∪ failedi) do
9: probe(i ,n)
10: end for
11: shouldBeOK := (statusi = “waiting”) ∧ (probingi = {})
12: if shouldBeOK then
13: statusi := “ok”
14: failedi := {}
15: send 〈〈“LeaseRequest”, i〉, lseti .leftneighbor〉
16: send 〈〈“LeaseRequest”, i〉, lseti .rightneighbor〉
17: end if
18: end procedure
Lease
The lease granting protocol modeled in LuPastry is inspired by the idea of Haeberlen
et al. (2005) discussed in Section 3.2. In the action RecPRply(i) (Algorithm 21), mes-
sages of the type “LeaseRequest” are required to settle conflicts in key-coverage, we call
it “lease”. This part of the action is different from the periodic lease granting protocol
in Haeberlen et al. (2005) and FreePastry (2009).
The periodic lease granting protocol reflects the version implemented in FreePastry
(2009). In that protocol, a “ready” node periodically checks the leases of its immediate
neighbors and sends “LeaseRequest” messages to those neighbors missing their leases.
The action RequestLease(i) in LuPastry Algorithm 22 describes another mech-
anism. The purpose of this action here is different from that in FreePastry (2009).
Here it helps the joining node to complete the lease granting protocol after the first
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“LeaseRequest” messages have failed to get a reply due to newly joined nodes.
Algorithm 22 Action: RequestLease (i)
Require: (statusi = “ok”) ∧ (lseti .leftneighbor /∈ leasei ∨ lseti .rightneighbor /∈ leasei)
1: procedure
2: if lseti .leftneighbor /∈ leasei then
3: send 〈〈“LeaseRequest”, i〉, lseti .leftneighbor〉
4: else if lseti .rightneighbor /∈ leasei then
5: send 〈〈“LeaseRequest”, i〉, lseti .rightneighbor〉
6: end if
7: end procedure
In the following, the variables leasei and granti are used to remember from which
nodes node i received leases, and to which nodes node i granted leases, respectively.
In action RecLReq(i) (see Algorithm 23), the “LeaseReply” message is involved to
answer the “LeaseRequest” message. In action RecLReply(i) (see Algorithm 24), the
“LeaseReply” messages are used to propagate the information that the node has become
“ready”. In both cases, the node “grants” a lease. Nodes only grant leases to their direct
neighbors and only “ok” or “ready” nodes can receive “LeaseRequest” or “LeaseReply”
messages as a precondition to actions RecLReq(i) and RecLReply(i).
When receiving a “LeaseRequest” message in action RecLReq(i) in Algorithm 23,
the node grants the leases (granting bit is set to true) if the “LeaseRequest” message
came from direct neighbors, otherwise it replies without granting. It was not clear
in Haeberlen et al. (2005) and FreePastry (2009) if an “ok” node should be able to
grant. It was discovered through model checking analysis that if only “ready” nodes can
grant, then concurrent joining of nodes between “ready” nodes may never finish the join
protocol to become “ready”, because one of the nodes might be waiting for the other
concurrent joining node to grant it. Therefore, in HaeberlenPastry and LuPastry,
both “ok” and “ready” nodes can grant.
Algorithm 23 Action: RecLReq(i)
Require:
(
receivei(〈“LeaseRequest”, j 〉)
∧ (statusi = “ok” ∨ statusi = “ready”)
)
1: procedure
2: isNeighbor := (j = lseti .leftneighbor) ∨ (j = lseti .rightneighbor)
3: if isNeighbor then
4: granti := granti ∪ {j}
5: end if
6: send 〈〈“LeaseReply”, lseti , isNeighbor〉, j 〉
7: end procedure
In action RecLReply(i) in Algorithm 24, the “ready” or “ok” node only receives
“LeaseReply” messages from its direct neighbors, because a “LeaseReply” message from
another node cannot fulfill its purpose according to Haeberlen et al. (2005), as described
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in Section 3.2.2: a node should transmit key coverage to its neighbor via the lease
granting protocol as the last phase of its joining. When receiving a “LeaseReply” message
from direct neighbors in action RecLReply(i), node j extends its leasej with the sender.
If the extended leasej contains the direct left and right neighbors of node j and node j
is currently still “ok”, then it should become “ready”.
Unlike HaeberlenPastry, one more notification step is added after a node be-
comes “ready”, as illustrated in action RecLReply(i) in Algorithm 24. In this case, node
j propagates the lease to its left and right neighbors by sending the granting message
“LeaseReply” and adds these two neighbors into its grant history grantj .
When the corresponding neighbor, say the left neighbor ln, receives the “LeaseReply”
message from the current node j , which it has helped to join, the neighbor resets its tojln
back to itself. This ensures that the “ready” node ln, which originally helped j to join,
can help other nodes (see Assumption 3.4.4) only after the joining node j is “ready”.
Now a node has finished the join process completely with the last notifications to its
neighbors.
Algorithm 24 Action: RecLReply (i)
Require:
 receivei(〈“LeaseReply”, ls, grant〉)∧ (statusi = “ok” ∨ statusi = “ready”)
∧ (ls.node = lseti .leftneighbor ∨ ls.node = lseti .rightneighbor)

1: procedure
2: ln := lseti .leftneighbor
3: rn := lseti .rightneighbor
4: if grant = true then
5: leasei := leasei ∪ {ls.node}
6: end if
7: okToReady := (ln ∈ leasei) ∧ (rn ∈ leasei) ∧ (statusi = “ok”)
8: if toji = ls.node then
9: toji = i
10: end if
11: if okToReady then
12: statusi := “ready”
13: granti := granti ∪ {ln, rn}
14: send 〈〈“LeaseReply”, i ,true〉, ln〉
15: send 〈〈“LeaseReply”, i ,true〉, rn〉
16: end if
17: end procedure
3.3.4 Verification of LuPastry
The overall verification goal is the safety property that at any time there can only be
one node responsible for any key (property CorrectDelivery , formally defined as Prop-
erty 4.3.4 in Section 4.3). The model checker TLC is employed to validate the Pastry
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model illustrated in Section 3.3.3 against this property (see Section 5) for four particular
nodes, in order to gain confidence, and then a theorem proving approach was embarked
upon to finally verify the Pastry model for its property CorrectDelivery for arbitrary
instances.
Reduction
First of all, the property CorrectDelivery is reduced to hypothetical invariants of the
underlying data structures, and TLAPS is used to prove that these imply the global
correctness property CorrectDelivery .
This property CorrectDelivery consists of two major parts: one states that if a node
delivers a key, it should be the closest “ready” node; the other states that if this node
delivers that key, then no other node should deliver it at the same time.
Knowing that only “ready” nodes can deliver and a node delivers a key when it
covers it, it is intuitive to infer that the property CorrectDelivery is ensured if all the
“ready” nodes agree with each other about their coverages. Furthermore, the coverage
of a node is calculated according to the distance from a node to its direct neighbors
as introduced in Section 3.1.1. Therefore, the property CorrectDelivery is reduced to
a property of “ready” nodes and their direct neighbors: if for any “ready” node i , no
other “ready” node lies between i and its immediate neighbor, then it follows that there
will be no conflicts among “ready” nodes w.r.t. key coverage. This is the basic idea of
the invariant NeighborClosest .
NeighborClosest Invariant
More precisely, the invariant NeighborClosest states that the left and right neighbors of
any “ready” node i lie closer to i than any other “ready” node j distinct from i .
The way to prove this invariant is to focus on the critical transition when a node i
goes from “ok” to “ready” in action RecLReply in Algorithm 24.
• This node i should ensure that there is no other “ready” node k between its direct
left and right neighbors and itself.
• The node i , which is “ok” and is to become “ready”, should not lie between some
node r and the direct left or right neighbor of that node r .
Since node i can become “ready” only when it receives leases from both of its direct
neighbors, there should be invariants making sure that the granted leases are indeed
from the closest “ready” neighbors; in addition, the granting nodes should also ensure
that there is no other “ready” node lying between themselves and the granted node.
For the first case, it is sufficient to prove a stronger invariant saying that there is
no “ready” node between any (not necessarily “ready”) node and its neighbors. This
is in fact the invariant IRN illustrated in Section 6.5.1 and proved in Section 6.5.2. In
addition, the basic idea of Pastry protocol that nodes always join through their closest
“ready” nodes is in fact not trivial to prove, and is also formulated as the invariant
TojClosest in Section 6.5.1.
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For the second case, it is obvious that at the time of granting a lease, the nodes
granted leases are neighbors of the nodes granting them (by the granting conditions in
Algorithm 23), as long as no nodes joined in between and became “ready” in the mean-
time. In order to ensure this, further invariants are needed for the variable grant (e.g.
GrantNeighborNew illustrated in Section 6.5.1). Besides, not only “ready” nodes but
also “ok” nodes can grant leases, because otherwise concurrently joining nodes between
two “ready” nodes might never be able to join. But if “ok” nodes are allowed to grant a
lease, the induction hypothesis of NeighborClosest cannot be applied to prove the invari-
ant GrantNeighborNew. Here again the stronger invariant IRN, which in fact subsumes
the property NeighborClosest , must be applied instead of NeighborClosest .
Detailed proof of property NeighborClosest and relevant important invariants will
be explained in Chapter 6.
3.4 Assumptions
Although departure of nodes itself might not hurt the property CorrectDelivery , it is no
longer considered as a target for verification, because it does not make much sense to
allow departure of nodes in the absence of any repair mechanism. The same principle
applies to message loss. There is no mechanism described in Pastry as to how the
lost message should be discovered and recovered. Therefore, although message loss is
modeled in TLA+ codes, it is not included among the possible actions of the verified
Pastry model.
The following are all the assumptions for verifying the Pastry system.
Assumption 3.4.1. There is always at least one “ready” node in the network.
Assumption 3.4.1 makes sure that the network protocol is available, and that lookup
and join services are functional. This is weaker than in Castro et al. (2004) and Haeberlen
et al. (2005), both require at least L “ready” nodes.
Assumption 3.4.2. No message manipulation or corruption occurs.
Assumption 3.4.2 excludes security properties, which lie outside our verification
interest for the moment.
Assumption 3.4.3. No nodes leave the network.
Assumption 3.4.3 is a very strong assumption, but at the moment no more relaxation
can be found, due to the phenomenon of network separation illustrated in Section 3.2.4
Based on this assumption, the original assumption of Haeberlen et al. (2005), stating
that all leaf set members are connected can be relaxed to the assumption that the
members of the leaf sets of a node are always reachable from that node. This relaxed
assumption makes sure that probing/routing messages can always be delivered smoothly
to their destination, if it is not faulty (“dead”).
Assumption 3.4.4. At any time point, one “ready” node serves at most one joining
node.
77
3 Pastry Protocol
Assumption 3.4.4 eliminates the concurrent joining problem shown in Section 3.2.4.
Here joining node refers to a candidate node wishing/attempting to join the network
which has already received a “JoinReply” message from a “ready” node in the network
Assumption 3.4.5. No message corruption and no message loss.
Assumption 3.4.5 allows delays such that the order in which messages are received
may differ from that in which they were sent.
3.5 Summary
This chapter introduced the CastroPastry based on Castro et al. (2004), its extension
HaeberlenPastry based on Haeberlen et al. (2005) and the improved Pastry Ideal-
Pastry and finally LuPastry with its formal verification.
The Pastry models CastroPastry and HaeberlenPastry are formally specified
and analyzed against the formally defined correctness property of the system: Correct-
Delivery . Non-trivial problems with these two versions are discovered by model checking
analysis as illustrated in Section 3.2.4. It is revealed that leaf set completeness checks
are imprecise and unnecessary. First updating and then exchanging the updated leaf
sets through “ProbeReply” messages causes loss of information, and leads to violation
of CorrectDelivery . Allowing a newly joined node to process a “Probe” message before
the expected “JoinReply” message causes misunderstanding of the delayed “Probe” mes-
sage in some previous join actions, which leads to violation of CorrectDelivery . Allowing
departure of nodes with leaf set repair mechanisms enables separation of the network
and violation of CorrectDelivery . Unrestricted concurrent joining of nodes through the
same “ready” node allows new nodes to become “ready” between the original “ready”
node and its neighbor, which violates CorrectDelivery .
The protocol is improved to IdealPastry and further to LuPastry based on
the results of this analysis. The model LuPastry can be implemented according to
the pseudocode demonstrated in Section 3.3.3. It is validated with model checking on
5 instances without any violation of its correctness property. Except the actions for
repairing leaf sets and handling node departures from the network, it is also verified via
theorem proving by postulating CorrectDelivery to synthesizing hypothetical invariants
of the underlying data structures and then proving those invariants for networks of
arbitrary size (Section 3.3.4).
This is the first attempt at verifying a real world network protocol formally and in
detail. Although no solutions to the problem of guaranteeing the safety property could
be found for the protocol with passive node departures and its repair mechanism, the
verified protocol LuPastry providing dependable routing in spite of concurrent joining
of new nodes can be also interesting for network design.
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Pastry is modeled as a (potentially infinite-state) transition system in TLA+( Lam-
port (2002)). According to the comparison of different formal method techniques in
Section 2.2, TLA+ fits protocol verification quite nicely, because its concept of actions
matches the rule/message-based definition of protocols.
Different versions of TLA+ models of Pastry are available on the Web (see VeriDis
(2013)) and this chapter illustrates LuPastry in TLA+ code.
Notations from TLA+ will be used based on those introduced in Section 2.3, but
slightly polished for the sake of pretty representation. Several abbreviations of results
of mathematical operations are used in TLA+ in order to make it feasible to be proved
automatically, but these are explicitly shown in the thesis. For example, 2M−1 is ab-
breviated as half in TLA+. The invariants and theorems are always assigned names, in
order to be referred to in a proof in TLA+, but the assignment is omitted in the thesis
to avoid confusion with the definition of data structure. The complete original TLA+
model of LuPastry can be found on the Web in VeriDis (2013).
LuPastry is introduced in Section 3.3, model checked in Chapter 5 and a complete
proof of correct delivery of key with all relevant interesting invariants are shown in
Section 6.5.
4.1 Static Model
In the static model of Pastry, all the data structures and operations on them are modeled
using the primitives provided by TLA+ as introduced in Section 1.2. A data structure
is always a boolean value, a natural number, a set, a function or a complex composition
of them. An operation on data structure is always a functional mapping from given
signature of data structures to a returned value, which is again a data structure.
4.1.1 Ring Operation
As introduced in Section 3.1.1, several parameters define the size of the ring and of the
fundamental data structures. In particular, M ∈ N defines the space I = [0..2M − 1]
of node and key identifiers, and L ∈ N indicates the size of each leaf set (see Defini-
tion 4.1.2). The following definition introduces different notions of distance between two
nodes x and y on the ring, meaning how many identifiers lie within the region from node
x to y on the ring (inclusive x and exclusive y). For example, the distance from 0 to 1
is 1 in the counter clockwise direction and 2M − 1 in the clockwise direction.
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Definition 4.1.1 (Distances). Given x, y ∈ I :
Dist(x , y)
∆
= if x − y < −2M−1 then x − y + (2M − 1)
else if x − y > 2M−1 then x − y − (2M − 1)
else x − y
AbsDist(x , y)
∆
= |Dist(x , y)|
CwDist(x , y)
∆
= if Dist(x , y) ≥ 0 then Dist(x , y)
else 2M + Dist(x , y)
The sign of Dist(x , y) is positive if there are fewer identifiers on the counter-clockwise
path from x to y than on the clockwise path; it is negative otherwise. The case distinction
of x−y < −2M−1 and x−y > 2M−1 ensures that the result ranges within [−2M−1, 2M−1],
such that its absolute value is never greater than half of the capacity of the ring. The
absolute value AbsDist(x , y) gives the length of the shortest path along the ring from
x to y . Finally, the clockwise distance CwDist(x , y) returns the length of the clockwise
path from x to y .
4.1.2 Leafset
The leaf set data structure ls of a node is modeled as a record with three components:
ls.node, ls.left and ls.right . The first component contains the identifier of the node
maintaining the leaf sets, the other two components are the two leaf sets to either side
of the node. The following operations access or manipulate leaf sets.
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Definition 4.1.2 (Operations on leaf sets (ls ∈ LSet , delta ∈ subset I )).
LSet
∆
= [node ∈ I , left ∈ subset I , right ∈ subset I ]
GetLSetContent(ls)
∆
= ls.left ∪ ls.right ∪ {ls.node}
EmptyLS (i)
∆
= [node 7→ i , left 7→ {}, right 7→ {}]
LeftNeighbor(ls)
∆
= if ls.left = {}
then ls.node
else choose n ∈ ls.left : ∀p ∈ ls.left :
CwDist(p, ls.node) ≥ CwDist(n, ls.node)
RightNeighbor(ls)
∆
= if ls.right = {}
then ls.node
else choose n ∈ ls.right : ∀q ∈ ls.right :
CwDist(ls.node, q) ≥ CwDist(ls.node,n)
LeftCover(ls)
∆
= (ls.node + CwDist(LeftNeighbor(ls), ls.node)÷ 2)%2M
RightCover(ls)
∆
= (RightNeighbor(ls) +
CwDist(ls.node,RightNeighbor(ls))÷ 2 + 1)%2M
Covers(ls, k)
∆
= CwDist(LeftCover(ls), k)
≤ CwDist(LeftCover(ls),RightCover(ls))
Overlaps(ls)
∆
= (ls.left ∩ ls.right) 6= {}
AddToLSet(delta, ls)
∆
= let i
∆
= ls.node
can
∆
= (ls.left ∪ ls.right ∪ delta) \ {i}
newleft
∆
=
if |can| ≤ L then can
else choose subsetleft ∈ subset can :
∧ |subsetleft | = L
∧ ∀out ∈ (can \ subsetleft), in ∈ subsetleft :
CwDist(in, i) < CwDist(out , i)
newright
∆
=
if |can| ≤ L then can
else choose subsetright ∈ subset can :
∧ |subsetright | = L
∧ ∀out ∈ (can \ subsetright), in ∈ subsetright :
CwDist(i , in) < CwDist(i , out)
in [node 7→ i , left 7→ newleft , right 7→ newright ]
The EmptyLS (i) defines the empty leaf sets of a node. The LeftNeighbor(ls) and
RightNeighbor(ls) of a node are defined as the closest nodes (also called direct neighbors)
in the corresponding sides of its leaf set members. If both sides are empty, the node itself
is taken as its neighbor. Therefore, a statement, that “the direct left (right) neighbor of
a node is itself”, is intuitively equivalent to a statement “the left (right) side of the leaf
sets is empty”. This property is formally specified in Lemma 4.1.3. Many such kinds
of lemmas, to be found in VeriDis (2013), are formalized as primitive lemmas used for
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formal proofs later.
Lemma 4.1.3 (EmptyLSNoNeighbor).
EmptyLSNoNeighbor
∆
= ∀ ls ∈ LSet :
∧ LeftNeighbor(ls) = ls.node
∧ RightNeighbor(ls) = ls.node
⇔ ls = EmptyLS (ls.node)
Note that the parameter ls is an arbitrary instance of LSet . Intuitively one would
expect to use a node identifier, e.g. i , as given parameter, which then will access the leaf
sets of particular node i . Since the operation should access only data structures but not
state variables, all the given parameters are instances of LSet , instead of node identifiers.
This detail of parameter is crucial for the theorem proving process, because properties
of local data structure like the Lemma 4.1.3 can be proved by their definition, but the
properties of state variables are system property, which can be only proved inductively
over all actions.
The functions LeftCover(ls) and RightCover(ls) of a given node define the upper
bound (exclusive the edge) and lower bound (inclusive the edge) of the key coverage of
its corresponding node (ls.node) w.r.t. its leaf sets. Recall that 2M is the ring capacity
of all identifiers. Function Covers(ls, k) checks if a node k lies within the region starting
from the RightCover(ls) counter clockwise to the LeftCover(ls) of a node (ls.node).
The boolean function Overlaps(ls) checks if the left and right leaf sets are overlap-
ping.
The operation AddToLSet(delta, ls) adds the set of nodes delta into left and right
sides of the leaf sets ls. More precisely, both left and right sides of the leaf sets in the
resulting data structure ls ′ contain the L nodes closest to ls.node among those contained
in ls and the nodes in delta, according to the clockwise or counter-clockwise distance.
The formal specification of the operation RemoveFromLSet(delta, ls) is omitted here
because it is roughly the same as AddToLSet(delta, ls): instead of adding new nodes, it
removes delta from the whole leaf set and then lets the left and right sides of the leaf sets
be rebuilt out of the rest of the members, details on the code can be found in VeriDis
(2013).
4.1.3 Routing Table
Despite the fact that the structure of a routing table is shown to be irrelevant to verify
the safety property CorrectDelivery later in Chapter 6, the position of the matrix plays
an essential role in efficient routing and is also involved in finding the next hop in the
routing algorithm illustrated in Algorithm 17 in Section 3.3.3. For this reason, a detailed
formal description of the routing table is illustrated in Definition 4.1.4 as followed.
The routing table of a Pastry node is a mapping matrix from the positions (Pos) of
the matrix to the value, which are either a node identifier or a place holder (null). As
already introduced in Section 3.1.1, there are M ÷B rows and 2B columns of the table,
where M is formally defined in Section 4.1.1 and B ∈ N defines the base (2B ) of the
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digits representing the node identifier. Therefore, M ÷B is also the number of digits of
the node identifiers. Take the node identifiers illustrated in Figure 3.1 in Section 3.1.1
as an example. All the identifiers consist of 8 ÷ 2 = 4 digits, which also explains that
the routing table shown in Table 3.2 has 4 rows.
The InitRTable maps all the position of the matrix to the value null , which represents
in fact a pure empty routing table. Note that this is not the real initial routing table for
a new Pastry node, because each node should have itself in its routing table.
The function GetRTableContent(rt) returns all the node identifiers in the routing
table rt as a set. The function GetDig(i , j ) takes the row number i (starting from 1)
and a node identifier j as arguments and returns the digit at the i -th position of the
identifier j , e.g. GetDig(1, 1032) returns 1 and GetDig(2, 1032) returns 0. The function
SharedDig(i , j ) takes two node identifiers i and j as arguments and returns the length
of the shared prefix of them. The function GetPos(i , j ) calculates the corresponding
position (〈row , column〉) of the node identifier j in the routing table of a particular node
i . For example as shown in Table 3.2, the corresponding position of node 3131 in the
routing table of node 1032 is GetPos(1032, 3131) = 〈1, 3〉, as it is filled in the first row
and the third column.
The operation AddDelta(delta, rt , i) adds all the node identifiers in the set delta
into the routing table rt of a particular node i . It first calculates for the given set of
nodes all their corresponding positions in that table (posToChange), then put the node
identifiers one by one at the expected position. Note that for one node identifier, there
is a deterministic position in the table, but there can be many nodes expected to be
candidates for the same position. Here the operation TheBetterNode(id1, id2) chooses
the “better” node according to user application, which is beyond of the interest of the
thesis.
The operation AddSelf (rt , i) adds node i itself into the given routing table rt of
that node i . As mentioned before, a node should have itself in its routing table. Due to
the specific structure, the node identifier i should occur in each row of the routing table
rt after it is added into it. This is easy to see from the example illustrated in Table 3.2.
The operation AddToTable(delta, rt , i) is the frequently used one later in the dy-
namic model in Section 4.2, when new entries in delta need to be added into a particular
routing table rt of specific node i . It is implemented here in the way that the node
identifier always shows up in each row of its routing table after the adding operation is
accomplished each time. To achieve that, the operation first adds the given set of nodes
except i into the routing table, then it adds the node itself into it.
Definition 4.1.4 (Operations on Routing Table (rt ∈ RTable, delta ∈ subset I , i , j ∈ I ,
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null as a new system Constant)).
Pos
∆
= [1..(M ÷ B)]× [0..(2B − 1)]
RTable
∆
= [Pos → (I ∪ {null})]
InitRTable
∆
= [p ∈ Pos 7→ null ]
GetRTableContent(rt)
∆
= {rt [pos] : pos ∈ Pos} \ {null}
GetDig(i , j )
∆
= let p
∆
= M ÷ B − i
in (j %2B(p+1))÷ 2Bp
SharedDig(i , j )
∆
= let helpSD [k ∈ N] ∆=
if (k > M ÷ B) ∨ (GetDig(i , k) 6= GetDig(j , k))
then k − 1
else helpSD [k + 1]
in helpSD [1]
GetPos(i , j )
∆
= let r
∆
= SharedDig(i , j )
c
∆
= GetDig(j , r + 1)
in 〈r + 1, c〉
AddDelta(delta, rt , i)
∆
= let posToChange
∆
= {GetPos(i , j ) : j ∈ delta}
in [p ∈ Pos 7→
if p ∈ posToChange
then
let newNode
∆
= choose v ∈ delta : GetPos(i , v) = p
in TheBetterNode(rt [p],newNode)
else rt [p]]
AddSelf (rt , i)
∆
= let posToChange
∆
= {〈k ,GetDig(i , k)〉 : k ∈ 1..(M ÷ B)}
in [p ∈ Pos 7→
if p ∈ posToChange
then i
else rt [p]]
AddToTable(delta, rt , i)
∆
= AddSelf (AddDToTable(delta \ {i}, rt , i), i)
4.1.4 Messages
Messages are defined as records consisting of their destinations and the message content:
DMsg
∆
= [destination ∈ I ,mreq ∈ MReq ]. The message content(MReq) consists of the
following different types.
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Definition 4.1.5. Message Types
Look
∆
= [type ∈ {“Lookup”},node ∈ I ]
NoLR
∆
= [type ∈ {“NoLegalRoute”}, key ∈ I ]
JReq
∆
= [type ∈ {“JoinRequest”}, rtable ∈ RTable,node ∈ I ]
JRpl
∆
= [type ∈ {“JoinReply”}, rtable ∈ RTable, lset ∈ LSet ]
Prb
∆
= [type ∈ {“Probe”},node ∈ I , lset ∈ LSet , failed ∈ subset I )]
PRpl
∆
= [type ∈ {“ProbeReply”},node ∈ I , lset ∈ LSet , failed ∈ subset I )]
LReq
∆
= [type ∈ {“LeaseRequest”},node ∈ I ]
LReply
∆
= [type ∈ {“LeaseReply”}, lset ∈ LSet , grant ∈ {true, false}]
MReq
∆
= Look ∪NoLR ∪ JReq ∪ JRpl ∪ Prb ∪ PRpl ∪ LReq ∪ LReply
In the later formal specification, the values of the components of a message is often
be referred by component name. For example, m.mreq .type = “Lookup” tells that the
message m ∈ DMsg has the message content of type Look .
The “Lookup” message contains only the node which it is looking for.
The “NoLegalRoute” message is used for reporting an error during routing “Lookup”
or “JoinRequest” messages in action RouteLookup(i , j ) and RouteJReq(i , j ).
In the “JoinRequest” message, rtable is used to collect new nodes during routing
process, so that they can be added into the final receiver’s routing table and replied in
the “JoinReply” message to the joining node in action RecJReq(i). Together with the
routing table, the leaf sets of the final receiver of “JoinRequest” message is also replied
in the “JoinReply” message, to help the joining node to initiate its own ones.
The “Probe” message contains the node sending the probe (node), its leaf set and the
set of nodes it believes to be faulty. As a reply to the probing message, the “ProbeReply”
message contains the node replying the probe (node), the replier’s leaf sets and failed
set of nodes.
The “LeaseRequest” message contains the node identifier which request a lease. The
“LeaseReply” message replies such requests, either granting the lease or not, with its
component grant . Besides, the receiver provides also its own leaf sets, where its own
identifier is contained in ls.node. Instead of only sending back the node identifier, the
leaf sets were designed to provide extra nodes information, which may serve a purpose as
it is in “Probe” message, namely to propagate and exchange the leaf sets among nodes.
4.2 Dynamic Model
The high-level outline of the transition model is formally specified in TLA+ as shown
Definition 4.2.1. The overall system specification Spec is defined as Init ∧ [Next ]vars ,
which is the standard form of TLA+ system specifications as introduced in Section 2.3.
It requires that all runs start with a state that satisfies the initial condition Init , and
that every transition either does not change vars (defined as the tuple of all state vari-
ables) or corresponds to a system transition as defined by Next . This form of system
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specification is sufficient for proving safety properties. Since liveness properties are be-
yond the verification interest of this thesis, no fairness hypotheses are asserted, claiming
that certain actions eventually occur.
Definition 4.2.1 (Overall Structure of the TLA+ Specification of Pastry.).
vars
∆
= 〈receivedMsgs, status, lset , probing , failed , rtable, lease, grant , toj 〉
Init
∆
= ∧ receivedMsgs = {}
∧ status = [i ∈ I 7→ if i ∈ A then “ready” else “dead”]
∧ toj = [i ∈ I 7→ i ]
∧ probing = [i ∈ I 7→ {}]
∧ failed = [i ∈ I 7→ {}]
∧ lease = [i ∈ I 7→ if i ∈ A then A else {i}]
∧ grant = [i ∈ I 7→ if i ∈ A then A else {i}]
∧ lset = [i ∈ I 7→ if i ∈ A
then AddToLSet(A,EmptyLS (i))
else EmptyLS (i)]
∧ rtable = [i ∈ I 7→ if i ∈ A
then AddToTable(A, InitRTable, i)
else AddToTable({i}, InitRTable, i)]
Next
∆
= ∃i , j ∈ I : ∨ Join(i , j ) ∨ Lookup(i , j ) ∨ Deliver(i , j )
∨ RouteJReq(i , j ) ∨ RouteLookup(i , j )
∨ RecJReq(i) ∨ RecJReply(j )
∨ RecProbe(i) ∨ RecPRply(j )
∨ RecLReq(i) ∨ RecLReply(i)
∨ RequestLease(i)
Spec
∆
= Init ∧[Next ]vars
The variable receivedMsgs holds the set of messages in transit. It is assumed in
the formal model that messages are never modified when they are on the way to their
destination, that is, no message is corrupted.
The other variables hold arrays that assign to every node i ∈ I its status, leaf sets,
routing table, the set of nodes it is currently probing, the set of nodes it has determined
to have dropped off the ring (failed), the node to which it has sent a join reply and not
yet got confirmation if it has become “ready” (toj ), the nodes from which it has already
got the leases (lease) and the nodes to which it has granted its leases (grant).
The predicate Init is defined as a conjunction that initializes all variables. In par-
ticular, the model takes a parameter A indicating the set of nodes that are initially
“ready”.
The next-state relation Next is a disjunction of all possible system actions, for all
pairs of identifiers i , j ∈ I . Each action is defined as a TLA+ action formula. As an
example, Definition 4.2.2 shows how Deliver(i , k) is formally modeled as an action in
TLA+. Except Deliver(i , k), each of the other actions listed here correspond to the
action with the same name introduced in Section 3.3.3.
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Definition 4.2.2. Action: Deliver(i , j )
Deliver(i , j )
∆
=
∧ status[i ] = “ready”
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs : ∧ m.mreq .type = “Lookup”
∧ m.destination = i
∧ m.mreq .node = j
∧ Covers(lset [i ], j )
∧ receivedMsgs ′ = receivedMsgs \ {m}
∧ unchanged 〈status, rtable, lset , probing , failed , lease, grant , toj 〉
Different from the action Deliver(i , user , k) introduced in Algorithm 16 in Sec-
tion 3.3.3, here the action Deliver(i , j ) has only two parameters i (the delivering node)
and j (the key) and the original sender x is omitted. That is because it is only interesting
here who delivers this key, but not the recipient. The action is executable if node i is
“ready”, if there exists an unhandled “Lookup” message addressed to i , and if j , the
identifier of the requested key, falls within the coverage of node i (see Definition 4.1.2).
Its effect is simply defined as removing the message m from the network, because for
this particular action, only the execution of the action is interesting, not the answer
message that it generates. Each time when receiving a message, the node will remove
the message from the message pool receivedMsgs, so that it will not be received again.
The other variables are unchanged.
As follows, the corresponding formal definitions of those actions introduced in Sec-
tion 3.3 will be illustrated, which is also formally verified against system property Cor-
rectDelivery . This formal model of Pastry is the final formal model proved in Section 6.5.
Other version of Pastry models can be found in VeriDis (2013).
The prefix Rec of many action names denotes that those actions are reactive on the
message it received. For example, one of the precondition of the action RecProbe(i) is
that the network contains a message of type “Probe” whose destination is i .
Different from the actions described in pseudocode before, changes to a variable
within an action is made only once in the formal specification as illustrated in the
following sections. This is because a specification in TLA+ is by default a big conjunction
of all formulas, as explained in Section 2.3.
4.2.1 Lookup and Join
The action Lookup(i , j ) in Algorithm 1 is modeled in the Definition 4.2.3. The node i
looks up the key j by sending a “Lookup” message to itself, which will then enable the
routing action RouteLookup(i , j ) (Definition 4.2.6) later.
Definition 4.2.3. Action: Lookup(i , j )
Lookup(i , j )
∆
=
∧ receivedMsgs ′ = receivedMsgs
∪ {[destination 7→ i ,
mreq 7→ [type 7→ “Lookup”,node 7→ j ]]}
∧ unchanged 〈status, rtable, lset , probing , failed , lease, grant , toj 〉
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The action Join(j , i) in Algorithm 15 is formally modeled in Definition 4.2.4, where
a “dead” node j joins the network by sending a “JoinRequest” message to some node
i . As described for status of nodes in Section 3.3.2, here the node changes its status
from “dead” to “waiting”, in order to wait for the “JoinReply” message later in action
RecJReply(i).
Definition 4.2.4 (Action: Join(j , i)).
Join(j , i)
∆
=
∧ status[j ] = “dead” ∧ status[i ] = “ready”
∧ status ′ = [except ![j ] = “waiting”]
∧ receivedMsgs ′ = receivedMsgs ∪ {[destination 7→ i ,
mreq 7→ [type 7→ “JoinRequest”,node 7→ j ]]}
∧ unchanged 〈rtable, lset , probing , failed , lease, grant , toj 〉
4.2.2 Routing Actions
Two types of messages can be routed: “Lookup” messages and “JoinRequest” mes-
sages. The action RouteLookup(i , j ) routes the “Lookup” messages and the action
RecJReq(i , j ) routes the “JoinRequest” messages. Both of them use the same routing
algorithm defined in function findNext(i , j ), returning a node identifier as the next hop
for the node i to forward, in order to lookup the key j . An implementation of this func-
tion is already introduced in Algorithm 17 in Section 3.3.3 and here this implementation
is formally specified in Definition 4.2.5.
In the formal Definition 4.2.5, those failed nodes are excluded from being the can-
didate of next hop because forwarding any message to them does not make much sense.
Besides, it is explicitly shown what the minimal distance as verbally expressed in Al-
gorithm 17 in Section 3.3.3 really means. Here the Functions LeftMost(lset [i ], j ) and
RightMost(lset [i ], j ) are defined as operations for leaf sets, which returns the left most
and right most node of either side of the leaf sets of a node respectively. Their for-
mal definition is omitted because it is exactly the same as for LeftNeighbor(ls, i) and
RightNeighbor(ls, i) shown in Definition 4.1.2 except changing the direction of the in-
equality.
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Definition 4.2.5 (Function: findNext(i , j )).
findNext(i , j )
∆
=
if (Overlaps(lset [i ]) ∨ CwDist(LeftMost(lset [i ]), j ) ≤
CwDist(LeftMost(lset [i ]),RightMost(lset [i ])))
then let lsCan
∆
= GetLSetContent(lset [i ]) \ failed [i ]
in if lsCan 6= {i}
then let next
∆
= choose n ∈ lsCan \ {i} :
∀m ∈ lsCan : AbsDist(n, j ) ≤ AbsDist(m, j )
in if AbsDist(next , j ) = AbsDist(i , j )
then next
else choose n ∈ lsCan :
∀m ∈ lsCan : AbsDist(n, j ) ≤ AbsDist(m, j )
else i
else let r
∆
= SharedDig(j , i)
rtCan
∆
= rtable[i ][〈r ,GetDig(j , r + 1)〉]
in if rtCan 6= null
then rtCan
else
let canrelax
∆
=
{can ∈ (GetLSetContent(lset [i ]) ∪GetRTableContent(rtable[i ])) \ failed [i ] :
(AbsDist(j , can) < AbsDist(j , i)) ∧ (SharedDig(j , can) ≥ r)}
in if canrelax 6= {}
then choose can ∈ canrelax :
∀m ∈ canrelax : AbsDist(can, j ) ≤ AbsDist(m, j )
else i
The action RouteLookup(i , j ) described in Algorithm 16 is separated in two actions
in the formal specification here: the action Deliver(i , j ) delivers the “Lookup” message in
Definition 4.2.2, and the action RouteLookup(i , j ) routes the “Lookup” message in Defi-
nition 4.2.6. The reason for this separation is that the enabling condition of Deliver(i , j )
is used to formulate the system correctness property CorrectDelivery , which will be
formally defined in Property 4.3.4 in Section 4.3.
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Definition 4.2.6 (Action: RouteLookup(i , j )).
RouteLookup(i , j )
∆
=
∧ status[i ] 6= “dead”
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.destination = i
∧ m.mreq .type = “Lookup”
∧ m.mreq .node = j
∧ ¬Covers(lset [i ], j )
∧ let nh ∆= findNext(i , j )
in receivedMsgs ′ = (receivedMsgs \ {m}) ∪
if nh 6= i
then {[destination 7→ nh,mreq 7→ m.mreq ]}
else {[destination 7→ i ,mreq 7→ [type 7→ “NoLegalRoute”, key 7→ j ]]}
∧ unchanged 〈status, rtable, lset , probing , failed , lease, grant , toj 〉
As already discussed when the action RouteLookup(i , j ) is illustrated in Algo-
rithm 16, the node only routes a “Lookup” message when it does not cover its key.
It invokes the function findNext(i , j ) to find a closer node to j to forward the message.
If the function findNext(i , j ) and Covers(lset [i ], j ) are correctly implemented as they are
formal specified in Definition 4.2.5 and 4.1.2 respectively, then the case for reporting the
error message “NoLegalRoute” is redundant. However this case is kept here for check-
ing the correctness of the model, in order to cope with the situation when the function
findNext(i , j ) is implemented in another way.
Routing the “JoinRequest” message in action RouteJReq(i , j ) (Definition 4.2.7) has
a similar procedure as routing the “Lookup” message. The difference to the action
RouteLookup(i , j ) is that the routed message updates its routing table after each hop
as described in Algorithm 18.
Definition 4.2.7 (Action: RouteJReq(i , j )).
RouteJReq(i , j )
∆
=
∧ status[i ] 6= “dead”
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.destination = i
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinRequest”
∧ m.mreq .node = j
∧ ¬Covers(lset [i ], j )
∧ let nh ∆= findNext(i , j )
in receivedMsgs ′ = (receivedMsgs \ {m}) ∪
if nh 6= i
then {[destination 7→ nh,mreq 7→ [type 7→ “JoinRequest”, rtable 7→
AddToTable(GetRTableContent(rtable[i ]),m.mreq .rtable, i),node 7→ j ]]}
else {[destination 7→ i ,mreq 7→ [type 7→ “NoLegalRoute”, key 7→ j ]]}
∧ unchanged 〈status, rtable, lset , probing , failed , lease, grant , toj 〉
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4.2.3 Actions for Join Protocol
As illustrated in Algorithm 18, a “ready” node replies a “JoinRequest” message in action
RecJReq(i), when it covers that node and has not yet started helping another node to
join. The Definition 4.2.8 illustrates its formal specification.
Definition 4.2.8 (Action: RecJReq(i)).
RecJReq(i)
∆
=
∧ status[i ] = “ready”
∧ toj [i ] = i
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinRequest”
∧ m.destination = i
∧ Covers(lset [i ],m.mreq .node)
∧ toj ′ = [except ![i ] = m.mreq .node]
∧ lset ′ = [except ![i ] = AddToLSet({m.mreq .node}, lset [i ])]
∧ receivedMsgs ′ = (receivedMsgs \ {m})
∪{[destination 7→ m.mreq .node, [type 7→ “JoinReply”,
rtable 7→ m.mreq .rtable, lset 7→ lset [i ]]]}
∧ unchanged 〈status, rtable, probing , failed , lease, grant〉
As explained in Section 3.3.3, only “waiting” node handles “JoinReply” message.
As illustrated in Algorithm 8, the node built up its own leaf sets and routing table from
the ones in the received “JoinReply” message and probes the new candidates in its leaf
sets to confirm their liveness. The probing process is specified formally as a new set of
messages instead of a loop of probing procedure.
Definition 4.2.9 (Action: RecJReply(i)).
RecJReply(i)
∆
=
∧ status[i ] = “waiting”
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.destination = i
∧ let newlset ∆= AddToLSet(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset), lset [i ])
toprob
∆
= GetLSetContent(newlset) \ {i}
in ∧ rtable ′ = [except ![i ] = AddToTable(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset)
∪ GetRTableContent(m.mreq .rtable), rtable[i ], i)]
∧ lset ′ = [except ![i ] = newlset ]
∧ probing ′ = [except ![i ] = toprob]
∧ receivedMsgs ′ = (receivedMsgs \ {m}) ∪ ProbeSet(i ,newlset , {}, toprob)
∧ unchanged 〈status, lease, grant , toj , failed〉
Instead of invoking a procedure as the action described in Algorithm 8, the function
ProbeSet(i , ls, f , toprob) is invoked to prepare the set of probing messages as followed in
Definition 4.2.10.
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Definition 4.2.10 (Function ProbeSet(i , ls, f , toprob)).
ProbeSet(i , ls, f , toprob)
∆
=
{[destination 7→ j ,mreq 7→ [type 7→ “Probe”,
node 7→ i , lset 7→ ls, failed 7→ f ]] : j ∈ toprob}
Function ProbeSet(i , ls, f , toprob) returns a set of one probing message with the
given parameter: i is a node identifier, ls is leaf sets of a node, f and toprob are two sets
of nodes. Different from the for loop in Algorithm 8, Algorithm 20 and Algorithm 21,
where the procedure probe(j , k) (Algorithm 9), is invoked to change the set probingi and
send “Probe” messages one after another, all the changes to a variable are summarized
here in formal description at one position and only one unique change of a state variable
is made in an action to keep it as a valid formula.
As explained in Algorithm 20, the precondition of action RecProbe(i) in Defini-
tion 4.2.11 rules out the case when a node is waiting for the “JoinReply” message but
receives a “Probe” message.
Different from the action RecProbe(i) described in Algorithm 20, in the formal
specification here in Definition 4.2.11, the probing messages with different purpose are
explicitly defined with different names, to make the codes more readable. The set prb1
stands for the leaf set members that the sender j believes to have failed and node i will
then check them itself. The set prb2 stands for potential new leaf set members that are
not yet probed after adding new nodes from the received leaf sets into the copied local
ones. The set prb summarizes the final nodes that node i should probe.
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Definition 4.2.11 (Action: RecProbe(i)).
RecProbe(i)
∆
=
∧ status[i ] 6= “dead”
∧ status[i ] = “ready” ∨ lset [i ] 6= EmptyLS (i)
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “Probe”
∧ m.destination = i
∧ let j ∆= m.mreq .node
fi
∆
= failed [i ] \ {j}
ls1
∆
= AddToLSet({j}, lset [i ])
lprim
∆
= GetLSetContent(AddToLSet(
(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset) \ fi), ls1))
prb1
∆
= GetLSetContent(ls1) ∩m.mreq .failed
prb2
∆
= lprim \GetLSetContent(ls1)
prb
∆
= (prb1 ∪ prb2) \ (probing [i ] ∪ fi)
newm
∆
= [type 7→ “ProbeReply”,node 7→ i , lset 7→ lset [i ], failed 7→ fi ]
in ∧ failed ′ = [except ![i ] = fi ]
∧ rtable = [except !′[i ] = AddToTable({j}, rtable[i ], i)]
∧ lset ′ = [except ![i ] = ls1]
∧ probing ′ = [except ![i ] = probing [i ] ∪ prb]
∧ receivedMsgs ′ = (receivedMsgs
∪ {[destination 7→ j ,mreq 7→ newm]}
∪ Probe(i , ls1,fi , prb)) \ {m}
∧ unchanged 〈status, lease, grant , toj 〉
The formal model of action RecPRply(i) in Algorithm 21 is described in Defini-
tion 4.2.12. Similar to the formal model of action RecProbe(i) in Definition 4.2.11, the
different set of “Probe” messages are explicitly defined. The set prb1 in both actions is
the same. The set prb1∪prb2 in action RecPRply(i) is in fact the same as prb in action
RecProbe(i). The set prb3 in action RecPRply(i) stands for the overall nodes that node
i will probe and those nodes that node i has probed but not yet got any reply from. If
prb3 is empty, the current node can become “ok” if it is still of the status “waiting”.
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Definition 4.2.12 (Action: RecPRply(i)).
RecPRply(i)
∆
=
∧ status[i ] 6= “dead”
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “ProbeReply”
∧ m.destination = i
∧ let j ∆= m.mreq .node
fi
∆
= failed [i ] \ {j}
ls1
∆
= AddToLSet({j}, lset [i ])
lprim
∆
= GetLSetContent(AddToLSet(
(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset) \ fi), ls1))
prb1
∆
= GetLSetContent(ls1) ∩m.mreq .failed
prb2
∆
= lprim \ (GetLSetContent(ls1) ∪ probing [i ] ∪ fi ∪ prb1)
prb3
∆
= (probing [i ] ∪ prb1 ∪ prb2) \ {j}
shouldBeOK
∆
= ∧ status[i ] = “waiting”
∧ prb3 = {}
in ∧ rtable ′ = [except ![i ] = AddToTable({j}, rtable[i ], i)]
∧ lset ′ = [except ![i ] = ls1]
∧ failed ′ = [except ![i ] = if shouldBeOK then {} else fi ]
∧ probing ′ = [except ![i ] = prb3]
∧ status ′ = [except ![i ] = if shouldBeOK then “ok” else status[i ]]
∧ receivedMsgs ′ = (receivedMsgs
∪ Probe(i , ls1,fi , prb1 ∪ prb2)
∪ if shouldBeOK
then {[destination 7→ LeftNeighbor(ls1),
mreq 7→ [type 7→ “LeaseRequest”,node 7→ i ]]}
∪ {[destination 7→ RightNeighbor(ls1),
mreq 7→ [type 7→ “LeaseRequest”,node 7→ i ]]}
else {}) \ {m}
∧ unchanged 〈lease, grant , toj 〉
4.2.4 Request and Grant Leases
The periodic lease checking of “ok” nodes in action RequestLease(i) in Algorithm 22 is
modeled as non-deterministic action in the formal model as follows in Definition 4.2.13.
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Definition 4.2.13 (Action: RequestLease(i)).
RequestLease(i)
∆
=
∧ status[i ] = “ok”
∧ let ln ∆= LeftNeighbor(lset [i ])
rn
∆
= RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
in ∧ (ln /∈ lease[i ] ∨ rn /∈ lease[i ])
∧ receivedMsgs ′ = (receivedMsgs
∪ if ln /∈ lease[i ]
then {[destination 7→ ln,
mreq 7→ [type 7→ “LeaseRequest”,
node 7→ i ]]}
else {})
∪ if rn /∈ lease[i ]
then {[destination 7→ rn,
mreq 7→ [type 7→ “LeaseRequest”,
node 7→ i ]]}
else {})
∧ unchanged 〈status, rtable, lset , probing , failed , lease, toj , grant〉
As illustrated in action RecLReq(i) in Algorithm 23 and RecLReply(i) in Algo-
rithm 24, only “ok” or “ready” nodes can receive “LeaseRequest” or “LeaseReply” mes-
sages. In action RecLReq(i), a node grants the lease if the sender of the “LeaseRequest”
is its direct neighbor. The Definition 4.2.14 illustrates its formal description.
Definition 4.2.14 (Action: RecLReq(i)).
RecLReq(i)
∆
=
∧ status[i ] ∈ {“ok”, “ready”}
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “LeaseRequest”
∧ m.destination = i
∧ grant ′ = [except ![i ] =
if m.mreq .node ∈ {LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]),RightNeighbor(lset [i ])}
then grant [i ] ∪ {m.mreq .node}
else grant [i ]]
∧ receivedMsgs ′ = (receivedMsgs \ {m})
∪ {[destination 7→ m.mreq .node,mreq 7→
[type 7→ “LeaseReply”, lset 7→ lset [i ]
grant 7→ m.mreq .node ∈ {LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]),
RightNeighbor(lset [i ])}]]}
∧ unchanged 〈status, rtable, lset , probing , failed , lease, toj 〉
In action RecLReply(i), a node receives only “LeaseReply” from its neighbor as
explained for Algorithm 24. The formal description of the action RecLReply(i) is shown
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in Definition 4.2.15. As explained in Algorithm 24, a node will upgrade its status from
“ok” to “ready” if it has the leases from both its direct neighbors. Together with
upgrading, it sends the “LeaseReply” messages to both of its neighbors to announce its
new status. As stated by Algorithm 24, the action RecLReply(i) serves two purpose,
for the joining node to receive grants and upgrade its status, and also for the “ready”
node to receive grants from the joining node to release its variable toj , in order to accept
other join requests.
Definition 4.2.15 (Action: RecLReply(i)).
RecLReply(i)
∆
=
∧ status[i ] ∈ {“ready”, “ok”}
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “LeaseReply”
∧ m.destination = i
∧ m.mreq .lset .node ∈ {LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]),RightNeighbor(lset [i ])}
∧ let ln ∆= LeftNeighbor(lset [i ])
rn
∆
= RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
newlease
∆
= if m.mreq .grant = true
then lease[i ] ∪ {m.mreq .lset .node}
else lease[i ]
okToReady
∆
= ∧ ln ∈ newlease
∧ rn ∈ newlease
∧ status[i ] = “ok”
in ∧ lease ′ = [except ![i ] = newlease]
∧ toj ′ = [except ![i ] = if toj [i ] = m.mreq .lset .node then i else toj [i ]]
∧ status ′ = [except ![i ] = if okToReady then “ready” else status[i ]]
∧ grant ′ = [except ![i ] =
if okToReady
then grant [i ] ∪ {LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]),RightNeighbor(lset [i ])}
else grant [i ]]
∧ receivedMsgs ′ = if okToReady
then (receivedMsgs \ {m})
∪ {[destination 7→ LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]),
mreq 7→ [type 7→ “LeaseReply”,
lset 7→ lset [i ], grant 7→ true]]}
∪ {[destination 7→ RightNeighbor(lset [i ]),
mreq 7→ [type 7→ “LeaseReply”,
lset 7→ lset [i ], grant 7→ true]]}
else (receivedMsgs \ {m})
∧ unchanged 〈lset , rtable, probing , failed〉
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4.2.5 Statuses
As already illustrated in Section 3.3.2, different statuses of the nodes are defined to
distinguish the different phrases one node has, when it is joining the network.
Definition 4.2.16 (Status).
ReadyNodes
∆
= {i ∈ I : status[i ] = “ready”}
OKNodes
∆
= {i ∈ I : status[i ] = “ok”}
ReadyOK
∆
= ReadyNodes ∪OKNodes
WaitNodes
∆
= {i ∈ I : status[i ] = “waiting”}
DeadNodes
∆
= {i ∈ I : status[i ] = “dead”}
Here the status is one of the variables of the Pastry model as introduced in Def-
inition 4.2.1. Here new names are assigned to sets of nodes with particular statuses.
The status of a node i can be expressed either using variable name with indicator
(statusi = “ready”) or using membership of the sets defined above (i ∈ ReadyNodes).
The reason different ways are used to express the same thing is that the model checker
TLC can work more efficiently by accessing directly the variables in the first way, while
the second way is more readable and adequate for the theorem prover TLAPS.
It is obvious that the four subsets of nodes, as defined in Definition 4.2.16: ReadyNodes,
OKNodes, WaitNodes and DeadNodes, are disjoint. As explained in Section 3.3.2, a
node is initially either a member of ReadyNodes or DeadNodes. As soon as it sends the
“JoinRequest” message, it becomes a member of WaitNodes, which means it is waiting
to become member of OKNodes. After it has completed its leaf sets and received all
the “ProbeReply” messages, it will become member of OKNodes. Once it has obtained
both leases from its left and right neighbors, it will become a member of ReadyNodes.
Only members of ReadyNodes can deliver “Lookup” messages or reply to “JoinRequest”
messages.
4.3 The Correctness Properties
This section summarizes the correctness properties of the Pastry model that the thesis
has verified.
4.3.1 Type Correctness
Since TLA+ does not have type, state variables should conform to their desired data
structures, such that accessing components of them will be always successful. For ex-
ample, status[i ] should access the state variable status of a particular node i and it
is supposed to be one of the states, not a node identifier. The correctness of “types”
are defined as state property TypeInvariant and then proved to be an invariant for the
system as shown in Theorem 4.3.1.
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Theorem 4.3.1 (Type Correctness). Spec ⇒ TypeInvariant
The state property TypeInvariant is shown in Property 4.3.2, which defines an ex-
hausted type constraints for all state variables. Most of the variables are functional
mappings from node identifiers to a set of identifiers. The leaf set of a node must be
an instance of data structure LSet . Besides, the node component of the leaf set must
coincides with the corresponding node identifier. Since a node only allows one node to
join through it at a time, the variable toj always maps a node identifier to another.
Property 4.3.2 (TypeInvariant).
TypeInvariant
∆
= ∧ receivedMsgs ∈ subset DMsg
∧ status ∈ [I → {“ready”, “ok”, “waiting”, “dead”}]
∧ lease ∈ [I → subset I ]
∧ grant ∈ [I → subset I ]
∧ rtable ∈ [I → RTable]
∧ lset ∈ [I → LSet ] ∧ ∀i ∈ I : lset [i ].node = i
∧ probing ∈ [I → subset I ]
∧ failed ∈ [I → subset I ]
∧ toj ∈ [I → I ]
4.3.2 Safety Property
The major verification goal of this thesis is to show that the Pastry protocol as formally
modeled above confirms (ensures) the safety property CorrectDelivery , saying that the
key will be delivered by the correct node, which should be the only one responsible node
covering the key.
Formally speaking as Theorem 4.3.3, the verification goal is to show that given the
formulas defined for Pastry as Spec, it can be entailed that the property CorrectDelivery
always holds.
Theorem 4.3.3 (Correctness of Pastry). Spec ⇒ CorrectDelivery
As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 3, the main safety property of Pastry is
that there can be only one node responsible for any key at any time. This is formally
expressed as follows.
Property 4.3.4 (CorrectDelivery).
CorrectDelivery
∆
= ∀i , k ∈ I :
enabled Deliver(i , k)
⇒ ∧ ∀n ∈ I \ {k} : status[n] = “ready”⇒ AbsDist(i , k) ≤ AbsDist(n, k)
∧ ∀j ∈ I \ {i} : ¬enabled Deliver(j , k)
The property CorrectDelivery asserts that whenever node i can execute the action
Deliver(i , k) for key k then both of the following statements are true:
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• The node i has minimal absolute distance from the key k among all the “ready”
nodes in the network.
• The node i is the only node that may execute the action Deliver(i , k) for the key
k .
Observe that there can be two nodes with minimal distance from k , to either side of the
key. Therefore, the asymmetry in the definition of LeftCover(ls, k) and RightCover(ls, k)
in Definition 4.1.2 is designed to break the tie and ensure that only one node is allowed
to deliver.
From the definition of the action Deliver(i , k)(see Definition 4.2.2), it is intuitive
to see that the Theorem 4.3.3 is related to the Coverage of node i w.r.t. the key k .
Observing the definition of Covers(ls, k) in Definition 4.1.2, it is intuitive to tell that the
correct knowledge about neighborhood of a node is the essential key to ensure correct
coverage. This intuition leads to the discovery of the property NeighborProp.
Property 4.3.5 (NeighborProp).
NeighborProp
∆
= HalfNeighbor ∧NeighborClosest
The property NeighborProp consists of two properties: HalfNeighbor and Neighbor-
Closest . The property HalfNeighbor basically asserts that whenever there is more than
one “ready” or “ok” node i , then the left and right neighbors of every such node i are
different from i . In other words, the leaf sets of such a node i can not be empty, followed
by the lemma EmptyLSNoNeighbor introduced in Lemma 4.1.3 in Section 4.1.2. The
other case states that some node considers itself its neighbor (on both sides) and in fact
that node is the only ReadyOK node.
Property 4.3.6 (HalfNeighbor).
HalfNeighbor
∆
=
∨∀k ∈ ReadyOK :
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [k ]) 6= k
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [k ]) 6= k
∨∃k ∈ ReadyOK :
∧ ReadyOK = {k}
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [k ]) = k
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [k ]) = k
The property NeighborClosest states that the left and right neighbors of any “ready”
node i lie closer to i than any other “ready” node j .
Property 4.3.7 (NeighborClosest).
NeighborClosest
∆
= ∀i , j ∈ ReadyNodes :
i 6= j ⇒ ∧ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]), i) ≤ CwDist(j , i)
∧ CwDist(i ,RightNeighbor(lset [i ])) ≤ CwDist(i , j )
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In the next chapter, the model checker TLC is employed to validate that the prop-
erty NeighborProp is an invariant for the Pastry protocol specified as spec in Defini-
tion 4.2.1 with up to 4 nodes as instances. Finally in Chapter 6 a complete formal
proof will be unfolded starting with the formal proof of reducing CorrectDelivery to
NeighborProp.
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This chapter explains how the model checker TLC introduced in Section 1.2 is employed
to analyze and validate the Pastry models CastroPastry, HaeberlenPastry and
LuPastry. In Section 5.2, CastroPastry and HaeberlenPastry are analyzed with
help of the violation trace of property CorrectDelivery and NeighborClosest . Then it
is demonstrated how the interesting properties of LuPastry (specified in Chapter 4),
such as Symmetry , are analyzed. After that, Section 5.3 describes how TLC is used to
validate LuPastry.
5.1 Introduction
The following screen shot in Figure 5.1 shows the user interface of the TLA+ toolbox
when it launches the model checker TLC on Pastry for finding and analyzing counterex-
amples.
Figure 5.1: Screen shot of the TLA+ Toolbox running model checker TLC.
In Figure 5.1, configuring a run of model checking is illustrated in the Model Overview
feature in the left half of the picture. In the upper-left window, a user interface is
provided to specify the initial state and the Next formula, or directly temporal formula
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as the specification. In the windows below, the properties or invariants are added into
the lists respectively.
On top of the middle in Figure 5.1, system parameters introduced in Section 3.1.1
are configured in the window. In the following sections without explicit clarification, the
system parameter B as introduced in Section 3.1.1 is set to 2, meaning that the identifier
of a node is represented in 4-based system as shown in the example in Figure 3.1. The
parameter L for the length of leaf set as introduced in Section 3.1.1 is set to 1 and M for
the maximal identifier space as introduced also in Section 3.1.1 is set to 8. In order to
restrict the state space, the identifier space from [0..2M − 1] as defined in Section 4.1.1
is initialized with four arbitrary nodes I
∆
= {17, 55, 65, 95}. For convenience1, node
identifiers shown in the examples for model checking are simply written in decimal. The
system parameter A is initialized with the set {17}, which means that at the beginning
there is only one “ready” node in the network.
There are other options of running TLC, for example, the checkbox in the mid-left
provides the option if the TLC should check deadlocks, and the counter and turning
bar at the center of the screen let user configure how many threads and resources of
memory should the TLC use. There are advanced options summarized in another view,
where breadth-first search or depth-first search is selected. By default, TLC is run in
breadth-first search. When all the configuration options are chosen, the button“Run
TLC” at the bottom in the middle can be clicked to launch the model checker. Then
the view of Model Checking Results will be shown in the front layer, demonstrating the
current depth of model exploration and the number of explored states, distinct states
and unexplored states in the queue.
The trace exploration features on the right half of the Figure 5.1 demonstrates the
trace of the found counterexample. Changed state variables are highlighted and clicking
on the line of one particular state variable unfolds the details of its value in the window
below. When double clicking on the action in the trace, as the tool tips suggest, the
definition predicate of this action shows up in the left half of the screen, covering the
Model Overview. The Error-Trace Exploration features in the middle on the right side
allows additional formulas being evaluated after a counterexample was found, in order
to help find out the reason causing the violation.
This TLA+ toolbox is employed to discover counterexamples for analysis purpose
thanks to its interactive user interface. Before this was developed in 2011, each run
of TLC had been launched by command line with help of a separate configuration file
for TLC to find the assignment of all the system parameters. This traditional way is
still used for generating log files for important counterexamples and for validation of the
model on remote servers, where huge system resources are allocated and controlled over
a long time without human attendance.
1According to the definition of B above, these four nodes can be interpreted as 4-based numbers for
routing table and calculation of prefixes, namely (0101)4, (0313)4, (1001)4 and (1133)4. However, it
is a convention in TLA+ to write all the numbers as naturals in decimal base.
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5.2 Model Analysis on Pastry Properties
Various models of Pastry are specified in TLA+ according to different designs of Pastry
and verification purposes. In this section, only the analysis on CastroPastry based
on Castro et al. (2004), HaeberlenPastry based on Haeberlen et al. (2005) and Lu-
Pastry will be demonstrated. Other versions of Pastry model together with their model
checking results are available online at VeriDis (2013).
Again, to restrict the state space, the routing table structure RTable as formalized
in Definition 4.1.4 is simplified from a matrix to a set as specified in Definition 5.2.1.
Correspondingly, the operations on routing tables are also simplified to set operations.
For example the AddToTable(delta, rt , i) for adding new entries into a routing table is
simplified to a union of the two sets rt and delta.
Definition 5.2.1 (Simplified Routing Table (rt ∈ RTable, delta ∈ subset I ,n ∈ I ).
RTable
∆
= subset I
InitRTable
∆
= {}
AddToTable(delta, rt ,n)
∆
= delta ∪ rt
Since the position of a node within the routing table is no more relevant to the
simplified version, the function findNext(i , j ) as formalized in Definition 4.2.5 is also
simplified as shown in Definition 5.2.2, in the way that finding the specific entry position
from the routing table is omitted. If the node is not covered within the range of leaf
sets, it simply takes all nodes from its routing table and leaf sets and choose the one
with minimal distance to the key.
Definition 5.2.2 (Simplified Function: findNext(i , j )).
findNext(i , j )
∆
=
let lsCan
∆
= GetLSetContent(lset [i ]) \ failed [i ]
canrelax
∆
= {can ∈ (GetLSetContent(lset [i ]) ∪GetRTableContent(rtable[i ]))
\failed [i ] : AbsDist(j , can) < AbsDist(j , i)}
in if Overlaps(lset [i ]) ∨ CwDist(LeftMost(lset [i ]), j ) ≤
CwDist(LeftMost(lset [i ]),RightMost(lset [i ]))
then choose n ∈ lsCan : ∀m ∈ lsCan : AbsDist(n, j ) ≤ AbsDist(m, j )
else if canrelax 6= {}
then choose can ∈ canrelax : ∀m ∈ canrelax : AbsDist(can, j ) ≤ AbsDist(m, j )
else i
5.2.1 Analysis of CorrectDelivery on CastroPastry
Initial results on model checking the Pastry specification appear in Lu et al. (2010).
In this paper, a problem is found for joining new nodes in CastroPastry. If two
nodes join concurrently between two neighbor “ready” nodes, then the leaf sets of the
new nodes may be incomplete, eventually leading to a situation where both nodes claim
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Row Action lseta lsetb lsetc lsetd
0 Join (b, c) || Join (a, d) N/A N/A {d} {a}
1 RecJReq (c, b) || RecJReq (d, a) N/A N/A {d} {c}
2 RecJReply (b, c) N/A {c, d} {d} {c}
3 RecJReply (a, d) {c, d} {c, d} {d} {c}
4 probe (a, c) || . . . || probe (b, d) {c, d} {c, d} {d} {c}
5 RecProbe (c, a) {c, d} {c, d} {d, a} {c}
6 RecProbe (d, b) {c, d} {c, d} {d, a} {c, b}
7 RecProbe (c, b) {c, d} {c, d} {d, b} {c, b}
8 RecProbe (d, a) {c, d} {c, d} {d, b} {c, a}
9 RecPRply (a, c) || . . . || RecPRply (b, d) {c, d} {c, d} {d, b} {c, a}
10 Lookup (a, b) || Lookup (b, b) {c, d} {c, d} {d, b} {c, a}
Table 5.1: Concurrent Join Violation of CorrectDelivery in CastroPastry
responsibility for the same key. This problem was introduced in Section 3.2.1 and here
it will be explained in details how TLC model checker found the counterexample.
The model checker TLC is run in its breath-first mode and it has discovered a
violation of the property CorrectDelivery , introduced in Property 4.3.4 when it reaches
the depth of 17, after it has explored 490915 states, of which 47193 states are distinct.
Figure 5.1 shows the screen shot how TLC demonstrates the violation and Figure 5.2
illustrates this violation trace in detail together with Table 5.1.
In this and later sections, violation traces of model checking specific properties will
be illustrated in an abbreviated way, in the sense that not each state after applying a
transition action will be illustrated, but only the “milestone” states, which show major
changes of the state variable. These abbreviated states are shown with step numbers in
a sequence starting from initial state 0 as shown in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1.
Initially nodes c and d are “ready” and the other nodes a and b are “dead” as
illustrated in Step 0 in Figure 5.2. Here the notation of status (“ready” or “dead”)
replaces the original notation active (true or false) used in CastroPastry to keep
the notion consistent with later examples, where intermediate statuses such as “waiting”
and “ok” are introduced.
Two nodes a and b concurrently join between nodes c and d as shown in Step 1
in Table 5.1. According to their location on the ring as shown in Step 0 in Figure 5.2,
the join request from node b is handled by node c, the join request from node a is
handled by node d . Subsequently, node b receives the “JoinReply” message from c
and node a from d as shown in Step 2 and 3 respectively in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1.
Same as in Figure 3.12 illustrated in Section 3.3.1, the solid arrow from node b to c
on the clockwise arc shows that node b considers c as its direct clockwise neighbor,
while the counter clockwise arc from node b to d represents that node d is the direct
counter-clockwise neighbor of node b.
Both nodes a and b learn about the presence of c and d , and add them to their leaf
sets, then send probe requests to both c and d as shown in Step 4 in Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.2: Violation trace of concurrent join in CastroPastry.
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Now, node c first receives the “Probe” message from node a as show in Step 5.
Learning that a new node has joined, which is closer than the previous entry in the
respective leaf sets, node c updates its leaf sets with a. Subsequently node c receives
the “Probe” message from node b. It learns of the existence of a new node b to its left,
which is closer to the one currently in its leaf sets (node a) and therefore updates its
leaf sets by replacing a with b, then sends this updated leaf sets within it “ProbeReply”
message back to b as shown in Step 6.
Similarly after that, node d first handles the “Probe” message from node b as shown
in Step 7 and at last it receives “Probe” message from a, similarly it replaces node b from
its leaf sets with node a and replies a with this leaf sets in the “ProbeReply” message
as shown in Step 8.
The subsequent transitions are abbreviated as Step 9 in Table 5.1, because receiving
the “ProbeReply” messages does not increase any information of node a and b, due to
the updated leaf sets in the “ProbeReply” messages as mentioned before.
The violation occurs when “Lookup” messages for the key b coming concurrently to
node a and node b as Step 10 illustrated in Table 5.1. According to the shared coverage
of node a and b illustrated as white sector in Step 10 in Figure 5.2, the “Lookup”
message for the key b can be delivered both by a and b and hence violates the property
CorrectDelivery .
The designers of Pastry point to a technical report Haeberlen et al. (2005) that
provides a solution for this problem, according to which an updated model Haeberlen-
Pastry was specified, as described in Section 3.2.2 and analyzed in details in the next
section.
5.2.2 Analysis of NeighborProp on HaeberlenPastry
HaeberlenPastry adds the lease granting protocol after the nodes has received all the
“ProbeReply” messages from candidate leaf set members. By analyzing Haeberlen-
Pastry as reported in ?, TLC is unable to find counterexample when it has been stopped
after running on the breath-first search mode for almost one day till the depth of 29,
exploring 1,697,559,249 states (123,813,996 distinct states). However, a counterexample
illustrated later will show that it does not hold, which is discovered after running TLC
for about 5 days till the depth of 34, exploring 23,782,311,896 states (1,303,220,907
distinct states). The results are summarized in Table 5.3 by the end of this section.
In fact, the property CorrectDelivery , is reduced to the property NeighborProp in
order to launch TLC in more efficient way to discover the potential counterexample.
The reason is that TLC has to be launched with lookup and routing protocol to violate
the property CorrectDelivery . These actions can be omitted for finding violation of
NeighborProp, which saves a huge state space. The correctness of reduction is proved
using TLAPS, which will be explained later in Section 6.1.
Since the invariant NeighborProp consists of two separate invariant HalfNeighbor
and NeighborClosest , these two invariants are analyzed separately, in order to identify
which one of them is indeed violated.
By analyzing property NeighborClosest onHaeberlenPastry, TLC has discovered
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a counter example against NeighborClosest introduced in Section 3.2.4. Although the
analysis leads to several improvements of the model, which then makes reproducing of
the counterexample impossible, analysis result based on the output gives enough details
of how a counterexample may occur. Here the details are explored in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Violation trace of departure and rejoin of nodes in HaeberlenPastry (part
1).
Initially, only node b is “ready” and all the other three nodes are “dead” as illustrated
in Figure 5.3. Then, nodes a, c and d concurrently join by b. Observe that there is no
restriction on how many nodes can join by one node. Since b is the only “ready” node,
all “JoinRequest” messages contains node b as their destination.
In the next transitions, node b replies the “JoinRequest” messages from the nodes
a, c and d one after another. The “JoinReply” message sent from b to d is delayed,
while nodes a and c receive the “JoinReply” messages from b and probes b back. They
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Figure 5.4: Violation trace of departure and rejoin of nodes in HaeberlenPastry (part
2).
also probe each other, such that they finally become “ok” as illustrated in Step 1 in
Figure 5.3.
Subsequently, nodes a and c request leases from their neighbors {c, b} and {b, a},
then node b replies the “LeaseRequest” messages to a and c, as well as nodes a and c
reply to each other’s “LeaseRequest” messages. Hence, nodes a and c become “ready”
as shown in Step 2 illustrated in Figure 5.3.
Eventually node b leaves the network silently as Step 3 illustrated in Figure 5.3. By
this time, the delayed message from the previously “ready” node b to the waiting node
d is received by node d , which makes node d believe that b were the only “ready” node
on the network. So node d probes b in Step 4 illustrated in Figure 5.3. Regard that
nodes a and c are the real “ready” neighbor of d according to their positions on the
ring, but none of them are aware of node d .
Node b then rejoined the network by sending “JoinRequest” message to node a.
Then, node b processed the probing message from d and replied it. As a waiting node, b
should handle “Probe” messages. As an effect, node b adds d as its only leaf set member
and sends “ProbeReply” message back to node d . This change is summarized as Step 5
illustrated in Figure 5.3.
When node d received the “ProbeReply” messages from node b and has no other
nodes as new candidates to probe, hence became “ok”, as the Step 6 in Figure 5.4.
Remember that node b has tried to join through node a, but node a has not yet
received this “JoinRequest” message from b. Since there is no mechanism to make
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sure that node b must wait for the “JoinReply” message to become “ok”, any incoming
“ProbeReply” message may finish the probing process of node b and make it “ok”.
Notice that this example is based on HaeberlenPastry with the node departure
and mechanism for repairing the leaf sets illustrated in the flow chart in Figure 3.6.
Here node b repairs its leaf sets by probing node d as it is the only node in its leaf sets.
This “Probe” message will be replied by node d , which considers b as its only neighbor.
Subsequently, node b receives the “ProbeReply” message from node d and hence become
“ok”, as illustrated in the seventh stage in Figure 5.4.
As final step, node d requests the lease from node b, which then grants the lease
because it is an “ok” node. Therefore, node d becomes “ready”, considering the node b
as its only neighbor, whereas node a and c are ignored by node d , as illustrated in the
eighth stage in Figure 5.4.
Consequently, the coverage between node d and node c becomes shared by these two
nodes as the white sector shown in the last stage in Figure 5.4. This is a violation of the
invariant NeighborClosest . When eventually a “Lookup” message for a key k within this
range comes out, both of nodes c and d are able to deliver this message, which violates
the property CorrectDelivery . Discovering the violation of NeighborClosest has already
taken more than a day
This counterexample shows that allowing a joining node waiting for the “JoinReply”
message to receive “Probe” message can cause disorder of the join process of a node and
hence violates the NeighborProp property. A final fix to prevent this case is to add
a precondition for handling any incoming “Probe” message , that only “ready” nodes
or nodes that already have some leaf set members, can handle a “Probe” message, as
illustrated in Algorithm 20 and specified in Definition 4.2.11, which ensures that they
have already received the “JoinReply” message.
However, this improvement is not sufficient to ensure the safety property, because
further counterexamples can occur when separation of the network occurs or many nodes
join concurrently by one node, which will be discussed later in in Section 6.4.1 and
Section 6.4.2.
5.2.3 Analysis of Invariants of Final Model of Pastry
After several improvements of the Pastry model with help of counter examples, TLC
cannot find any more violation of the invariant NeighborClosest after running for more
than five weeks, reaching the depth of 34. Having gained the confidence of correctness of
the final Pastry model as illustrated in Section 3.3 and specified in Chapter 4, inductive
proof of the property NeighborClosest has been started with the idea of extending the
invariants to prove their conjunctions as inductive invariants. The following example
illustrates how TLC was used to refute a candidate invariant during that approach.
Here the property NeighborClosest is reduced again to two symmetrical invariants:
one saying that there exist no “ready” node between a “ready” node and its right neigh-
bor; the other saying that there exist no “ready” node between a “ready” node and its
left neighbor. Then it is interesting to see if the leaf set membership is symmetrical,
because the ring of identifiers of Pastry is a symmetrical geometric object. Moreover,
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the left and right leaf set structures on the ring are symmetrical.
Property 5.2.3 (Symmetry of leaf set membership).
Symmetry
∆
=
∀i , j ∈ I : status[i ] = “ready” ∧ status[j ] = “ready”
⇒ (i ∈ GetLSetContent(lset [j ])⇔ j ∈ GetLSetContent(lset [i ]))
It is intuitive that during the join process, the symmetry of leaf set membership
does not hold, but what about for those nodes in a stable stage? The invariant above is
talking about two “ready” nodes, which have already finished their joining process, so
it is not obvious to see why this can be violated. Unfortunately, the property Symmetry
is violated during the execution of the join protocol, where TLC yields the following
counterexample as illustrated in Figure 5.5.
“waiting”
“ready”
“ready”
“ready” a
b
c
d
Figure 5.5: Violation trace of property Symmetry in LuPastry.
Suppose that three “ready” nodes a, b and c are on the ring and a node d between
nodes a and c wants to join, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. The node a has received the
“JoinRequest” message from d and according to the improved join protocol in action
RecJReq illustrated in Algorithm 18 and specified in Definition 4.2.8, node a replaces
node c by d in its leaf sets (assuming a leaf set size of 1). Thus, the symmetry is broken,
because node c still has node a in its leaf sets.
Violation of Symmetry indicates that showing a “ready” node a is the direct left
neighbor of another “ready” node c can not prove that node c is the direct right neighbor
of the node a.
5.3 Validation
It is all too easy to introduce errors into a model that prevent the system from ever
performing any useful transition, it is therefore important to ensure that nodes can suc-
cessfully perform Deliver actions or execute the join protocol described in Section 4.2.
The model checker TLC was used with assertions of their impossibility, using the fol-
lowing formulas.
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5.3.1 Successful Join and Deliver
First of all, the Pastry model should be able to deliver a “Lookup” message as well as
let a new node join.
Property 5.3.1 (NeverDeliver and NeverJoin).
NeverDeliver
∆
= ∀i , j ∈ I : [¬Deliver(i , j )]vars
NeverJoin
∆
= ∀j ∈ I \A : (status[j ] 6= “ready”)
The first formula asserts that the Deliver action can never be executed, for any
i , j ∈ I . Similarly, the second formula asserts that the only nodes that may ever become
“ready” are those in the set A of nodes initialized to be “ready”. The model checker pro-
duces counter examples to these claims within 1 second, which evidenced the possibility
of successful join of node and deliver of key. This empirical result based on validation of
LuPastry is shown in the first two lines in the Table 5.2 in Section 5.3.3.
5.3.2 Successful Concurrent Join of Nodes
Being confident that join and lookup services are available in the model as shown
above, more advanced functionality tests are conducted in a similar way. For exam-
ple, model checking formulas ConcurrentJoin and CcJoinDeliver yields counterexam-
ples that demonstrate how two nodes may join concurrently in close proximity to the
same existing node, and how they may subsequently execute Deliver actions for keys for
which they acquired responsibility.
Property 5.3.2 (ConcurrentJoin).
LightNext
∆
= ∃i , j ∈ I : ∨ Deliver(i , j )
∨ RouteJReq(i , j ) ∨ RouteLookup(i , j )
∨ RecJReq(i) ∨ RecJReply(j )
∨ RecProbe(i) ∨ RecPRply(j )
∨ RecLReq(i) ∨ RecLReply(i)
∨ RequestLease(i) ∨ MsgLost
MCCJA
∆
= {17, 95}
CJNext
∆
= ∨ Join(65, 95)
∨ Join(55, 17)
∨ Join(70, 95)
∨ LightNext
SpecConcJoin
∆
= Init ∧[CJNext ]vars
ConcurrentJoin
∆
= ¬(status[95] = “ready”
∧ status[17] = “ready”
∧ status[65] = “ready”
∧ status[70] = “ready”
∧ status[55] = “ready”)
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In these model checking cases, such as the example illustrated in Property 5.3.2,
concrete examples are constructed to prevent the state explosion problem. Instead of
using the Next formula defined in the general specification of Pastry in Definition 4.2.1,
where the action Join and Lookup can be invoked for all possible nodes, restricted set
of actions is defined in model checking experiments. In this example Property 5.3.2,
LightNext is different from Next in the way that no Join or Lookup actions are included.
Then the specific Join and Lookup actions with particular nodes are added to the set of
possible actions as in CJNext in Property 5.3.2 to see if these nodes could be joined or
if a particular key could be delivered.
In Property 5.3.2 a specific model checking scenario is constructed for the prop-
erty ConcurrentJoin starting with two “ready” nodes: MCCJA
∆
= {17, 95}. The new
parameter MCCJA is defined to replace the system parameter A introduced in Defini-
tion 4.2.1 for the initiating “ready” nodes. Another way to do this is to initiate the
system parameter A directly by launching the model checker each time. The new speci-
fication SpecConcJoin is formalized to replace the specification Spec in Definition 4.2.1,
where the restricted LightNext is extended with three particular joins of nodes into the
network.
After running TLC for 4 seconds on the model SpecConcJoin in LuPastry, it finds
a violation trace of the property ConcurrentJoin as shown in the third line of Table 5.2,
illustrating how these nodes have concurrently joined into the network after exploring
27,802 states (2348 distinct states) when it reaches the depth of breath-first search by
23.
Another model checking scenario is constructed for property CcJoinDeliver in Prop-
erty 5.3.3, starting with the system parameter: MCCJDA
∆
= {17}, meaning only one
“ready” node 17 is initially in the network. The specification SpecCcJD is formalized
with the disjunction CCJDNext , which extends the LightNext (as first introduced in
Property 5.3.2) with joining action of node 95 and 55. Furthermore, the Lookup action
is added into CCJDNext to lookup a key 65 by node 95.
After running TLC on LuPastry for 2 seconds, it finds a violation trace, illustrating
how these nodes have concurrently joined into the network and provided a successful
lookup service after exploring 18,119 states (1619 distinct states) in the depth of 23.
Property 5.3.3 (CcJoinDeliver).
MCCJDA
∆
= {17}
CCJDNext
∆
= ∨ Join(95, 17)
∨ Join(55, 17)
∨ Lookup(95, 65)
∨ LightNext
SpecCcJD
∆
= Init ∧[CCJDNext ]vars
CcJoinDeliver
∆
= [@i , j ∈ I :Deliver(i , j )
∧ status[95] = “ready”
∧ status[17] = “ready”
∧ status[55] = “ready”]vars
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Properties Time Depth # States counterexample
NeverDeliver < 1” 4 9 yes
NeverJoin < 1” 9 28 yes
ConcurrentJoin 4” 23 27,802 yes
CcJoinDeliver 4” 23 18,119 yes
Symmetry 4” 24 26,970 yes
NeighborProp > 5 weeks 34 331,300,918,096 no
CorrectDelivery > 5 weeks 34 331,300,918,096 no
Table 5.2: Validation results of LuPastry with 4 nodes, leaf set length L = 1
5.3.3 Summary of Model Checking Results
After the Pastry model was improved based on the counterexamples illustrated in Sec-
tion 5.2, the final Pastry model LuPastry, which is specified in Chapter 4, is validated
against the property CorrectDelivery and NeighborProp in the previous section.
Table 5.2 summarizes the model checking experiments described so far for 4 nodes.
The model checker TLC is launched in command line mode with 40 worker threads
(hyper-threaded on 20 CPUs) on a 64 Bit Linux server with Xeon(R) CPU E7-4860
running at 2.27GHz with 256 GB of shared memory.
For each run, Table 5.2 reports the running time, the number of states generated
until TLC found a counterexample (or, in the case of Property 4.3.4, until the pro-
cess is killed), and the largest depth of these states. For example, the verification of
Property 4.3.4 is stopped after running TLC for more than five weeks without any
counterexample as illustrated in the last two lines in Table 5.2. Since the model checker
TLC is run in breadth-first search mode, if the model contains a counterexample to this
property, it must be of depth at least 34.
As introduced in the previous chapter, the NeighborProp property is the conjunction
HalfNeighbor ∧ NeighborClosest, to which the safety property CorrectDelivery can be
reduced (the proof is shown later in Section 6.1). The property HalfNeighbor here
simply states that a node either has nodes in both sides of its leaf sets or it has empty
leaf sets, which rules out the situation that a node has only half of the leaf sets.
With the strong assumption that no nodes leave the network, the validation of 3
nodes on the model with complex routing table structure as specified in Chapter 4 is
completed within about an hour. The model checker TLC has found 199, 466, 497 states,
of which 2, 293, 760 states are distinct. It reaches depth of 38. The validation of Pastry
on 4 nodes is not completed within 5 weeks, as illustrated in Table 5.2.
However, on the simplified Pastry models, where routing table is totally removed and
node are only allowed to join and lookup, the model checker has completed the validation
of LuPastry after 2 hours 15 minutes. It has found 16,064,479 states, 504,624 distinct
states and it has reached the depth of 49.
On the same simplified version of LuPastry, a validation with 5 nodes was com-
pleted after running the model checker for a week without any counterexamples. It has
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Pastry Version
(# Nodes)
Time Depth # States # Distinct
States
Result
CastroPastry
(4)
30 sec 17 490,915 47,193 Violated
Haeberlen-
Pastry (4)
> 20 hours 29 1,698 Mio. 124 Mio Interrupted
Simple
Haeberlen-
Pastry (4)
5 days 34 23,782 Mio. 1,303 Mio. Violated
LuPastry (3) 1 hour 38 199 Mio. 2 Mio. Validated
LuPastry (4) > 5 weeks 34 331,300 Mio. 1,984 Mio. Interrupted
Simple
LuPastry (4)
2 hours
15 min
49 16 Mio. 0.5 Mio. Validated
Simple
LuPastry (5)
1 week 54 7,070 Mio. 142 Mio. Validated
Table 5.3: Model Checking Property CorrectDelivery for different Pastry models with
different nodes, leaf set length L = 1
explored 7,070,872,610 states, under which 141,786,762 are distinct. It reached the depth
of 54. Verifying this simplified version leads to the conclusion that for a network of 5
particular nodes, LuPastry is completely correct under the assumption that no nodes
leave the network.
Table 5.3 summarizes the model checking results mentioned above verifying the
property CorrectDelivery on different Pastry models (CastroPastry, Haeberlen-
Pastry and LuPastry) and with different nodes (3, 4 and 5).
5.4 Experiences and Best Practices
The use of TLC helped to quickly explore different alternatives and ask “what-if” ques-
tions, and in this way produced different models are produced corresponding to possible
implementation choices.
The trace exploration features provided by TLC through the TLA+ toolbox were in-
valuable for understanding counterexamples produced for corner cases and for improving
the models.
However, TLC suffer from state explosion for complex systems as the one in this
thesis. Once TLC did no longer quickly produce error traces, one can turn to the
command-line version and let the model checker run on a multi-processor server. The
models shown above generate more than 30 billion states even for instances with just four
nodes; hash collisions are therefore highly probable. The use of several worker threads
during state exploration led to a significant speed-up and worked without a glitch.
Following are some best practices for using TLC to analyze complex system, in
particular to work around state explosion problem.
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First, there are several useful options provided by TLC. This thesis runs TLC using
shell script by following command.
java m.tla -difftrace -cleanup -deadlock -workers 40 -config m.cfg
Here the m.tla and m.cfg are the model checking TLA+ file and its corresponding
configuration file. The “deacklock” is used for checking the deadlock, “workers” for
running it with more threads to boots up the speed, “difftrace” for restricting the output
of violation trace such that it only shows the changed state variables for each step.
Second, the way to prune the state space is to avoid symmetries as shown in Prop-
erty 5.3.2. Here actions Join(i , j ) and Lookup(i , j ) are removed by LightNext and par-
ticular join actions are added to avoid the permutation of all possible joins of nodes. A
risk has to be noticed here that using this approach, the TLC can be only used to find
counterexamples. However, if the TLC provides no counterexamples but completely
explored all states, no confidence of the model can be gained.
Third, an advanced method to prune the state space is to reduce the complexity of
the data structure or even remove the “unnecessary” state variables. In this thesis, the
routing table is shown to be irrelevant for guaranteeing safety property. Hence, removing
routing table gains efficient discovery of potential design problems of protocol.
Fourth, it is recommended to write the TLA+ and the configuration files for TLC
more modular, such that different versions can be easily constructed for model checking.
In this thesis, definitions relevant to the ring, leaf set, routing tables and messages are
encapsulated in separate modules and the inclusion structure of the modules is like a
shell. Recall that TLA+ does not allow second declaration or definition of the same
name. Therefore, more complex structure is not possible. In this way, the module for
routing table can be removed with minimal changes of the model. Besides, a separate
model checking process is launched using separate configuration file for each validation
purpose. This makes it possible to have a statistical comparison with evidences as
illustrated in Table 5.3.
115

6 Formal Proof of the Property
CorrectDelivery
The theorem proving approach starts with HaeberlenPastry but it fails because
a counterexample of NeighborClosest is discovered during the proof of Haeberlen-
Pastry. In a first step, hypothetical invariants HalfNeighbor and NeighborClosest of
the underlying data structures are stated. Note that they do not have arguments because
all state variables are implicitly the arguments of all properties. HalfNeighbor states that
the leaf set of a “ready” or “ok” node is never empty (contains only itself) except that
it is the only “ready” or “ok” node on the ring. NeighborClosest basically states that
no “ready” node lies between a “ready” node and its direct neighbor according to its
leaf set. TLAPS, the interactive TLA+ proof system (Chaudhuri et al. (2010)), is used
to prove that these imply the global correctness property CorrectDelivery , which states
that a key is always delivered by the closest “ready” node and no other “ready” nodes
deliver it at the same time. The reduction result is published in ? and Lu et al. (2011).
The reduction proof is explained in Section 6.1.
Section 6.2 illustrates the inductive approaches for proving property NeighborProp,
which is conjunction of HalfNeighbor and NeighborClosest . First, a detailed proof of
property HalfNeighbor on LuPastry (which was originally constructed for an early
version of LuPastry but then adapted to LuPastry) is explained to demonstrate how
the invariant is extended during the proof and is finally proved inductively. Then, the
problem of finding the inductive invariants for proving NeighborClosest on LuPastry
is illustrated.
Subsequently, Section 6.3 demonstrates an inductive proof of a stronger invariant
CompleteLeafSet on IdealPastry (an intermediate version of LuPastry), subsuming
the invariant NeighborClosest , but postulating two strong hypotheses that no nodes are
allowed to leave the network and no nodes can concurrently join between two “ready”
nodes close to each other. NeighborClosest basically states that no “ready” nodes lies
between any node with non-empty leaf sets and its direct neighbors according to its
leaf sets. IdealPastry shares the same definitions for actions of HaeberlenPastry
except that it has a new variable toj and the preconditions of RecJReq(i) checks of
the neighbor’s toj value, to implement the lock, namely, a node i does not answer a
“JoinRequest” message if itself or its neighbors currently help new node to join. Besides,
it improves several draw backs of HaeberlenPastry according to Section 3.2.4. It uses
a passive way to unlock the toj : The lock will be released when the “ready” node i non-
deterministically requires its leases from the joining node j after it has become “ready”.
By receiving a “LeaseReply” message from j , the node i releases its toj lock. The formal
model of IdealPastry and its proof are available online at VeriDis (2013).
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After that, Section 6.4 illustrates how the assumptions are relaxed. The assumption
that no nodes leave the network cannot be relaxed because separation of the network may
occur as shown in Section 6.4.1. Concurrent join can be allowed with a relaxed restriction
that a “ready” node can handle at most one joining node at a time, due to the many
concurrent join problem shown in Section 6.4.2. According to the relaxed assumption,
Pastry is further modified to the final version of LuPastry, and as a consequence, many
parts of the previous inductive proof of IdealPastry become invalid. The proof is then
analyzed using TLAPS and new invariants are constructed to adapt the proof for the
new protocol.
An inductive proof of the set of invariants on LuPastry (introduced in Section 3.3
and specified formally in Chapter 4) is illustrated in Section 6.5. The invariants are
formally specified with a short intuitive introduction and an example of the proof on
one core induction IRN , which subsumes NeighborClosest . IRN basically states that
the distance between any node and its direct neighbor is less or equal to the distance
from that node to any (other) “ready” nodes.
Finally, the general structure of TLA+ proof codes is demonstrated as the last part
of this chapter. A complete TLA+ proof are available online at in VeriDis (2013).
6.1 Reducing CorrectDelivery to NeighborProp
Using TLAPS, it is proved that NeighborProp, introduced in Section 4.3, implies Cor-
rectDelivery (Property 4.3.4). The formal proof is reduced to the proofs of the following
two lemmas: CoverageLemma and DisjointCovers.
Lemma 6.1.1 shows that assuming NeighborProp (NeighborClosest and HalfNeigh-
bor), for any two different “ready” nodes i 6= n and key k , then if node i covers k , then
i must be at least as close to k as n.
Lemma 6.1.1 (Coverage Lemma).
HalfNeighbor ∧NeighborClosest
⇒ ∀i ,n ∈ ReadyNodes : ∀k ∈ I : i 6= n ∧ Covers(lset [i ], k)
⇒ AbsDist(i , k) ≤ AbsDist(n, k)
Proof. For the sake of a contradiction, assume that k is covered by i but that there exists
another “ready” node n 6= i , which is closer to k than i as illustrated in Figure 6.1, then
try to derive false. This can occur in two cases: n and i are on the same side of k ,
hence n lies between i and k , or nodes i and n lie on opposite sides of the key k , but n
is closer. Further distinguishing between the left and right neighborhoods of k leads to
four cases, of which two are sketched as follows. The other two cases are symmetrical.
Case 1: The node n and i are both to the left of k as illustrated in Figure 6.1.
According to the definition of Cover (Definition 4.1.2), the clockwise distance from i
to its right cover (RightCover(lset [i ]) in Definition 4.1.2) is strictly smaller than the
clockwise distance from i to rn (the right neighbor of node i). As shown in the Case 1
in Figure 6.1, node rn is the right neighbor of node i and hence the right coverage of
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node i is only a half from node i to node rn, as shown in the white sector. Here in order
to let node i cover k , node rn must locate farther than twice of the distance from i to
k .
Notice that if the right neighbor of node i were itself, it could cover every node on
the ring. But one of the assumptions of CoverageLemma, the invariant HalfNeighbor
(defined in Invariant 4.3.6), states that if the right neighbor of a “ready” node is itself,
then it must be the only “ready” node on the ring. Since there are two “ready” nodes,
it is ensured that rn 6= i .
Moreover, by the assumption at the beginning of the proof, that n is closer to k than
i , and the condition for Case 1 that n and i are both to the left of k , the position of
node n must be chosen between node i and k , as illustrated in the Case 1 in Figure 6.1.
Using again the definition of Cover , it is straightforward to tell that the clockwise
distance from i to n is less than to its right cover. By transitivity, it follows that the
distance from i to n is smaller than the distance from i to rn, as illustrated in the Case
1 in Figure 6.1.
Another assumption of CoverageLemma, the invariant NeighborClosest (defined as
Invariant 4.3.7) states that the distance between i and its right neighbor rn is at most as
large as the distance between i and any other “ready” node n. Hence a contradiction of
the position of node n has been derived, which proves that in Case 1, the CoverageLemma
holds.
Case 2: Now suppose that i is to the left and n to the right of k as illustrated in
Case 2 in Figure 6.1. Since i covers k , the distance between node i and k is at most
as large as the distance between i and the right cover of i , which is half the distance
between i and its right neighbor rn.
According to the assumption NeighborClosest , the distance from i to rn is less
than the distance from i to n. Hence n must be chosen in the lower half circle in the
case 2 of Figure 6.1, such that the clockwise distance from i to n is larger than the
clockwise distance from i to its right neighbor rn. This has the effect that with the above
conclusion, the clockwise distance from i to k is less than half the clockwise distance
from i and n. Therefore, k is closer to i than to n, which contradicts the assumption at
the beginning of the proof.
The lemma DisjointCovers defined in Lemma 6.1.2 states that under the same hy-
potheses as CoverageLemma, if a “ready” node i covers key k then a different “ready”
node n cannot cover k at the same time.
Lemma 6.1.2 (Disjoint Covers).
HalfNeighbor ∧NeighborClosest
⇒ ∀i ,n ∈ ReadyNodes : ∀k ∈ I : i 6= n ∧ Covers(lset [i ], k)
⇒ ¬Covers(lset [n], k)
Proof. This lemma is also proved by contradiction. Assume that both nodes i and n
cover key k . By CoverageLemma in Lemma 6.1.1, the distances of i and n to k are the
119
6 Formal Proof of the Property CorrectDelivery
= RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
key
“ready”
“ready” Case 1 rn
k
n
i
= RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
key
“ready”
“ready” Case 2 rn
k
n
i
Figure 6.1: Case analysis for the proof sketch of CoverageLemma (Lemma 6.1.1).
same, i.e. k lies in the middle between i and n. W.l.o.g. assume that i is to the left of
n as illustrated in Figure 6.2. Because i and n are not identical and both of them are
“ready”, HalfNeighbor implies that RightNeighbor(lset [i ]) 6= i .
On one hand, by assumption NeighborClosest , no “ready” node lies between a
“ready” node and its direct neighbor, so the distance from i to n must be at least
that from i to rn. On the other hand, by the assumption that i covers k and the defi-
nition of coverage in Definition 4.1.2, the distance from i to RightNeighbor(lset [i ]) is at
least twice the distance from i to k . Satisfying both hands, the RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
can only be node n, as illustrated in Figure 6.2.
Now n is shown to be the right neighbor of i . The asymmetrical definitions of
LeftCover and RightCover in Definition 4.1.2 imply that node i does not share the
coverage with its direct neighbor, which contradict the assumption at the beginning of
this proof.
Theorem 6.1.3 (Reduction).
HalfNeighbor ∧NeighborClosest⇒ CorrectDelivery.
Taking together Lemma 6.1.1 and Lemma 6.1.2, Theorem 6.1.3 follows straightfor-
ward by unfolding the definition of the property names: HalfNeighbor , NeighborClosest
and CorrectDelivery . The formal verification in TLAPS is conducted in more complex
way. First, to avoid the problem introduced by the keyword enabled of the action
Deliver (cf. Definition 4.2.2). It is replaced with the enabling conditions of the action.
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= RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
key
“ready” n
k
i
Figure 6.2: Case analysis for the proof sketch of DisjointCovers (Lemma 6.1.2).
The reformulated property has the following definition:
CorrectCoverage
∆
= ∀i , k ∈ I :
∧ status[i ] = “ready”
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs : ∧ m.mreq .type = “Lookup”
∧ m.destination = i
∧ m.mreq .node = k
∧ Covers(lset [i ], k)
⇒ ∧ ∀n ∈ I : status[n] = “ready”⇒ AbsDist(i , k) ≤ AbsDist(n, k)
∧ @j ∈ I \ {i} : ∧ status[j ] = “ready”
∧ ∃m ∈ receivedMsgs : ∧ m.mreq .type = “Lookup”
∧ m.destination = j
∧ m.mreq .node = k
∧ Covers(lset [j ], k)
Then, the premises of the reduction is extended with the type correctness introduced in
Property 4.3.2 and the conjunction of all inductive invariants InvIdealPastry , which is
introduced later in Definition 6.5.2, such that the theorem is rewritten to the following
form:
TypeInvariant ∧ Inv ∧HalfNeighbor ∧NeighborClosest ⇒ CorrectCoverage
This theorem is proved using Lemma 6.1.1 and Lemma 6.1.2, together with the defi-
nitions of the mentioned property names HalfNeighbor , NeighborClosest and CorrectCoverage.
The proof is then automatically verified using TLAPS.
6.2 Towards an Inductive Proof of NeighborProp
In order to complete the proof that the specification of Pastry model (Definition 4.2.1)
satisfies the property CorrectDelivery (Property 4.3.4), it is enough by Theorem 6.1.3 to
show that every reachable state satisfies properties HalfNeighbor and NeighborClosest .
A predicate InvIdealPastry , initially consisting of NeighborClosest and HalfNeighbor
(InvIdealPastry
∆
= NeighborClosest ∧ HalfNeighbor) but then being strengthened, is
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defined and proved as inductive invariants using the induction rule as introduced in
Section 2.3.
The proof showing that the initial state satisfies InvIdealPastry is relative easy and
hence omitted to explain. In addition, a proof for the type correctness (Theorem 4.3.1)
is conducted also inductively, which is also conducted straightforward and hence omitted
the discussion. This theorem is used as lemma for proving other invariants, because type
correctness guarantees the access of the state variable is successful.
All the TLA+ proofs can be found in VeriDis (2013). The most subtle part was the
searching for inductive hypothesis for proving HalfNeighbor , which will be discussed as
follows.
6.2.1 Inductive Proof of Invariant HalfNeighbor
The property HalfNeighbor in restated as follows according to Definition 4.3.6 together
with TypeInvariant introduced in Property 4.3.2 is not sufficient to be the inductive
hypothesis, in order to derive after each execution of an action, that HalfNeighbor′ still
holds. Recall that primed variables refer to the values after the action as introduced in
Section 2.3.4.
HalfNeighbor
∆
=
∨∀k ∈ ReadyOK :
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [k ]) 6= k
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [k ]) 6= k
∨∃k ∈ ReadyOK :
∧ ReadyOK = {k}
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [k ]) = k
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [k ]) = k
Adding NeighborClosest into the inductive hypothesis will increase the complexity
of the invariant and make it even more infeasible. Hence, the HalfNeighbor is extended
during the invariant proof, such that it is only sufficient to prove itself.
More precisely, the appropriate extensions of HalfNeighbor are discovered case by
case when checking what is missing as prerequisites to prove HalfNeighbor′ on its in-
ductive proof at each action, and then strengthening HalfNeighbor by adding auxiliary
conjunctions in such way that it provides exactly the prerequisite for the proof. Each
time the invariant is extended, the model checker TLC is employed on the Pastry model
to help check if the new invariant holds on the model of four nodes. By violation of such
model checking approach, the formula derived from the last state of the counterexample
is used to reformulate the invariant. Details are illustrated as follows.
The methodology of the proof is by contradiction, namely, try to figure out why
a violation of the proof goal is not possible. Starting from the negated proving goal
as post condition of each action, it is either to contradict that the post condition is
not possible after applying the action, or to show that the precondition of the action
contradict already with the invariant, such that it is not applicable at all.
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In the proof of HalfNeighbor , starting from the original definition of HalfNeighbor in
Definition 4.3.6, the proof idea is to analyze the critical transition making HalfNeighbor′
not equal to HalfNeighbor . The state variables involved here are lset and status, where
lset is explicitly shown in the formula but status is implicitly involved by the set
ReadyOK , introduced in Definition 4.2.16 in Section 4.2.5.
The first task is to focus on the critical transition changing the set ReadyOK . Here
it is only interesting to focus on the case when ReadyOK is increased by a node, because
removing a node from the set ReadyOK cannot falsify HalfNeighbor : if the removed node
is the only node in ReadyOK , then the set ReadyOK ′ will be empty, which automatically
satisfy the first disjunct; if it is not, then by induction hypothesis, the rest of the nodes
satisfy the first disjunct.
The only possibility for a node to be added into the set ReadyOK is when it re-
ceives a “JoinReply” message and turns to “ok” from “waiting”. Hence proving that
HalfNeighbor ∧ RecPRply(i)⇒ HalfNeighbor′ is the crucial part of the induction proof
w.r.t. the changes on status. But the proof is so subtle that the original property
HalfNeighbor has to be extended in order to prove this step. The reason is explained as
follows.
According to the induction hypothesis of property HalfNeighbor , there are two cases
to analyze as the state before execution of the action RecPRply(i): either there are more
than one ReadyOK nodes on the ring, the leaf sets of which are not empty, or there is
only one ReadyOK node on ring, and it has no other node in its leaf sets.
The first case is easy to prove, because in action RecPRply(i) as specified in Defini-
tion 4.2.12, node i adds the node m.mreq .node into its leaf sets, which must be different
from i , because no node sends “ProbeReply” to itself (which is another invariant added
as extension for the proof). Therefore, the leaf sets of node i after execution of this
action contains at least the newly added node, which makes it for sure not empty. Using
induction hypothesis, other nodes in the set ReadyOK has not changed their leaf sets,
therefore still maintaining the invariant HalfNeighbor .
The proof for the second case is a bit tricky. Since there is only one ReadyOK node
before the execution of the action, which has no other nodes in its leaf sets, this node
should not change its leaf sets according to the RecPRply(i) in Definition 4.2.12, which
specifies only the status[i ] is changed. Therefore, after the joining node i becomes “ok”
through this action, there are more nodes in the set ReadyOK , which should all confirm
to the other case that they all have some other nodes in their leaf sets. This seems to
be a contradiction leading to violation of the property HalfNeighbor . In fact, it is not
contradiction, because the second case as predecessor state enabling the action should
never occur. But exclusion of this particular case cannot be derived from the current
hypothesis. Here, a new hypothesis is added:
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Lemma 6.2.1 (ExclusionLemma).
@a ∈ I ,ms ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ ReadyOK = {a}
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [a]) = a
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [a]) = a
∧ ms.mreq .type = “ProbeReply”
Lemma 6.2.1 is added into the invariant InvIdealPastry , such that it can be used as
induction hypothesis for each action. Here using Lemma 6.2.1 and the case condition,
there exists no “ProbeReply” message in receivedMsgs, which violates the enabling con-
dition of the action RecPRply(i) that node i receives a “ProbeReply” message. Hence,
this proof branch is closed. In fact, the Lemma 6.2.1 is then merged into the extended
definition of the invariant HalfNeighbor specified in Definition 6.2.2 as the only sub-
formula in the conjunction talking about “ProbeReply” message.
The second task of the proof is to analyze the actions changing the variable lset ,
which are RecJReq(i), RecJReply(i), probe(i) and RecPRply(i).
The action RecPRply(i) is already considered above. The action RecJReply(i) with
enabling condition of “waiting” node is no more interesting, because the precondition of
the invariant is not even fulfilled, it is then valid without proof. The action probe(i) is
similar to the action RecPRply(i) with respect to the change on leaf set. Therefore, its
inductive proof looks similar to the one for action RecPRply(i) and thus omitted here.
Considering the action RecJReq(i), HalfNeighbor is preserved by the fact that after
the “ready” node received the “JoinRequest” message, it will add the node into its
leaf set according to the definition of RecJReq(i), which fulfills the first disjunct of the
property HalfNeighbor .
Of course, the added sub formula in the extended invariant HalfNeighbor based on
LemmaExclusion needs to be proved again inductively throughout all actions, which
then causes further extension of the invariant HalfNeighbor . This complete invariant
proof can be found on the Web in VeriDis (2013).
Finally, the property HalfNeighbor is extended together with its formal proof to the
following complex invariant.
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Invariant 6.2.2 (HalfNeighborExt (Extended HalfNeighbor)).
∨∀k ∈ ReadyOK :
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [k ]) 6= k
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [k ]) 6= k
∨∃k ∈ ReadyOK :
∧ ReadyOK = {k}
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [k ]) = k
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [k ]) = k
∧ ∀w ∈ NodesWait : GetLSetContent(lset [w ]) ∈ subset {k ,w}
∧ ¬∃ms ∈ receivedMsgs : ms.mreq .type = “ProbeReply”
∧ ¬∃mk ∈ receivedMsgs : ∧ mk .mreq .type = “Probe”
∧ mk .destination 6= k
∧ ∀mj ∈ receivedMsgs : mj .mreq .type = “JoinReply”
⇒ GetLSetContent(mj .mreq .lset) = k
∧ ¬∃mb ∈ receivedMsgs : mb.mreq .type = “LeaseReply”
The formula above merges the Lemma 6.2.1 into the original definition of HalfNeigh-
bor and further extensions to make itself as an inductive invariant. HalfNeighborExt says
that if there is more than one member of ReadyOK on the ring, then none of them will
have empty leaf set.
For the special case that there is only one member of ReadyOK nodes k on the ring,
following statements hold:
• it has no neighbor;
• every “waiting” node (waiting to become “ok”) knows at most the node k and
itself;
• there is no “Probe” message to k ;
• there is no “ProbeReply” message or “LeaseReply” message at all;
• the leaf set within “JoinReply” message can only contain k .
The idea of extending the invariant during the search of proof is also used for the
invariant NeighborClosest , which is illustrated in the next section.
6.2.2 Towards an Inductive Proof of Invariant NeighborClosest
The inductive proof of NeighborClosest is far more complicated than HalfNeighbor , such
that it is no more feasible to extend the formula in the same way, which would then gen-
erate a huge and complicated formula that would no longer be understandable. There-
fore, separate understandable invariants are searched to extend InvIdealPastry together
with HalfNeighbor and NeighborClosest , which then should mutually prove each other
inductively throughout the execution of actions.
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The way of searching for the appropriate invariant is backwards symbolic execution.
The idea is to find a candidate invariant whose violation trace, if it is not valid, can be
shorter, such that the model checker TLC can be used to help discover and improve
such invariant.
The methodology starts with the violation of the property NeighborClosest . As
illustrated in both rings in Figure 6.3. Suppose that there is a “ready” node c between a
“ready” node a and its direct neighbor, w.l.o.g. say the right neighbor b, which considers
a also as its direct neighbor.
According to Section 3.3.2, a node goes from “ok” to “ready” only when it receives
leases from its direct neighbors, which also believe it is their direct neighbor. Considering
the position of node c’s right neighbor1 d , which must be different from node a or c, two
cases are illustrated in Figure 6.3: either node d lies between a and b (IncludeNeighbor),
or it lies farther to node c than b (CrossNeighbor). In both cases, node d grants the
lease to c. Since the violation of the property NeighborClosest cannot go beyond these
two situations, it is interesting to analyze them.
In order to detect violation as early as possible and on the other hand to make the
invariant as strong as possible, the model checking analysis is conducted on nodes with
all possible statuses except “dead”, which is summarized as NonDead
∆
= I \DeadNodes.
Since all the nodes do not have specific status restriction, this information is omitted
in Figure 6.3. After model checking it, if no violation is found, then this invariant is
easier to prove because it only relies on changes of leaf set; if a violation is found, further
analysis can be done to understand how this happens and if this may lead to a violation
of property NeighborClosest .
By constructing the candidate invariant IncludeNeighbor as shown in Figure 6.3,
notice that the right neighbor of node c cannot be a, nor b, because otherwise they will
not consider each other as direct neighbors. Finally, the candidate invariant is specified
in Property 6.2.3.
Property 6.2.3 (IncludeNeighbor).
IncludeNeighbor
∆
= 6 ∃a, b, c, d ∈ NonDead :
∧ c 6= d ∧ a 6= b
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [c]) = d
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [d ]) = c
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [a]) = b
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [b]) = a
∧ CwDist(a, c) < CwDist(a, b)
∧ CwDist(a, d) < CwDist(a, b)
After model checking IncludeNeighbor on HaeberlenPastry, the model checker
TLC reports a counterexample as illustrated in Figure 6.4. Starting from the initial
state when only node a is the “ready” node, nodes c and b concurrently join through
a and a replies the “JoinRequest” to all of them as illustrated in Step 0 in Figure 6.4.
1The case for its left neighbor is symmetrical and hence omitted.
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= RightNeighbor(lset [a])
= RightNeighbor(lset [c])
IncludeNeighbor b
c d
a
= RightNeighbor(lset [a])
= RightNeighbor(lset [c])
CrossNeighbor b
c
d
a
Figure 6.3: Intuition of hypothetical invariants IncludeNeighbor and CrossNeighbor .
Observe that node a does not add the joining nodes into its leaf sets and the “JoinReply”
messages back to them contains only empty leaf sets of the node a. Staring at Step 0,
it is intuitively hard to imagine that node a could consider node b as its right neighbor
when both node c and d have already become “ready”. The following trace breaks this
intuition.
Node c first reacts on the “JoinReply” message from a and successfully becomes a
“ready” node after probing process and lease granting process with node a as summarized
in Step 1 in Figure 6.4.
Then node b receives the “JoinReply” messages from a, containing empty leaf sets.
While node b adds a into its leaf sets and probes a back as illustrated in Step 2 in
Figure 6.4, its probe message is delayed and not received by node a. Therefore, the leaf
set of node a does not change in Step 2 comparing to previous step.
Meanwhile, node d also sends its “JoinRequest” to node a. It then receives the
“JoinReply” message, containing the leaf sets of a, which includes node c. After it
has probed c and a to complete its leaf sets, it has then got the leases from them and
becomes “ready”. By now, c, a, d are connected to each other and consider each other as
neighbors according to their position respectively, as summarized in Step 3 in Figure 6.4.
Suddenly node a leaves the network and rejoins by sending a join message to c as
shown in Step 4 in Figure 6.4.
It then receives the delayed “Probe” message from b and adds b into its leaf sets.
By now, node a has ignored node c and d and reaches b as its right neighbor, which
violates the invariant, as illustrated in the Step 5 in Figure 6.4.
One lesson learned from this counterexample is that the intuitive candidate invari-
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a
Figure 6.4: Counterexample of IncludeNeighbor .
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ant IncludeNeighbor is too strong. Because this violation of IncludeNeighbor does not
necessarily lead to a violation of property NeighborClosest , due to the fact that the node
a still needs to wait for the “JoinReply” message from c.
Another lesson learned is that many intuition on a linear identifier space are broken
in a network based on ring structure like Pastry. This violation shows how a node a can
get its right neighbor far away from it ignoring the existing “ready” nodes c and d . In
fact, the node a gets its right neighbor b from the other side of the ring, which is actually
its left neighbor. This is due to the definition of RightNeighbor(ls) in Definition 4.1.2.
The candidate invariant CrossNeighbor is also violated in a counter example repli-
cating the rejoin problem illustrated in Figure 5.3 in Section 5.2.2. Therefore, the formal
definition of CrossNeighbor and its analysis is omitted here.
All the previous counterexamples give the hint that the churns, namely departure
and concurrent join of nodes, are the reasons of violation of the property NeighborClosest .
After discovering many corner cases as counterexamples which are beyond of general
intuition, it is not even sure at this point if the Pastry model without churn ensures
CorrectDelivery . This motivates the following approach: making stronger assumptions
of the Pastry model to first disable the problems discovered so far and see if the simplified
model can be verified, then try to relax the assumption step by step.
6.3 A First Inductive Proof of NeighborClosest with Strong
Assumptions
A first formal verification of Pastry model (IdealPastry) is completed with a rather
strong assumption that not only presumes no departure of nodes, but also postulates no
concurrent join between two “ready” nodes closed to each other as the example shown
in Section 3.2.1.
This approach is described as follows.
6.3.1 Implementation of the Assumptions
The first assumption of IdealPastry is that no nodes leave the network, as defined in
Assumption 3.4.3.
In CastroPastry and HaeberlenPastry, departure of a node i is formally spec-
ified as an action NodeLeft(i), which changes the status of that node to “dead” and
assigns all the other state variables to the initial empty values of a “dead” node. This
action is not shown previously in this thesis in Chapter 3 because it is not a real action
of a node, but only a simulation in formal model for silence departure of nodes. Besides,
this action does not show up in LuPastry because that version assumes no departure
of nodes.
Besides the action NodeLeft(i), there are further actions to detect and recover the
leaf sets of those nodes in CastroPastry and HaeberlenPastry, which are affected
by the departure of node i . The handling of nodes departure together with those actions
are illustrated in Figure 3.6 in Section 3.2.2.
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In order to realize the assumption that no nodes leave the network, these actions
simulating and handling nodes departure are simply removed from the disjunction Next .
In fact, they do not show up in the Definition 4.2.1, where Next is defined for the final
Pastry model, because this assumption is still kept till then.
The second assumption is defined in Assumption 6.3.1.
Assumption 6.3.1. Not more than one node concurrently join between two “ready”
nodes, which are the closest “ready” nodes to each other on the ring.
In order to realize this assumption, a new state variable toj is introduced to re-
member to which node a “ready” node has replied a “JoinRequest” message. As long
as the “ready” node replies a “JoinRequest” message to a particular node j in action
RecJReq(i), it assigns toj [i ] with j . Then the action RecJReq(i) is disabled to react on
any further “JoinRequest” message by adding precondition ensuring that toj [i ] = i .
For preventing concurrent join through the other “ready” node, further preconditions
are added that the toj value of the left and right neighbor of any “ready” node i must
be set to themselves. Thus, no concurrent join could occur between the “ready” node
and its neighbors. This violates the principle that a node in a distributed system can
only read its local variables, but must use message passing to communicate with other
nodes in the network. But on an abstract level of the model, node could request a
“lock” from the neighbors, such that as soon as its own toj is occupied, its neighbors
toj must be locked, until the local toj is freed and the node grants the lock. In fact,
this is proposed by Ghodsi (2006). Of course, this is not a good solution, because for
example, the concurrent joining on the right neighbor may request a lock of this node,
which leads to a dead lock that can be only solved by random philosopher. Moreover,
concurrent nodes joining on the right neighbor of the right neighbor of node i (which
is different from node i and its left neighbor) may concurrently request the lock of toj
on the right neighbor of node i . A consensus protocol needs to be designed to again
resolve this concurrency problem. For this reason, this assumption is later relaxed in
the thesis by improving the protocol and the improved version is verified to be correct
and plausible to be implemented.
Since no concurrent join is allowed through the modification above, there is no need
for the joining nodes to grant each other to become “ready”. Hence, the precondition of
the action RecLReq(i) is strengthened such that only “ready” nodes can grant leases.
After several modifications explained above on HaeberlenPastry, model checker
TLC is applied to validate the improved model using the techniques illustrated in Sec-
tion 5.3. Then a stronger invariant CompleteLeafSet subsuming the invariant Neighbor-
Closest is used as the inductive invariant and several corresponding invariants, such as
NoCCJoin, CoverToj are defined with respect to the new assumptions, which will be
illustrated in the coming section.
6.3.2 Invariants
The inductive invariants are extended further, in order to be strong enough to be proved
themselves inductively for IdealPastry, which is an earlier version of LuPastry. The
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final conjunction of these invariants are illustrated in Definition 6.3.2
Definition 6.3.2 (InvIdealPastry).
∧ CompleteLeafSet
∧ ReadyNeighborRight
∧ ReadyNeighborLeft
∧ HalfNeighborExt
∧ NoCCJoin
∧ NoCCJoinL
∧ GrantNeighbor
∧ GrantReady
∧ LeaseGrant
∧ CoverToJ
∧ SingleReadyNodeToj
∧ SingleReadyNode
∧ LSnonEmpty
∧ SemPRplyNonEmpty
∧ SemJRplyLSnonEmpty
∧ SemLReply
∧ SemJRply
∧ SemJoinNeighbor
∧ SemJoinLeafSet
∧ SemSingleReadyJoin
∧ SemEmptyLSetSingleNode
∧ SemJReq
∧ JoinMsgDual
∧ LSetInv
∧ OneJRply
∧ OneJReq
∧ AtleastOneReady
The NeighborClosest and HalfNeighbor are not components of InvIdealPastry any-
more. The invariant HalfNeighbor is replaced with HalfNeighborExt , which is already
explained and specified in Invariant 6.2.2 in Section 6.2.1. The invariant NeighborClosest
is replaced by CompleteLeafSet , specified as follows in Invariant 6.3.3.
Invariant 6.3.3 (CompleteLeafSet).
CompleteLeafSet
∆
= ∀i ∈ I , j ∈ ReadyNodes :
lset [i ] 6= EmptyLS (i) ∧ i 6= j
⇒ ∧ CwDist(i ,RightNeighbor(i)) ≤ CwDist(i , j )
∧ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(i), i) ≤ CwDist(j , i)
In the definition of CompleteLeafSet the precondition of the implication states that
the leaf sets of node i must be not empty. According to the Lemma 4.1.3, a node with
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empty leaf sets has no neighbors. More precisely, it considers itself as its neighbor (on
both sides). Therefore the precondition of CompleteLeafSet matches the cases of the
other invariant HalfNeighbor , stating that either a node i has no neighbors, or there
are other “ready” nodes. Besides, the conclusion of CompleteLeafSet is the same as
property NeighborClosest . Since the property HalfNeighbor is already proved inductively
before, the inductive proof of NeighborClosest is then reduced to the inductive proof of
CompleteLeafSet . The following invariants are mainly used for supporting the inductive
proof of CompleteLeafSet , which will be illustrated in Section 6.3.3.
The invariant ReadyNeighborRight specified in Invariant 6.3.4 states that if a node
does not have an empty leaf sets (a not “dead” node or a node which has already received
“JoinReply” message), then this node can not locate between a “ready” node and its
right neighbor. Here it explicitly requires the node r to have no “ready” right neighbor,
because otherwise this invariant subsumes the CompleteLeafSet and therefore can not
be used as inductive hypothesis to prove the case when its right neighbor is not “ready”.
Invariant 6.3.4 (ReadyNeighborRight).
ReadyNeighborRight
∆
= ∀r ∈ ReadyNodes, k ∈ I :
∧ k 6= r
∧ lset [k ] 6= EmptyLS (k)
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [r ]) /∈ ReadyNodes
⇒ CwDist(r ,RightNeighbor(lset [r ])) ≤ CwDist(r , k)
The invariant ReadyNeighborLeft is the symmetrical invariant to ReadyNeighborRight
referring to the left neighbor instead of the right neighbor. These two invariants are in-
tuitively confirming the precondition of the action RecJReq(i), which implements the
assumption that no nodes are joining concurrently among the region of a “ready” node
and its left and right neighbors.
The invariant NoCCJoin specified in Invariant 6.3.5 states that if there is a node k
between a “ready” node i and its right neighbor r , which is “ready” too, then node k
is either joined by node i (in this case, there is no nodes trying to join by node r), or
node k is joined by node r (in that case, no node is trying to join by i).
Invariant 6.3.5 (NoCCJoin).
NoCCJoin
∆
= ∀i , r ∈ ReadyNodes, k ∈ I :
∧ i 6= k
∧ lset [k ] 6= EmptyLS (k)
∧ r = RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
∧ i 6= r
∧ CwDist(i , k) < CwDist(i , r)
⇒ ∨ toj [i ] = k ∧ toj [r ] = r
∨ toj [r ] = k ∧ toj [i ] = i
The invariant NoCCJoinL is the symmetrical invariant to NoCCJoin, but replace the
right neighbor with left neighbor and changes the corresponding positions. NoCCJoin
132
6.3 A First Inductive Proof of NeighborClosest with Strong Assumptions
and NoCCJoinL together formulate directly the assumption as invariants that no con-
current nodes are joining among the region of a “ready” node and its left and right
neighbors.
The invariant CoverToJ specified in Invariant 6.3.6 states that if a “ready” node r
covers a node k whose leaf sets are not empty, then node k must be joining by r .
Invariant 6.3.6 (CoverToJ).
CoverToJ
∆
= ∀r ∈ ReadyNodes, k ∈ I :
∧ r 6= k
∧ lset [k ] 6= EmptyLS (k)
∧ Covers(lset [r ], k)
⇒ toj [r ] = k
The invariant CoverToj clarifies the intuition of the link between the coverage of
a “ready” node and its value of the state variable toj , namely, as long as the “ready”
node covers some other node having not empty leaf sets and currently joining through
the “ready” node. This also confirms the precondition of the action RecJReq(i) that a
“ready” node only replies a “JoinRequest” message from a node which it covers.
The invariants GrantNeighbor , GrantReady and LeaseGrant state the properties of
state variables lease and grant . The invariant GrantNeighbor specified in Invariant 6.3.7
ensures that if node i is still not yet “ready”, which already gets lease granted by a
“ready” node k , then node i must be either the left or the right neighbor of node k .
Invariant 6.3.7 (GrantNeighbor).
GrantNeighbor
∆
= ∀k ∈ ReadyNodes, i ∈ I :
∧ i /∈ ReadyNodes
∧ i ∈ grant [k ]
⇒ ∨ i = LeftNeighbor(lset [k ])
∨ i = RightNeighbor(lset [k ])
The invariant GrantNeighbor confirms the transition defined in action RecLReq(i),
that node k only grants the lease to its left or right neighbor. From another perspective,
this invariant also states that the only possibility for a node k in grant [i ] not to be the
neighbor of node i , is that this node k is already a “ready” node, despites the fact that it
has got the lease granted from i . Hence, the invariant GrantNeighbor also helps to give
intuition of the state variable grant , namely, this variable marks the history to which
nodes a node has ever granted the leases.
The invariant GrantReady (Invariant 6.3.8) states that the nodes which has granted
other nodes must be a “ready” node.
Invariant 6.3.8 (GrantReady).
GrantReady
∆
= ∀i , j ∈ I : j ∈ grant [i ]⇒ i ∈ ReadyNodes
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This invariant confirms the precondition of the action RecLReq(i) that only “ready”
nodes can grant.
The invariant LeaseGrant (Invariant 6.3.9) states that if a node n is in another
node i ’s lease, then i must be already granted by n, which gives the intuition of the
relationship between state variable lease and grant .
Invariant 6.3.9 (LeaseGrant).
LeaseGrant
∆
= ∀i ,n ∈ I : n ∈ lease[i ]⇒ i ∈ grant [n]
Through the invariants GrantReady and LeaseGrant , a node i can infer from its
received leases that the nodes in its lease are “ready” nodes.
The invariants with names consisting of Sem and the message names (e.g. SemLReply)
state in fact the preconditions (status[n] = “ready” is equivalent to n ∈ ReadyNodes)
of the actions (RecLReq(i) specified in Definition 4.2.14), which generate those messages
(“LeaseRequest” message), and their postconditions (grant ′[n] = grant [n]∪{m.mreq .node})
occurring together with the generation of the messages. For example, the invariant
SemLReply as specified as follows in Invariant 6.3.10 states that when a node i re-
ceives “LeaseReply” message from n, then node n must be a “ready” node and if the
“LeaseReply” message grants the lease, then i is already added into the grant [n]. Other
message types also have similar invariants like SemLReply .
Invariant 6.3.10 (SemLReply).
SemLReply
∆
= ∀i ,n ∈ I ,m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “LeaseReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = n
∧ m.destination = i
⇒ ∧ n ∈ ReadyNodes
∧ (m.mreq .grant = true⇒ i ∈ grant [n])
Further invariants state the corner cases. For example, SingleReadyNodeToj states
that if there is only one Ready node r on the ring (and it is empty), then any node k
whose leaf sets are not empty must be joining by r .
6.3.3 Proof Sketch of CompleteLeafSet as an Example
With the general understanding of the invariants, the inductive proof of Invariant Com-
pleteLeafSet is explained in the following sketch.
Similar to the methodology used for the inductive proof of Invariant HalfNeighbor il-
lustrated in Section 6.2.1, violation of the proving target CompleteLeafSet lies in changes
of the two variables lset and status.
With respect to the change of lset , only actions extending leaf sets need to be consid-
ered, because no actions remove a node from any leaf sets according to the assumptions
and modification of Pastry model explained in Section 6.3.1.
134
6.3 A First Inductive Proof of NeighborClosest with Strong Assumptions
For further proof, an additional lemma on the operation AddToLSet(ls, delta) (spec-
ified in Definition 4.1.2 in Section 4.1.2) is introduced here to demonstrate how lemmas
on data structures are added aside the inductive proof to be used as argument of several
proof steps. This lemma states that after adding new nodes into leaf sets, the new direct
neighbors are always closer to the node than before, or they remain the same.
Lemma 6.3.11 (AddToLSetInvCo).
AddToLSetInvCo
∆
= ∀ s, ls ∈ LSet , d ∈ subsetI :
ls = AddToLSet(d , s)
⇒ ∧ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(ls), ls.node)
≤ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(s), s.node)
∧ CwDist(ls.node,RightNeighbor(ls))
≤ CwDist(s.node,RightNeighbor(s))
The lemma is easy to prove based on the definition of AddToLSet(ls, delta) and
the definition of LeftNeighbor(ls) (also specified in Definition 4.1.2 in Section 4.1.2).
Intuitively, if the added node is farther than the previous direct neighbor, the direct
neighbor does not change after the node is added, because AddToLSet(ls, delta) always
choose the minimal nodes to be the new leaf sets.
By induction hypothesis of invariant CompleteLeafSet (see Invariant 6.3.3) and the
lemma AddToLSetInvCo, together with transitivity of ≤ on distances, it can be deduced
that the invariant CompleteLeafSet holds when leaf sets are changed.
The proof gets more complicated with respect to the changes of state variable status,
when a joining node turns from “ok” to “ready”. This happens when the node receives
a “LeaseReply” message and the flag okToReady is true in the action RecLReply(i)
as specified in Definition 4.2.15. The idea is to construct the possible violation of the
Invariant CompleteLeafSet and then to prove that this violation can not occur by con-
tradiction.
= RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
“ok” to “ready”
ln
r
j
i
Figure 6.5: Hypothetical violation of CompleteLeafSet by its inductive proof.
The violation case is illustrated in Figure 6.5. As the first assumption of the proof,
node j , which is “ok” and going to become “ready” by the action RecLReply(j ), locates
between an arbitrary node i , whose leaf sets are not empty, and its direct right neighbor
r . The next task is to find out the reason why this configuration can not occur. The
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idea is to analyze the position of the direct left neighbor of node j , named as ln. If it
can be proved that ln lies between node i and node r , in the upper half of the ring in
Figure 6.5, then the induction hypothesis of CompleteLeafSet can be used to contradict
this situation. Hence, it must be shown that node ln is “ready” and it lies between node
i and its direct neighbor r , which breaks the proof to two sub-proofs.
The first part can be proved using the invariants SemLReply (see Invariant 6.3.10),
LeaseGrant and GrantReady (both introduced in Section 6.3.2) contained in hypothesis
InvIdealPastry and the precondition of action RecLReply(j ). It is easy to deduce that
the node j is granted by its left neighbor, based on the fact that knowing from the local
variable okToReady in RecLReply(j ), the left neighbor has either already granted the
lease before because it is in the lease[j ] (using LeaseGrant), or it has just granted the
lease through “LeaseReply” message (using SemLReply). Then using GrantReady , the
left neighbor of the node i can be derived to be “ready”, because it has granted node i
as shown before.
The second sub-proof needs to use ReadyNeighborRight specified in Invariant 6.3.4,
which deduces that the distance from a “ready” node ln to its right neighbor j is smaller
than from ln to some arbitrary node i , whose leaf sets are not empty. This statement
is equivalent to saying that ln lies between i and j as shown in Figure 6.5. Besides, it
is given as proof assumption at the beginning of the proof that j lies between i and r ,
then the final conclusion can be derived by transitivity of ≤ of distances of nodes on the
ring. However, in order to use ReadyNeighborRight , the preconditions according to its
definition must be fulfilled. Node ln is proved to be “ready” by the first part illustrated
above. Moreover, it is to show that node j is the right neighbor of node ln.
The idea is to use the Invariant GrantNeighbor (as defined in Invariant 6.3.7).
It shows that node j , which is granted by node ln, is indeed the right neighbor of
node ln, because node j is not yet “ready” according to the precondition of the action
RecLReply(j ).
Further corner cases are omitted here such that this proof sketch can focus on the
basic ideas and intuition. A detailed proof encoded in TLA+, which is automatically
verified through theorem prover TLAPS, is available online at VeriDis (2013).
This proof sketch illustrates how the invariants are used to deduce that the invariant
CompleteLeafSet is valid focusing on the critical transitions where the proof goal might
be violated. The invariants, which are not used in this proof, are necessary for proving
those invariants used here, such that all together as a conjunction InvIdealPastry can
be used as inductive invariant to prove throughout all possible actions of Pastry.
6.4 Relaxing the Assumptions
The verified Pastry model shown in the previous section has limitations due to the two
strong assumptions that nodes do not leave the network and concurrent join of nodes
between two neighboring “ready” nodes does not occur. The following task is to relax
all possible assumptions so far to see if it is still able to be verified.
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6.4.1 The Problem of Allowing Departure of Nodes
In order to allow departure of nodes, the actions NodeLeft(i) and corresponding actions
fromCastroPastry andHaeberlenPastry, such as SuspectFaulty(i , j ), TimeOut(i , j ),
are added into the possible actions of Pastry model Next of the earlier version of Lu-
Pastry, so that nodes can freely leave the network. Then a manual constructed coun-
terexample shows a possible separation of the network, which motivates the reservation
of this assumption.
Separation of the Network due to Concurrent Departures of Nodes
If the many nodes can drop the network concurrently, a separation of the network could
occur, as mentioned in Haeberlen et al. (2005). However, no effective solution is found
to ensure the property CorrectDelivery . The violation of the property CorrectDelivery
is illustrated in Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.6: Separation of the network due to concurrent departures of nodes.
Initially, there are six “ready” nodes in the network as shown in the Step 0 in
Figure 6.6. Remark that the length of the leaf sets L is one.
Then nodes d and a concurrently drop off, whereas their direct neighbors still have
them in their leaf sets as illustrated in Step 1 in Figure 6.6.
After a while, when the leases of them are expired by their neighbors, they use the
action SuspectFaulty(i , j ) to detect the “dead” nodes and when waiting time is expired,
they remove them from the leaf sets, as illustrated in Step 2 in Figure 6.6.
Subsequently, the rest of the nodes start to repair the leaf sets by probing the
current members in their leaf sets, which simply answer the “Probe” messages to each
other without any additional information. As a result, they turn to “ok” in the action
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RecPRply(i) when receiving the “ProbeReply” messages from each other. In the next
transitions, nodes request the leases from each other and get grants, which make them
“ready”, as illustrated in the Step 3 in Figure 6.6.
Now nodes c and b builds a separate network from the one consisting e and f . Such
kinds of separation problems of Pastry network motivate that the Assumption 3.4.3
mentioned in Section 3.4 should be kept that no nodes leave the network. In fact, this
result is already mention in several literatures, such as Castro et al. (2004), Haeberlen
et al. (2005), Ghodsi (2006) and Zave (2012), but no solution is proposed to prevent
network separation with guarantee.
6.4.2 The Approach of Allowing Concurrent Join
The precondition of the action RecJReq(i) is not realistic as discussed for Assump-
tion 6.3.1. The first approach is to remove this unrealistic precondition. This has a
consequence that concurrent join of nodes between neighboring “ready” nodes may oc-
cur.
Another modification of the Pastry model is relaxing the precondition of action
RecLReq(i) from “ready” nodes to “ready” or “ok” nodes. Before the modification, the
precondition requires that only “ready” nodes can handle the “LeaseRequest” messages.
Now since concurrent nodes are joining between neighboring “ready” nodes, they need
each other to grant the leases, in order to complete the lease granting process and become
“ready”, otherwise they would have to wait in a live lock in status “ok”, which prevents
any of them to join successfully.
The modifications lead to another intermediate version between HaeberlenPastry
and LuPastry, which is then improved based on the violation discovered as follows.
Pure Concurrent Join Problem
The modifications of the protocol leads to a violation of the property NeighborClosest ,
which is already illustrated in Section 3.2.4 and here it is explained in more details.
Remark that this corner case is impossible to detect using the model checker without
specific selection of node identifiers as illustrated in the Figure 6.7.
Assume there are five nodes a, b, c, d and e on the network as shown in Step 0 in
Figure 6.7. Only the two nodes a and b are initially “ready”. The rest of the nodes are
initially “dead”. The leaf set length L is one, meaning each node has only one node in
each side of its leaf sets.
First, node e joins the network through node a and receives the “JoinReply” message
from node a, which contains b in its leaf sets. But the probing message from node e to
node a is delayed. Only node b has received the “Probe” message from e. Node b now
has a new left neighbor, node e. The result of these transitions is illustrated in Step 1
in Figure 6.7.
Then node d joins the network through b. It gets the “JoinReply” message from
node b containing node a and e. It finds that the candidate leaf set members are e and
b, which are its left and right neighbors. Since the length of the leaf sets is one, node a
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Figure 6.7: Concurrent join with 5 nodes.
is excluded in the candidate leaf set members. Therefore, node d only probes both node
e and node b and becomes “ok” after both of nodes e and b reply the “Probe” messages.
Observe that node e can reply such “Probe” messages because it is a “waiting” node
and has leaf set members b and a before it adds e into its leaf sets. The result of these
transitions is illustrated in Step 2 in Figure 6.7.
Now node c joins the network through b. It gets the “JoinReply” message from
node b, which contains the node d . Then node c probes node d and b and becomes
“ok”. Subsequently, it requests the leases from the neighbors. Since d and b are “ok”
or “ready”, they both grant the leases to c, which makes c “ready”. The result of
these transitions is illustrated in Step 3 in Figure 6.7. Now the “ready” node a, which
considers its right and left neighbor to be the identical node b, has ignored the existence
of “ready” node c between itself and its right neighbor b, which violates the invariant
NeighborClosest .
In this counterexample, no node leaves the network and only join of nodes is allowed.
The invariant NeighborClosest is violated as shown in Figure 6.7 if there are many nodes
concurrently joining the network through one node b. One of the solutions is to restrict
the number of nodes one “ready” node can handle, such that if new nodes like d and c
come to join through b when it has already started to help e to join, they have to wait
until the joining node e has completed its join process through the “ready” node b.
For simplicity, the new assumption as mentioned in Assumption 3.4.4 in Section 3.4
allows a “ready” node to handle at most one joining node. This modification still allow
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concurrent join between two neighboring “ready” nodes. After this restriction, node c
cannot join the network and the concurrent joining node e and d can turn to “ready”
only after node a has replied the “Probe” message to e, which enables e to become “ok”.
6.4.3 The Meaning of Allowing Message Loss
Besides the two limitations discussed before, it is considered to relax further assumptions.
According to Assumption 3.4.2, message corruption and message loss are both excluded
from Pastry. Message corruption relates to security properties as mentioned before,
therefore no relaxing is possible. However, message loss can be considered as possible
action of Pastry model. In fact, message loss is modeled as an action in TLA+, which
simply removes arbitrary messages from the message pool receivedMsgs. The effect of
such action is that some joining node might not be able to continue the join process due
to the loss of crucial message such as “JoinReply” message.
Adding the action MessageLoss() into the Next formula in TLA+ does not affect the
final proof of safety property NeighborClosest and CorrectDelivery . But this does not
really bring too much novelty because on the one hand, there is no mechanism to rescue
the lost messages in Pastry, on the other hand, ensuring that a node can eventually join
into the network despite of message loss is in fact a liveness property, which is beyond
the verification purpose of this thesis.
6.4.4 Modification of the Proof and Invariants
After modifications of the actions of Pastry model from the version verified for CompleteLeafSet
to LuPastry, one could think of modifying the invariants based on the understanding
of assumptions and the invariants. But since there are too many invariants, there is a
more efficient methodology than analyzing them one after another. This methodology
can get the most benefits from the previous proof.
In order to prevent the restart of discovery of invariant, the previous formal proof is
first rechecked automatically using TLAPS, which then automatically discovers which
parts of the proof are no longer valid due to those modifications.
When TLAPS reports the invalid proof obligations, the following questions are
proposed subsequently:
• Why is this part of proof no more valid?
• Should this invariant be modified and how?
• Is this modified invariant valid?
• Is this modified invariant still useful to prove other invariants as before?
For each discovered corresponding invariant as proof goal, analysis is conducted
based on the questions one after another.
Firstly, the broken down proof is analyzed by checking if the preconditions of the
proof is no longer valid due to modification of the protocol at a particular action or if
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the invariant as proof obligation is no longer valid. For the first case, a new proof is
to constructed adapting the modification of the protocol case by case. For the latter
case, the invariant is analyzed by intuition and the model checker TLC is applied to
discover a counterexample to confirm the intuition and help reformulate the invariant.
For example, the previous invariant GrantReady as specified in Invariant 6.3.8 is no
longer valid by intuition because it reflects exactly the modification of the protocol on
the action RecLReq(i) that not only “ready” nodes can handle “LeaseRequest” messages,
but also “ok” nodes.
Secondly, two perspectives according to the last two questions are considered to
modify the previous invariants that are no longer valid or to construct the new candidates
for invariants to support the proof of those valid ones. On one hand, the proposed
candidate invariant should be valid, in the sense that it first should pass the model
checking for the case of four instances in the network, and then be formally proved
at the same place where the proof for the previous invariant is broken. On the other
hand, applying this proposed candidate should be still able to infer the previous proof
obligations as sub-proof for other invariants.
For example, the previous invariant GrantReady can be reformulated according to
its violation, such that a new invariant GrantOK can be constructed as followed:
Invariant 6.4.1 (GrantOK).
GrantOK
∆
= ∀i , j ∈ I : j ∈ grant [i ]⇒ i ∈ ReadyOK ∧ j ∈ ReadyOK
This new invariant should be valid according to the intuition and it is also easy
to prove. But it is no more useful for proving CompleteLeafSet according to the proof
in Section 6.3.3, where GrantReady is used to infer that the left neighbor granting
the joining node is “ready”, such that inductive hypothesis of CompleteLeafSet can be
applied on the “ready” left neighbor. Hence, the proof of CompleteLeafSet needs to
be modified: either another proof approach should be found, in which other invariants
for “ready” nodes can be applied instead of the previous GrantReady , or the invariant
CompleteLeafSet can be strengthen, such that it applies on not only “ready” nodes
but also “ok” nodes, in order to make use of the invariant GrantOK . Since the model
checker produces counterexamples of strengthened CompleteLeafSet on “ok” and “ready”
nodes, the proof approach for CompleteLeafSet must be changed. However, the invariant
GrantOK is still useful for proving other invariants.
Using the methodology described above, half the invariants need modification due to
their violations or inadequacies for supporting desired proofs as arguments. The results
are summarized in the next section.
6.5 Final Invariants and the Proof
6.5.1 Invariants
Based on the Assumption 3.4.3 stating that no nodes leave the network and the As-
sumption 3.4.4 stating that a “ready” node can at most handle one joining node at a
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time, the property NeighborClosest (Property 4.3.7) can be further reduced to rather
strong invariants IRN and NRI in the Pastry model LuPastry. These two invariants
together subsumes the property NeighborClosest . The difference is that NeighborClosest
guarantees that “ready” nodes do not ignore other “ready” nodes between themselves
and their neighbors, while IRN and NRI states that every node does not ignore any
“ready” node between itself and its neighbor.
Invariant 6.5.1. There cannot be a Ready node closer to i, than its left and right
neighbors.
IRN
∆
= ∀i ∈ I , r ∈ ReadyNodes : i 6= r
⇒ CwDist(i ,RightNeighbor(lset [i ])) ≤ CwDist(i , r)
NRI
∆
= ∀i ∈ I , r ∈ ReadyNodes : i 6= r
⇒ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]), i) ≤ CwDist(r , i)
The proof of IRN will be sketched at the end of this section, which needs other
invariants shown in the InvLuPastry as follows.
Definition 6.5.2 gives the complete list of inductive invariants used for proving Neigh-
borClosest for the final model of Pastry. Comparing to the invariants InvIdealPastry
defined before in Definition 6.3.2, some invariants, such as OnePRply and OneJReq ,
remain the same and are still valid for the new Pastry model. Many invariants are no
longer valid, such as GrantReady illustrated in Section 6.4.4, which is then changed to
GrantOK defined in Invariant 6.4.1.
As follows, each of the invariants will be illustrated with an intuitive introduction
and its formal definition.
Invariant 6.5.3. If a node i has already got the lease granted (see Section 3.2.2) by
another node k, then neither of these two nodes have empty leaf sets. The other node
cannot be closer to them than their neighbors.
GrantNeighborNew
∆
= ∀k , i ∈ I :
∧ i 6= k
∧ i ∈ grant [k ]
⇒ ∧ lset [i ] 6= EmtyLS (i)
∧ lset [k ] 6= EmptyLS (k)
∧ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]), i) ≤ CwDist(k , i)
∧ CwDist(i ,RightNeighbor(lset [i ])) ≤ CwDist(i , k)
∧ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(lset [k ]), k) ≤ CwDist(i , k)
∧ CwDist(k ,RightNeighbor(lset [k ])) ≤ CwDist(k , i)
Invariant 6.5.4. If a not yet “ready” node i lies between two other different nodes l and
r, and node i is joined through one of the node (e.g. l), whereas this node (i.e. l) has
granted its lease to the other node (i.e. r), then the direct neighbor of i must be closer
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to i than the other node (i.e. r).
GrantHistR
∆
= ∀l , i , r ∈ I :
∧ toj [l ] = i
∧ i 6= r
∧ r ∈ grant [l ]
∧ i /∈ ReadyNodes
∧ CwDist(i , r) < CwDist(l , r)
⇒ CwDist(i ,RightNeighbor(lset [i ])) ≤ CwDist(i , r)
GrantHistL
∆
= ∀l , i , r ∈ I :
∧ toj [r ] = i
∧ i 6= l
∧ l ∈ grant [l ]
∧ i /∈ ReadyNodes
∧ CwDist(l , i) < CwDist(l , r)
⇒ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]), i) ≤ CwDist(l , i)
Invariant 6.5.5. Only Ready or OK node can grant the leases.
GrantOK
∆
= ∀i , j ∈ I : j ∈ grant [i ] ∧ j 6= i ⇒ i ∈ ReadyOK ∧ j ∈ ReadyOK
Invariant 6.5.6. A “ready” node never covers another node, which has joined through
some other node.
CoverNoNode
∆
= ∀i ∈ ReadyNodes, j , k ∈ I :
∧ Covers(lset [i ], k)
∧ i 6= k
∧ j 6= k
⇒ toj [j ] 6= k
Invariant 6.5.7. If a node i has joined through some node l , then no other node which
holds a grant from l can cover node i.
CoverNoToj
∆
= ∀l , i , r ∈ I :
∧ Covers(lset [r ], i)
∧ r ∈ grant [l ]
∧ toj [l ] = i
∧ i 6= r
∧ r 6= l
⇒ false
Invariant 6.5.8. If a not yet “ready” node i has joined through some node r1, then
between these two nodes, there exists no node k different from i, which has joined through
some node r2 different from r1. Note that the node r2 different from r1 is not explicit
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in the following predicate; it is implied by the parts that assert i 6= k, toj [r1] = i and
toj [r2] = k.
TojClosestL
∆
= ∀r1, r2, i , k ∈ I :
∧ i 6= r1
∧ i 6= k
∧ toj [r1] = i
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [r1]) = i
∧ i /∈ ReadyNodes
∧ toj [r2] = k
∧ r2 6= k
⇒ CwDist(r1, i) ≤ CwDist(k , i)
TojClosestR
∆
= ∀r1, r2, i , k ∈ I :
∧ i 6= r1
∧ i 6= k
∧ toj [r1] = i
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [r1]) = i
∧ i /∈ ReadyNodes
∧ toj [r2] = k
∧ r2 6= k
⇒ CwDist(i , r1) ≤ CwDist(i , k)
Invariant 6.5.9. If the leaf sets of some not yet “ready” node i is not empty, then there
must exist a “ready” node, through which node i has joined the network.
TojNoReady
∆
= ∀i ∈ I :
∧ i /∈ ReadyNodes
∧ lset [i ] 6= EmtyLS (i)
⇒ ∃r ∈ ReadyNodes : toj [r ] = i
Invariant 6.5.10. If a not yet “ready” node i has joined through some node r, then
node i must be r’s direct neighbor.
SemToj
∆
= ∀r , i ∈ I :
∧ i /∈ ReadyNodes
∧ toj [r ] = i
∧ r 6= i
⇒ ∨ RightNeighbor(lset [r ]) = i
∨ LeftNeighbor(lset [r ]) = i
Invariant 6.5.11. If a not yet “ready” node i has joined through some node r, and node
i is r ’s direct neighbor on one side, then the node r must be the direct neighbor of i to
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the other side. 2
TojDualR
∆
= ∀r , i ∈ I :
∧ r 6= i
∧ toj [r ] = i
∧ RightNeighbor(lset [r ]) = i
∧ i /∈ ReadyNodes
∧ lset [i ] 6= EmtyLS (i)
⇒ LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]) = r
TojDualL
∆
= ∀r , i ∈ I :
∧ r 6= i
∧ toj [r ] = i
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [r ]) = i
∧ i /∈ ReadyNodes
∧ lset [i ] 6= EmtyLS (i)
⇒ RightNeighbor(lset [i ]) = r
Invariant 6.5.12. Only “ready” node can allow a new node to join.
TojReady
∆
= ∀r ∈ I : toj [r ] 6= r ⇒ r ∈ ReadyNodes
Invariant 6.5.13. Different nodes must be joined through different nodes.
TojInjective
∆
= ∀i , j , k ∈ I :
∧ toj [i ] = k
∧ toj [j ] = k
∧ i 6= k
∧ j 6= k
⇒ i = j
Invariant 6.5.14. If a node i lies in another node’s leaf sets, then either it has just
joined through that node, or it already has some node in its own leaf sets.
LSnonEmptyToj
∆
= ∀i , j ∈ I :
∧ i ∈ GetLSetContent(lset [j ])
∧ i 6= j
⇒ ∨ lset [i ] 6= EmptyLS (i)
∨ toj [j ] = i
Invariant 6.5.15. As long as there is a “JoinReply” message to node j , there can never
be a “ready” node, which lies between the future left and right neighbor of node j , which
will be then initiated after the node j has received the “JoinReply” message. If the node
j considers i as its left neighbor, then its right neighbor will be the current right neighbor
2This is in fact an extension to the invariant 6.5.10 (SemToj ), in order to avoid too complex formula
structure of the invariants for better readability and simpler proof structure.
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of the node i. If the node j considers i as its right neighbor, then it will have the same
left neighbor as the node i.
JoinNCL
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs, r ∈ ReadyNodes, i , j ∈ I :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = i
∧ m.destination = j
∧ r 6= i
∧ LeftNeighbor(AddToLSet(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset),EmptyLS (j ))) = i
⇒ CwDist(i ,RightNeighbor(m.mreq .lset)) ≤ CwDist(i , r)
JoinNCR
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs, r ∈ ReadyNodes, i , j ∈ I :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = i
∧ m.destination = j
∧ r 6= i
∧ RightNeighbor(AddToLSet(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset),EmptyLS (j ))) = i
⇒ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(m.mreq .lset), i) ≤ CwDist(r , i)
Invariant 6.5.16. As long as there is a “JoinReply” message to node j , the sender of
this message will never grant another node, which lies between the future left neighbor and
right neighbor of node j , which will be initiated after the node j receives the “JoinReply”
message.
JoinGrantL
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs, g , i , j ∈ I :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = i
∧ m.destination = j
∧ g ∈ grant [i ]
∧ g 6= i
∧ LeftNeighbor(AddToLSet(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset),EmptyLS (j ))) = i
⇒ CwDist(i ,RightNeighbor(m.mreq .lset)) ≤ CwDist(i , g)
JoinGrantR
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs, g ∈ I :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = i
∧ m.destination = j
∧ g ∈ grant [i ]
∧ g 6= i
∧ RightNeighbor(AddToLSet(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset),EmptyLS (j ))) = i
⇒ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(m.mreq .lset), i) ≤ CwDist(g , i)
Invariant 6.5.17. As long as there is a “JoinReply” message from node i to node j ,
then node i must have the node j as its direct neighbor. Here the ls is introduced only
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to improve the readability of the invariant.
JoinNeighborR
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs, ls ∈ LSet , i , j ∈ I :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = i
∧ m.destination = j
∧ ls = AddToLSet(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset),EmptyLS (j ))
∧ RightNeighbor(ls) = i
⇒ LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]) = j
JoinNeighborL
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs, ls ∈ LSet , i , j ∈ I :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = i
∧ m.destination = j
∧ ls = AddToLSet(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset),EmptyLS (j ))
∧ LeftNeighbor(ls) = i
⇒ RightNeighbor(lset [i ]) = j
Invariant 6.5.18. As long as there is a “JoinReply” message from node i, whose current
left and right neighbors are identical, then this message must contain empty leaf sets.
This situation refers to the situation when there is only one “ready” node in the network
and some other node wants to join.
JoinSingleNode
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs, i ∈ I :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = i
∧ LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]) = RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
⇒ m.mreq .lset = EmptyLS (i)
Invariant 6.5.19. As soon as a “LeaseReply” message has been sent out from a node i
to the node j knowing that node i has joined through j , then node i must be “ready”.
SemLReplyReady
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs, i , j ∈ I :
∧ m.mreq .type = “LeaseReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = i
∧ m.destination = j
∧ toj [j ] = i
⇒ i ∈ ReadyNodes
Invariant 6.5.20. The leaf sets of the sender and destination of any “LeaseReply”
message are never empty.
SemLReplynonEmpty
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs :
m.mreq .type = “LeaseReply”
⇒ ∧ lset [m.mreq .lset .node] 6= EmptyLS (m.mreq .lset .node)
∧ lset [m.destination] 6= EmptyLS (m.destination)
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Invariant 6.5.21. For any “LeaseRequest” message from node i to node j , we know
that (1) j has not joined through i; (2) i must be either “ready” or “ok”; (3) neither i
nor j has empty leaf sets; (4) j is farther to i than i’s direct neighbors.
SemLReq
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs, i , j ∈ I :
∧ m.mreq .type = “LeaseRequest”
∧ m.lset .node = i
∧ m.destination = j
⇒ ∧ toj [i ] 6= j
∧ i ∈ ReadyOK
∧ i 6= j
∧ lset [i ] 6= EmptyLS (i)
∧ lset [j ] 6= EmptyLS (j )
∧ CwDist(i ,RightNeighbor(lset [i ])) ≤ CwDist(i , j )
∧ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(lset [i ]), i) ≤ CwDist(j , i)
Invariant 6.5.22. If a node n has sent a “LeaseReply” message to i, we know that (1)
n must be either “ready” or “ok”; (2) i is different from n; (3) if the granting bit is set
to true then n must have granted its lease to i (i ∈ grant [n]).
SemLReply
∆
= ∀i ,n ∈ I ,m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “LeaseReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = n
∧ m.destination = i
⇒ ∧ n ∈ ReadyOK
∧ n 6= i
∧ (m.mreq .grant = true⇒ i ∈ grant [n])
Invariant 6.5.23. For any “JoinReply” message, we know (1) its destination must still
have empty leaf sets; (2) its receiver is joined through its sender; (3) the sender must be
a “ready” node; (4) the receiver must be a “waiting” node.
SemJRply
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs : m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
⇒ ∧ lset [m.destination] = EmptyLS (m.destination)
∧ toj [m.mreq .lset .node] = m.destination
∧ m.mreq .lset .node ∈ ReadyNodes
∧ m.destination ∈WaitNodes
Invariant 6.5.24. As long as there is a “JoinReply” message, the current left neighbor
and right neighbor of the sender cannot be farther from the sender than the neighbors
according to the leaf set contained in the message.
SemJoinLeafSet
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs,n ∈ I :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset .node = n
⇒ ∧ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(lset [n]),n) ≤ CwDist(LeftNeighbor(m.mreq .lset),n)
∧ CwDist(n,RightNeighbor(lset [n])) ≤ CwDist(n,RightNeighbor(m.mreq .lset))
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Invariant 6.5.25. All the leaf set members contained within a “JoinReply” message
must have no empty leaf sets themselves. The leaf sets of those nodes that are leaf set
members contained within a “JoinReply” message are never empty.
SemJRplyLSnonEmpty
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs :
m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
⇒ ∀k ∈ GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset) :
lset [k ] 6= EmptyLS (k)
Invariant 6.5.26. If a node i is in another node j ’s leaf sets, and node i is not currently
joining the network through j , then i’s leaf sets are not empty.
LSnonEmpty
∆
= ∀i , j ∈ I :
∧ i ∈ GetLSetContent(lset [j ]) \ {toj [j ]}
∧ i 6= j
⇒ lset [i ] 6= EmptyLS (i)
Invariant 6.5.27. There are no two different “JoinReply” messages sent to the same
node.
OneJRply
∆
= ∀m,mm ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ mm.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.destination = mm.destination
⇒ m = mm
Invariant 6.5.28. If a node i owns the lease from n, then n must have granted its lease
to i.
LeaseGrant
∆
= ∀i ,n ∈ I : n ∈ lease[i ]⇒ i ∈ grant [n]
Invariant 6.5.29. As long as there is a “JoinRequest” message from a node i, the node
must be still “waiting” and has no leaf set members.
SemJReq
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs : m.mreq .type = “JoinRequest”
⇒ ∧ m.mreq .node ∈WaitNodes
∧ lset [m.mreq .node] = EmptyLS (m.mreq .node)
Invariant 6.5.30. If a node i receives “JoinReply” message from r, then either its left
neighbor becomes r and its right neighbor becomes the right neighbor of r or its right
neighbor becomes r and its left neighbor becomes the left neighbor of r .
SemJoinNeighbor
∆
= ∀ls ∈ LSet ,m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ ls = AddToLSet(GetLSetContent(m.mreq .lset),EmptyLS (m.destination))
⇒ ∨ ∧ RightNeighbor(ls) = m.mreq .lset .node
∧ LeftNeighbor(ls) = LeftNeighbor(m.mreq .lset)
∨ ∧ LeftNeighbor(ls) = m.mreq .lset .node
∧ RightNeighbor(ls) = RightNeighbor(m.mreq .lset)
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Invariant 6.5.31. The leaf sets of the sender of a “Probe” or “ProbeReply” message
must not be empty. The node will never send “Probe” or “ProbeReply” message to itself
or to the set of nodes it propagate to other nodes, which it believed to be faulty.
SemProbePRply
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∨ m.mreq .type = “ProbeReply”
∨ m.mreq .type = “Probe”
⇒ ∧ lset [m.mreq .node] 6= EmptyLS (m.mreq .node)
∧ m.mreq .node = m.mreq .lset .node
∧ m.mreq .node 6= m.destination
∧ m.destination /∈ m.mreq .failed
Invariant 6.5.32. The leaf sets of the destination of a “ProbeReply” message must be
not empty. A node only receives “ProbeReply” from another node when it has probed
that node.
SemPRply
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs :
m.mreq .type = “ProbeReply”
⇒ ∧ lset [m.destination] 6= EmptyLS (m.destination)
∧ m.mreq .node ∈ probing [m.destination]
Invariant 6.5.33. The leaf sets of a “dead” node are always empty.
SemDead
∆
= ∀k ∈ I : (status[k ] = “dead”)⇒ (lset [k ] = EmptyLS (k))
Invariant 6.5.34. The sender of any “Probe” message must be awaiting a reply from
the receiver by having the receiver in its probing set.
SemProbe
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs :
m.mreq .type = “Probe”
⇒ m.destination ∈ probing [m.mreq .node]
Invariant 6.5.35. The message “ProbeReply” from node i to j is the reply to message
“Probe” from j to i. Therefore, both message can not exist at the same time.
PrbMsgDual
∆
= ∀mp,mr ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ mr .mreq .type = “ProbeReply”
∧ mp.mreq .type = “Probe”
⇒ ∨ mp.mreq .node 6= mr .destination
∨ mr .mreq .node 6= mp.destination
Invariant 6.5.36. There are no two different “ProbeReply” messages from the same
sender and to the same receiver.
OnePRply
∆
= ∀m1,m2 ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m1.mreq .type = “ProbeReply”
∧ m2.mreq .type = “ProbeReply”
∧ m1.mreq .node = m2.mreq .node
∧ m1.destination = m2.destination
⇒ m1 = m2
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Invariant 6.5.37. There are no two different “Probe” messages from the same sender
and to the same receiver.
OneProbe
∆
= ∀m1,m2 ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m1.mreq .type = “Probe”
∧ m2.mreq .type = “Probe”
∧ m1.mreq .node = m2.mreq .node
∧ m1.destination = m2.destination
⇒ m1 = m2
Invariant 6.5.38. There are no two different “JoinRequest” messages from the same
node.
OneJReq
∆
= ∀m1,m2 ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m1.mreq .type = “JoinRequest”
∧ m2.mreq .type = “JoinRequest”
∧ m1.mreq .node = m2.mreq .node
⇒ m1 = m2
Invariant 6.5.39. As a “JoinReply” comes to the message pool with the destination to
i, there must be no “JoinRequest” message sent by i.
JoinMsgDual
∆
= ∀m,mm ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ mm.mreq .type = “JoinRequest”
⇒ mm.mreq .node 6= m.destination
Invariant 6.5.40. As long as there is a “JoinReply” message containing empty leaf set
in the message, then the sender of the “JoinReply” message must be the only “ready”
node of the network.
SemSingleReadyJoin
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs :
∧ m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
∧ m.mreq .lset = EmptyLS (m.mreq .lset .node)
⇒ ReadyNodes = {m.mreq .lset .node}
Invariant 6.5.41. In a “JoinReply” message, if either of the neighbor of the node
according to the contained leaf set is the node itself, then the leaf set must be empty
and vise versa. This is in fact a result of turning Lemma 4.1.3 to an invariant.
SemEmptyLSetSingleNode
∆
= ∀m ∈ receivedMsgs :
m.mreq .type = “JoinReply”
⇒ ((m.mreq .lset .node = LeftNeighbor(m.mreq .lset)
∨ m.mreq .lset .node = RightNeighbor(m.mreq .lset))
⇔ m.mreq .lset = EmptyLS (m.mreq .lset .node))
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Invariant 6.5.42. When there is only one “ready” node in the network and there is
some other node with non-empty leaf set, then this latter node should be assigned as
joining node by the “ready” node.
SingleReadyNodeToj
∆
= ∀k ∈ I , r ∈ I :
∧ ReadyNodes = {r}
∧ lset [k ] 6= EmptyLS (k)
∧ r 6= k
⇒ toj [r ] = k
Invariant 6.5.43. There is at least one “ready” node on the ring. This is the invariant
corresponding to the assumption that initially there is one “ready” node and no node
leaves the network.
AtleastOneReady
∆
= ReadyNodes 6= {}
6.5.2 Proof Sketch of the Invariant IRN as an Example
The invariant IRN states that no “ready” node r can be closer to a node i than its
direct right neighbor.
∀i ∈ I , r ∈ ReadyNodes : i 6= r
⇒ CwDist(i ,RightNeighbor(lset [i ])) ≤ CwDist(i , r)
Since this is in fact a strengthened invariant of property NeighborClosest , which is sim-
ilar to the invariant CompleteLeafSet as illustrated in Invariant 6.3.3, the proof of the
invariant IRN uses a similar approach as the one used in the proof for CompleteLeafSet
explained in Section 6.3.3. The change of the two variables lset and status is critical.
With respect to the change of leaf sets, the proof uses Lemma 6.3.11 to show that
adding nodes into leaf sets preserves the validity of the invariant and since no action
in the new Pastry model removes nodes from leaf sets, the changes of leaf sets always
preserve the invariant IRN .
Regarding the changes of status as in the proof of the invariant CompleteLeafSet it
is enough to consider the action RecLReply(r) as specified in Definition 4.2.15 and to
hypothetically construct a violation which is then to be refuted.
The node r only turns to “ready” when it is “ok” and fulfills the condition of
okToReady in the action RecLReply(r). Applying TojNoReady in Invariant 6.5.12 on
the “ok” node r , it can be concluded that there exists a node r2, such that toj [r2] = r .
Applying SemToj in Invariant 6.5.10 on this result, node i is either the right or the left
neighbor of node r2. This intermediate result will be used later (*).
The proof method now is to make a case analysis on the position of this node r2 as
illustrated in Figure 6.8. According to IRN , either r2 is node i or r2 is outside the range
from i to its right neighbor rn(i), because otherwise IRN should have been violated.
Since node r2 must be “ready” to help joining node and according to IRN , node r2
cannot be inside the range from i to its right neighbor. Hence, the following 3 cases are
possible for the position of node r2:
152
6.5 Final Invariants and the Proof
case 1 : r2 = i . By (*) and case analysis on the position of node r2 and its neighbor,
this case that r2 = i is impossible: If r were the right neighbor of r2, which is now i ,
then r should be the right neighbor of i , which contradicts with the assumption shown
in Figure 6.8. If r were the left neighbor of r2, then the left distance (counter clockwise)
from i to its left neighbor r is larger than the left distance from i to its right neighbor,
which contradicts the definition of LeftNeighbor and RightNeighbor in Definition 4.1.2.
Hence r2 cannot be i .
case 2 : CwDist(i ,RightNeighbor(lset [i ])) < CwDist(i , r2). Using (*) again, we
make case analysis on the node r , which is either left or right neighbor of r2. Suppose
r is the right neighbor of node r2 as illustrated in Figure 6.8 and the other case can
be proved symmetrically. The next step is to analyze the status of node i . If node i
were a “ready” node, then this would violate IRN because then a “ready” node i would
exist between a node r2 and its right neighbor r . Hence this case is impossible. If node
i were not “ready” node, using invariant TojNoReady (Invariant 6.5.9) to construct an
arbitrary positioned “ready” node r4, through which node i is currently joining. Then
use the invariant TojClosestL (Invariant 6.5.8), which states that if node r is joined
through some node r2, then between these two nodes, there exists no further node such
as i , which is currently joining through another node r4. Hence, this case is impossible.
Other cases are symmetrical to the cases analyzed here, therefore can be closed using
the symmetrical invariants TojClosestR and NRI respectively.
case 3 : r2 = RightNeighbor(lset [i ]). Here, we make a case analysis on the posi-
tion of ln = LeftNeighbor(lset [r ]), in order to show that such ln does not exist. That
means, assuming such ln exists, contradiction must be derived. The node ln cannot
be the same node as i , because according to GrantNeighborNew (Invariant 6.5.3), if
node ln had granted the node r , then r could not be closer than its right neighbor
RightNeighbor(lset [i ]). But due to the assumption that node r is “ok” and is becoming
“ready”, it must already get the grant from its left neighbor ln. Hence contradiction is
derived, such that this case is impossible.
The node ln can not be left to i as illustrated in ln2 in case 3 of Figure 6.8. In
this situation, node i cannot be “ready” because it locates between a node r and its
left neighbor ln. According to TojNoReady (Invariant 6.5.9), for the node i that is not
“ready”, there exists a node r3, through which node i is currently joining. Then the left
task is to refute the existence of such a node r3. The node r3 cannot be r2, hence, node
r3 must be the left neighbor of i . According to TojDualR (Invariant 6.5.11) together
with SemToj (Invariant 6.5.10), node i must be the right neighbor of r3. The next step
is to discuss the position of the r3 as the left neighbor of i . On the one hand, it must
exist between i and ln, because if node ln is “ready”, it can not lie between a node i
and its left neighbor r3 by NRI . But on the other hand, node r3 cannot lie between i
and ln, because r3 is ready and it should not lie between a node r and its left neighbor
ln. Therefore, r3 can only be equal to node ln. Thus the precondition for GrantHistL
(Invariant 6.5.4) is fulfilled, which applies here with the following statement: If a not
yet “ready” node i lies between two other different nodes r3 (as well as ln) and r , and
node i is joined through one of the node, i.e. node r3, whereas this node, again node
r3, has granted its lease to the other node r (according to the assumption that node r
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is turning from “ok” to “ready”), then the direct neighbor of i , which is r2, must be
closer to i than the other node r . Regarding the last case in Figure 6.8, r2 is not closer
to i than r . Hence a contradiction is derived, such that node ln cannot be left to i as
shown in case 3 of Figure 6.8.
Now regard how ln cannot exist between i and r . By the inductive hypothesis of
IRN , ln cannot be “ready”, because it lies between a node i and its right neighbor
r2. Then again by TojNoReady (Invariant 6.5.9), there exists a node r5, such that
toj [r5] = LeftNeighbor(lset [r ]). The next step is to make a case analysis of the position
of r5. Because of IRN , it cannot be inside the range [i , rn(i)]. Because of TojClosestL,
r5 cannot be outside the range of (i , r). Hence, r5 cannot exist. Hence, node ln cannot
lie between i and r .
In conclusion, there is no possible position for such a node ln to exist, which means
that there exists no node to grant node r its lease to make it “ready”, and therefore,
the constructed violation is impossible. Thus the proof is competed.
6.6 The TLA+ Proof
The proof of the inductive invariant InvLuPastry in TLA+ is constructed hierarchically.
The induction step is shown in the example in Figure 6.9. The TLA+ proof language
illustrated here is introduced in Section 2.3.6.
The head of the proof (first two lines in Figure 6.9) claims the induction step as a
lemma with name InvInvariant . It is a sequent assuming that the induction hypothesis
InvLuPastry holds and concluding that the post condition InvLuPastry′ still holds. The
type correctness TypeInvariant is inductively proved as a separate theorem, which is
used as an assumption here.
The following lines are the proof body of the lemma InvInvariant , which consists of
several steps as case analysis, each of which targets a particular action from Next or the
stuttering step unchanged vars for the case no action is executed. Each branch of the
proof is finalized with a qed step. For example, the last step 〈1〉99 finalizes the proof
with a qed step by summarizing all the cases, which confirm the definition of Next .
The arguments for a proof is always introduced with the keyword by with the used
lemmas, either with their names or with the step number within the local proof as shown
in the last step 〈1〉99. Here in step 〈1〉99, the step number 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2 and 〈1〉98 are the
previously proved lemmas, each representing that the InvLuPastry holds after execution
of a particular action.
In the proof arguments of step 〈1〉99, the keyword SMT stands for a proof method
used by the TLAPS prover system, telling the TLAPS prove manager to launch the
SMT back-end prover to solve this step of proof.
Take a particular proof step 〈1〉1 as an example to see how a sub-proof is manually
conducted in TLA+, if a simple by . . .def . . . arguments can not be proved by the
back-end prover. This step states a sequent that asserts that InvLuPastry is preserved
by the action Deliver(i , j ) for any i , j ∈ I , guided by the structure of formula Next.
The back-end prover is not able to find a proof in a huge search space when all the
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definitions are unfolded and all the proved lemmas are used at once. Therefore, using
divide and conquer techniques to unfold only the necessary definition and to include only
the needed lemmas for local proof is the most challenging task left to the proof writer.
It is said that by the time this thesis is written, the Toolbox (GUI) of TLA+ helps in
obvious decompositions by suggesting the high-level structure of the proof.
For example, the sub-proof step 〈2〉1 restates the proof obligation of its parent level
〈1〉1. by further unfolding the definition of the action Deliver(i , j ). Here the enabling
condition of Deliver(i , j ) as shown in Definition 4.2.2 is not included in the set of assump-
tions listed in the step 〈2〉1, because for this particular proof obligation NeighborClosest ,
this information is useless.
The assumptions introduced in the assume part are always the ingredients for the
following proof steps, which can be referred by its step number. For example the sub
step 〈3〉9 uses some statement from 〈2〉1 by referring to the step number.
The conjuncts of InvLuPastry are proved one by one after execution of each action.
As illustrated in Figure 6.9, the sub-proof step 〈2〉25.GrantOK ′ shows that the invariant
GrantOK holds after execution of action Deliver(i , j ), as mentioned in the parent proof
step 〈1〉1. The step 〈2〉99 of each sub-proof for a particular action finalizes the local
proof by summarizing all the sub-proofs of the invariants.
In some proofs, an additional proof step is invented as a local lemma, which is
frequently referred in the later local proof steps. Take the sub-proof step 〈2〉2 of proof
step 〈1〉2 as an example which is the easiest case of such kinds of lemmas. Here the
arguments for proving this lemma includes many external lemmas, such as StatusDisjoint
and ReadyInI .
These lemmas are separately proved as preparation for the final inductive proof.
Some of them are lemmas of types, such as ReadyInI states that all the “ready” nodes
are also elements of I ; others are lemmas of properties of the data structure used for state
variables, such as StatusDisjoint states that the status of a node is unique, such that a
“ready” node cannot be at the same time a “waiting” node. Here using the definition of
invariant SemJReq , which states that a node sending a “JoinRequest” message must be
a “waiting” node, and the lemma StatusDisjoint , it can be inferred that the sender of
the received “JoinRequest” message m.mreq .node cannot be the same node as i because
node i is a “ready” node according to the assumption listed in step 〈2〉1.
The final TLA+ proof for the inductive invariant consists of more than 14500 lines
without any comments as the lines illustrated in Figure 6.9. This does not include the
repeating sub-proof steps, which are reformulated as external lemmas in a separate proof
file consisting 600 lines. Additionally, the type correctness is also proved inductively in
about 1000 lines. The lemmas of data structures such as StatusDisjoint and further
lemmas about the general ring structure of Pastry are proved separately in about 2000
lines. These proofs with more than 20,000 lines, corresponding to more than 10000
proof steps, are all automatically verified using TLAPS proof manager, which launches
different back-end first-order theorem provers or an extension of ISABELLE to find the
proof and the proof can partially be checked by the core of ISABELLE.
Here more than 200 proof steps of the proof on invariants launch SMT solver. These
steps simplify about 5 proof steps that consist of only explicit instantiation of the defini-
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tions of invariants and some simple simplification proof steps into one proof step, which
is not feasible to be automatically proved by other back-ends such as ZENON and IS-
ABELLE/TLA. However, it is not yet possible to check these proofs from SMT solver
in TLAPS using the core of ISABELLE. When the complete proof sketch of inductive
invariants is iteratively verified, the proof can be checked automatically as a whole by
one click in TLAPS, which at the end takes 4 hours using a Dell laptop with Intel Core
i3-2330M CPU at 2.2GHz with full usage of 8GB memory.
There are still leftover proofs for the lemmas on the data structure, in particular
the ring calculation which involves modulo arithmetics. Redlog3 is used to verify most
of them.
3http://redlog.dolzmann.de/
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Definition 6.5.2 (InvLuPastry).
∧ IRN ∧NRI
∧ GrantNeighborNew
∧ GrantHistR ∧GrantHistL
∧ GrantOK
∧ CoverNoNode
∧ CoverNoToj
∧ TojClosestL ∧ TojClosestR
∧ TojNoReady
∧ SemToj
∧ TojDualR ∧ TojDualL
∧ TojReady
∧ TojInjective
∧ LSnonEmptyToj
∧ JoinGrant
∧ JoinNC
∧ JoinSingleNode
∧ JoinNeighborR ∧ JoinNeighborL
∧ SemLReplynonEmpty
∧ SemLReplyReady
∧ SemLReq
∧ SemLReply
∧ SemJRply
∧ SemJoinLeafSet
∧ SemJRplyLSnonEmpty
∧ LSnonEmpty
∧ OneJRply
∧ SemDead
∧ SemPRply
∧ SemProbe
∧ PrbMsgDual
∧ OnePRply
∧ OneProbe
∧ SemProbePRply
∧ HalfNeighborExt
∧ LeaseGrant
∧ SemJReq
∧ SemJoinNeighbor
∧ OneJReq
∧ JoinMsgDual
∧ SemSingleReadyJoin
∧ SemEmptyLSetSingleNode
∧ SingleReadyNodeToj
∧ AtleastOneReady
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RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
“ok” to “ready”
¬IRN
r
i
RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
“ok” to “ready”
r2 = case 1
r
i
= RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
“ok” to “ready”
case 2
r2
r
i
RightNeighbor(lset [i ])
“ok” to “ready”
case 3 r2
r
iln1/
ln2/
ln3/
Figure 6.8: Hypothetical violation of IRN by its inductive proof.
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lemma InvInvariant
∆
= assume TypeInvariant ,Nextvars , Inv
prove Inv ′
〈1〉1. assume new i ∈ I , j ∈ I ,
Deliver(i , j ),TypeInvariant , Inv
prove Inv ′
〈2〉1.suffices assume new m ∈ receivedMsgs,
receivedMsgs ′ = receivedMsgs \ {m},
unchanged 〈status, lset , rtable, probing , failed , lease, grant , toj 〉,
TypeInvariant , Inv
prove Inv ′
by 〈2〉1, 〈1〉1def Deliver
〈2〉25.GrantOK ′
〈3〉1.suffices assume . . .prove . . .
. . .
〈3〉9.qed by 〈3〉1, 〈2〉1, . . .
〈2〉26.LeaseGrant ′
. . .
〈2〉99.qed by 〈2〉25, 〈2〉26, . . .
〈1〉2. assume new i ∈ I ,
RecJReq(i),TypeInvariant , Inv
prove Inv ′
〈2〉1.suffices assume status[i ] = “ready”, . . .
prove Inv ′
by 〈2〉1.〈1〉2.def RecJReq
〈2〉2.m.mreq .node 6= i
by〈2〉1,StatusDisjoint ,ReadyInI def ReadyNodes,SemJReq , Inv
〈2〉25.GrantOK ′
. . .
〈2〉99.qed by 〈2〉25, . . .
. . .
〈1〉98. case unchanged vars
. . .
〈1〉99. qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, . . . , 〈1〉98,SMT def Next
Figure 6.9: TLA+ codes of the inductive proof of invariants.
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7 Related Works
7.1 Other P2P Systems
As classified in Section 2.1.2, there are other types of P2P systems using different tech-
niques and terminologies. The purpose of this section, however, is not to restrict the
criteria for different categories, but to clarify the essence of the origins of different tech-
niques and to provide a global rough picture of most popular P2P techniques. Figure 7.1
compares the virtual topologies of different distributed systems.
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Figure 7.1: Different topologies of distributed systems.
In the following sections, they will be shortly introduced with their advantages and
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disadvantages. A summary of comparison is shown then in Table 7.1.
7.1.1 Unstructured Decentralized Systems
Different from the structured P2P system as Pastry, unstructured P2P systems do not
have particular constraints on the links between different peers. When a node joins
the network, it typically initializes its links by repeatedly performing a random walk
through the overlay starting at the seed and requesting a link to the node where the
walk terminates. More random walks may be performed when the connection degree
of a node falls below some minimum; they refuse link requests when the maximum
degree is exceeded. Therefore, the minimum node degree is typically decided to maintain
the connectivity against node failures and membership changes, whereas the maximum
degree is set to bound the overhead maintaining the links.
Unstructured P2P systems store the content in the inserting node and the node
which downloads the content. In addition, they also benefit from the random walk path
for content storage. To obtain and locate the content, a node floods a request message,
specifying a key, meta-data or keywords, through its connected nodes. If one of these
nodes itself or some node in its routing table matches the search criterion, it responds to
the query node. If not, the search continues by flooding the request two hops away from
the query node, and so on, until some node can answer the query by returning the node
address which holds the content. Alternatively, the query node can also use random
walk as a search method instead of flooding as introduced in Rodrigues and Druschel
(2010).
Coordination in the unstructured P2P system is by nature epidemic, i.e. information
spreads like virus from one node to its neighbors. Therefore it is simple and robust.
A more effective way is to form a spanning tree using a decentralized algorithm as
mentioned in Rodrigues and Druschel (2010). This tree can then be used to multi-cast
messages to all members or to compute summaries of the group. No matter which
techniques are used, a balance needs to be kept between the efficiency and the overhead
to maintain the system to be able to provide this efficiency. In the worst case, answering
a query could lead to exploration of the complete network.
One of the successful techniques for unstructured P2P systems is the swarming
protocol, used by BitTorrent and PPTV. Unlike the tree-based protocols introduced
above for coordination and content distribution, swarming protocols do not have any
structure. Content is divided into small bulks and multi-casted to all overlay nodes. In
each swarming interval, overlay neighbors exchange knowledge indicating which blocks
they have. They intersect the availability information received from their neighbors and
request a block they do not have from one of its neighbors who has it. Fairness and
randomness play here a key role.
Compared to Client/Server systems, unstructured decentralized P2P systems scale
much better and are more resilient to failures, attacks and legal issues, due to the lack of
a central controller as the target. The simplicity and robustness of unstructured systems
make them quite widely adopted by non-profit communities such as Gnutella, and for
sharing bulk data in trackless BitTorrent (the newer version). In fact, the trackless
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BitTorrent uses an unstructured overlay for dissemination of data, but uses a key-
based search for locating the resource provider. Key-based search is then a technique
used in structured system, which will be introduced in a sequel.
7.1.2 Hybrid (Partly Centralized) P2P Systems
Hybrid P2P systems are a compromise between Client/Server systems and pure P2P
systems. They always have a controller (or many super-nodes) that maintains a set of
peers, and coordinate them to communicate among each other, or to find remote peers.
For example, Napster maintains its membership and content index on a Web site.
Skype also has a central site to provide utilities for the members to log-in and pay.
When new nodes join in a hybrid system, they first connect to the controller, which
provides a set of nodes it manages and coordinates. Then peers set up the connections
among themselves based on the information they get from the controller.
In addition to the controller, some hybrid systems have more complicated structure.
For instance, Skype has developed the Global Index technology (“GI” or a so-called third
generation of P2P technology “3G P2P”) on a multi-tiered network where Super Nodes
communicate in such a way that every such node in the network has full knowledge of all
available users and resources with minimal latency. According to Goodin (2012), Super
Nodes are those P2P nodes dedicated from the company side on servers within secure
data centers. However, it is not clear if they run P2P protocol among themselves. “This
has not changed the underlying nature of Skype’s P2P architecture, in which Super
Nodes simply allow users to find one another (calls do not pass through Super Nodes)”,
reported in Goodin (2012).
In Hybrid P2P systems, the typical places to store an object are the node that
inserts the object and any nodes that subsequently download the object. Since the
controllers maintain the information about which nodes exist in the system, as well as
keys and other attributes of them, the queries for a given key or a set of keywords are
answered by those controllers, which respond to the queries with a set of nodes from
which the requested resources can be obtained. In the same manner, coordinations for
streaming content or telephone channel can be set up directly through the central points
(or coordinated through Super Nodes).
Despite central controllers or trackers, sharing of the content are carried out by the
peers introduced through those central nodes, to release the throughput on the service
initiator. After coordination is completed through the central nodes, the requesters set
up P2P connections with the peer nodes, download the information and act by default
like them to share the resources.
Based on global coordination and local sharing, Hybrid P2P systems can provide
more organic growth and ample resources, and are more scalable and resilient to failures
and attacks than pure Client/Server systems, but more restricted than those of pure
P2P systems. The central nodes often form potential bottleneck and a single point of
failure and attack, reported by Rodrigues and Druschel (2010). In contrast to pure P2P
systems, the hybrid systems are often better to manage and control. Therefore they are
widely adopted by enterprises such as Napster, PPTV, PPStream, Skype.
163
7 Related Works
Classification Hybrid Unstructured Structured
Examples Napster, Skype,
BitTorrent
Gnutella,
Kazza, track-
less BitTorrent
Pastry, Chord
Techniques/
Terminology
tracker,
Super Nodes
seed, random walk,
flood, swarming,
spanning tree
DHT , shared-
prefix, logarithmic
hop steps
Content
Distribution
inserting node,
downloaders
swarming, along
random walk path
set of neighbors,
pointers
Search&
Coordination
controller,
keywords-based,
central index
no index, flood,
keywords-based,
index in DHT ,
key-based routing,
spanning tree
Pros easier management,
better control
scale very well,
simple and robust,
resilience, complex
keywords search
scale very well,
efficient routing,
less overhead,
resilience
Cons restricted
scalability,
vulnerable for
single point failure
large routing cost
more overhead,
no control
complicated algo-
rithm, suffer from
churn, no keywords
search
Table 7.1: Classification of P2P Systems
7.1.3 Summary of P2P Systems
Table 7.1 summarizes the mentioned points to the different categories discussed above
and give a comparison of them. In the mean time, these techniques are adopted by each
other in the real applications, such that a clear classification of a P2P system is no more
possible. The message to take is that a practical P2P system cannot simultaneously
achieve all three goals of scalability, availability and resilience to churn, a system can
only choose two of them according to Blake and Rodrigues (2003).
7.2 Formal Analysis of Chord
Similar to Pastry, Chord (Stoica et al. (2001)) is also a virtual ring implementation of
DHT . They share the ring topology and similar mechanisms for join, departure of nodes
and their neighborhood maintenance. However, Chord has been described with a more
formal specification, which makes it the target of many verification approaches.
A recent approach is Zave (2012), which uses Alloy to model Chord at a much higher
level of abstraction than the model shown in this thesis for Pastry.
An important difference between Chord and Pastry is that Chord as described in Sto-
ica et al. (2001) uses predecessor and successor according to their assignment in an action
rather than a left (counter clockwise) and right (clockwise) neighbor of Pastry according
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to their leaf sets. Therefore, Pastry has a correct local ordering by construction, that
means, a left neighbor of a node is never numerically closer to a node than its right
neighbor on the clockwise direction. While predecessor and successor of a node in Chord
ring may become disordered when nodes concurrently join at one node.
Complementary to the drawback of Chord due to this difference, concurrent joins in
Chord between two adjacent nodes on the ring can only disrupt the successor, because
new node j is added by replacing j ’s hypothetical predecessor’s successor by the pointer
of j and assign the successor of j to be the previous successor of j ’s predecessor. A
concurrent joining node between j ’s predecessor and successor can only join through its
predecessor. On the opposite, Pastry suffers from neighborhood conflicts as illustrated in
Section 3.2.1 because concurrent joins may disrupt both adjacent nodes, as a concurrent
joining node of j between its hypothetical left neighbor (predecessor) and right neighbor
(successor) can be joined through its right neighbor (successor).
7.2.1 Formal Analysis on Chord Using Alloy
Zave (2012) uses Alloy to formally analyze Chord on an abstract level. Many non-trivial
counterexamples are discovered, which demonstrate the benefits of light-weight verifi-
cation using model checking and model enumeration techniques of Alloy. The abstract
model in Zave (2012) is compared with the formal specification in this thesis as follows.
By modeling the static structure, the concept of “between” corresponding to three
nodes on ring is taken care of in both approaches. The difference is that the specification
of between in Zave (2012) is on a higher abstract level. It invokes the boolean function
lt [n1,n3] to check if a node n1 is “less than” another node n3. But the semantics of “less
than” is not clearly explained. This makes the correctness of between in Zave (2012)
vulnerable to some intuitive refinement, such as implementing lt [n1,n3] as n1 ≤ n3
or n1 < n3. In this implementation, between[0, 2M − 2, 2M − 1] will return false,
although it should be true, since 2M − 1 is the largest identifier whose successor is
0. In contrast to Zave (2012), this thesis gives a detailed formal specification on the
ordering of distances on a ring by comparing the counter clockwise distances as specified
in Definition 4.1.1 in Section 4.1.1.
By verifying the dynamic behavior of the systems, both approaches provide a proof
for the “pure join” cases, though with different interpretations of this concept. The proof
in Zave (2012) relies on atomic and non-interfering executions of join and stabilize steps
that update local neighborhood knowledge. As mentioned before, concurrent join in
Chord only disrupt the successor, which leads to the result that pure join trivially does
not violate the property ValidSuccessorList defined in Zave (2012), which states that a
node should not ignore an existing node between itself and its successor. However, Pastry
may easily violate the property NeighborClosest , which is similar to ValidSuccessorList,
by concurrent join problem illustrated in Section 3.2.1.
Besides the similar actions like stabilization in Chord, the pure join model in this
thesis allows all kinds of interleaving of join, lookup and route, which enlarges the scale
of the problem.
One further difference is message interleaving. Since Zave (2012) assumes that
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“nodes can read the states of adjacent nodes”, message exchange is cleverly abstracted
away. But due to the nature of distributed systems, message delivering is rather essential
because of possible disruptions caused by message interleaving. This thesis models the
messages directly, in order to provide a standard framework of modeling distributed sys-
tems. In fact, allowing message interleaving does introduce a lot of unexpected challenges
as illustrated in Section 5.2. More precisely, the variable toj is introduced to accomplish
blocking of further joins that leads to the problem illustrated in Section 3.2.4. These
problems are not discoverable on an abstraction level as Zave (2012).
Besides the comparison on the abstraction level, the desired property is also compa-
rable. Zave (2012) makes efforts on analyzing connectivity and reachability of a network,
i.e. if nodes can form a ring by their predecessor and successor and if all nodes are reach-
able/connected through some path on the ring, although the ordering of the nodes on
the ring is also one of the invariants for proving these properties. In contrast to Zave
(2012), this thesis focuses on collision-free coverage of the nodes (CorrectDelivery speci-
fied in Property 4.3.4), i.e. no “ready” node share the responsibility of keys with another
node. This property requires more rigorous implementation of the protocol. Therefore,
the corresponding set of invariants as shown in Definition 6.5.2 are therefore also more
complicated than those proved in Zave (2012).
Additional perspective of comparison is the improvement of the protocol. Zave
(2012) aims rather at finding the errors while this thesis aims at proposing a confident
solution. Although a flaw was found in the original description of the algorithm of Chord,
for which Zave (2012) suggests a fix that may be correct, there is no formal proof of
this solution. This thesis suggests a series of improvements of the Pastry protocol in
Section 3.2.4 and gives a formal description of a valid system in Chapter 4 with respect
to desired properties and provides a formal proof of them in Chapter 6.
In fact, Alloy is not supported by a theorem prover like TLAPS to formally prove
the invariants. Therefore, the formal analysis in Zave (2012) is based on model checking
and model enumeration, which provides assertions only on a restricted number of nodes
and leaves the generalization with an informal proof. Using TLAPS, this thesis is able
to deliver a complete induction proof of the desired temporal property of the system and
the proof is also automatically verified by TLAPS.
7.2.2 Previous Formal Approaches Analyzing Chord
To the best of our knowledge, no approaches exist besides this thesis for formal verifica-
tion of Pastry. However, several approaches to analyzing Chord can be found in litera-
ture, such as Lynch and Stoica (2004), Li et al. (2004), Risson et al. (2005) and Bakhshi
and Gurov (2007).
On a similar abstract level as this thesis, Lynch and Stoica (2004) provides formal
description of the protocol as transition system considering concurrent join and leave and
assumes no message loss. However, Lynch and Stoica (2004) focuses on providing fault
tolerance by bounding the latency of messages and the number of leaving and concurrent
joining nodes, while this thesis discusses and proves the guarantee of the safety property
CorrectDelivery . Besides, this thesis provides a proof that is automatically checkable.
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Li et al. (2004) models an abstract version of Chord with active departure protocol.
Active departure and active join means that the node contacts the adjacent nodes before
they join or leave the network. Li et al. (2004) argues that active departure is useful
and more efficient than passive approaches. Li et al. (2004) provides also an “assertional
proof” of pure join protocol of Chord.
Li et al. (2004) defers from this thesis firstly by its abstract level, where message
interleaving is omitted, i.e. it implicitly assumes no message delay. However, this thesis
assumes message delay by modeling non-deterministic execution of actions that allows
message interleaving. The second difference lies in the verified property. This thesis
focuses on correct key-addressing despite concurrent join, while Li et al. (2004) proves
the connectivity of the Chord ring under join. The proof in Li et al. (2004) in a sketch
way is quite convincing. However, this thesis has discovered several flaws of the proof
sketch of LuPastry and used TLAPS to automatically check the final proof to have
more confidence.
Further results from Li et al. (2004) include a conclusion that trivial combination
of the leave protocol and the join protocol would cause live-lock, which then must be
handled using dicing as proposed in Lehmann and Rabin (1981). Since this thesis has
not provided a solution for node departure, the combination of active departure and the
current join protocol in LuPastry can be an interesting future work to see if Correct-
Delivery can be preserved.
In Risson et al. (2005), Event-B is applied to specify the Chord protocol with active
departure. Implementing the Paxos commit protocol, which is already written in TLA+,
Risson et al. (2005) suggests a topology maintenance protocol providing the continuity
of the ring with some fault-tolerance. It does not prove these properties but rather
provides an analysis result involving 3 nodes on the ring and one faulty nodes, while in
this thesis, model checking analysis and validation are carried out by 4 nodes and in a
simplified version even with 5 nodes.
Bakhshi and Gurov (2007) also only considers join and assumes implicitly no depar-
ture of nodes. Different from the thesis, its proof shows that “the stabilization algorithm
will eventually fix the immediate successor of each node” and the network will “even-
tually form a ring topology again”. This thesis have proposed these analysis result on
Pastry as a validation approach in Section 5.3, where a violation of an artificially for-
mulated safety property with negative intention evidences the eventual success of join
and lookup. Such kind of analysis from both approaches have the drawback that they
do not provide any guarantee. For this reason, this thesis proposed further approach
using theorem proving techniques to show the guarantee of safety properties such as
CorrectDelivery .
7.3 Other Formal Methods Applied on Verifying Correctness of
Network Protocol
Another formal method used for verification is process algebra. System is specified using
algebraic structure and the verification is the algebraic calculation process to derive that
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the refinement or implementation simulates the abstract representation. Since DHTs
are implementations of abstract hash tables with a distributed implementation, they
provide a good application case for using this approach.
Karsten et al. (2007) proposes an axiomatic basis for message delivery and addressing
problems of network. It uses Hoare-style logic to specify the handling of messages at a
network node and extend the logic with leads-to relation to mimic the store-and-forward
principle.
A correctness proof for correct forwarding is established in Karsten et al. (2007) by
symbolically reducing the post-condition to a trivially true pre-condition applying all
possible operations.
Borgstro¨m et al. (2004) uses CCS (a typical process algebra language) to specify the
abstract model of the hash table and its implementation with Distributed K-ary Search
(DKS) consisting of request, route and lookup actions. It shows that these two models
are weakly bi-simulated. This approach shares its interest with the thesis in verifying
correctness of routing actions. But it ignores the dynamics of a DHT system and only
focuses on the static case, where membership of the network does not change.
Bakhshi and Gurov (2007) first uses pi-calculus to model Chord on an abstract level
by employing an additional token ring protocol using the Chord and then shows that the
refinement of the distributed algorithm used by Chord simulates the abstract protocol
by showing their behavior equivalence.
Personally speaking, the proof and model in process algebra is far away from an exe-
cutable implementation of a system, whereas the comparable results shown in this thesis
using TLC is more intuitive for a software engineer to understand and to implement.
Besides papers, there are also extensive researches such as Ph.D. theses on relevant
topics of this thesis.
The Ph.D. thesis Ghodsi (2006) has generalized the ring-based implementations of
DHT to a DKS as already introduced in Borgstro¨m et al. (2004) and mentioned that Pas-
try, Chord can be instantiated from DKS. It discusses several common problems such as
concurrent join, departures of nodes, separation of networks and introduces novel appli-
cations of DHT system in group communication, bulk operation and replication. Same
as this thesis, Ghodsi (2006) also argues that consistency is impossible in the case of node
failures due to the network partition problem, though no solution is proposed in either
approach. Its point of view lies in extend the application of DHT only to P2P systems
like Skype, where peers are unpredictable users with all kinds of abnormal behaviors,
but also to ordinate clouds of servers, where departure of nodes is not common. Sharing
this philosophy, the formal verification approach in the thesis can be implemented in
such applications as well, provided with a trustful proof of correctness of LuPastry on
the safety property CorrectDelivery .
However, Ghodsi (2006) differs from this thesis because it tries to use a lock to solve
this problem of concurrent join on the abstract level. This solution was once considered
during the development of IdealPastry but then refuted for its unavailability, which
leads to its improvement in LuPastry. In fact, as long as a node joins to the network
in that model of Ghodsi (2006), at least three nodes are locked and there is no obvious
way to unlock if a concurrent join at the neighbor node occurs before the join has
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accomplished.
Ghodsi (2006) also shows that consistency can be preserved in the case of joining and
voluntary leaving of nodes, though not as a safety property, but rather as the validation
result similar to Bakhshi and Gurov (2007). Besides, Ghodsi (2006) seems not to use
formal method to verify its claims, whereas this thesis has provided complete formal
proof of IdealPastry and LuPastry.
The Ph.D. thesis Bongiovanni (2012) provides an automatically checkable proof by
ISABELLE for verifying the CAN P2P system, which implements DHT in a different
way from Ring structures as Pastry and Chord.
In Bongiovanni (2012), the dynamic behaviors of the system are not modeled, i.e.
the structure and membership of the network is assumed to be static, whereas this
thesis investigates much efforts on verifying the correctness of the safety property under
all possible joins of new nodes and provides a proof which is automatically checkable
using TLAPS.
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8 Conclusion and Future Work
The novelty and contributions of this thesis are summarized in the form of answers to
the proposed research goals stated at the beginning of this thesis in Sections 1.1 and 1.2.
8.1 Answers to the Questions About Pastry
How does Pastry work, in particular, how does the protocol realize the DHT?
As explained in Section 3.1.1 in detail, Pastry is a structured P2P algorithm realizing
a Distributed Hash Table (DHT ) over an underlying virtual ring of nodes with logical
identifiers from an ID space. The IDs serve two purposes: both as keys and identifiers
of the nodes, such that an overlay node is in particular responsible for keys that are
numerically close to its ID, i.e. it provides the primary storage for the hash table entries
associated with these keys. Key responsibility is divided equally according to the distance
between two neighbor nodes.
Pastry is supposed to provide “dependable routing” according to Castro et al. (2004),
i.e. a lookup message for a key will be answered by the unique node which is responsible
for that key. Nodes may join and leave the network dynamically, which is called churn.
Therefore, Pastry maintains its correct key mapping in the presence of churn through
its join protocol, which eventually adds a new node with an unused network ID to the
ring.
This thesis formally modeled the protocols of Castro et al. (2004) as Castro-
Pastry. Fine-grained pseudocode of CastroPastry is shown in Section 3.1.3. This
model is further improved to HaeberlenPastry based on the formal analysis results
from model checking CastroPastry using TLC and inspiration from Haeberlen et al.
(2005) and FreePastry (2009). HaeberlenPastry requires an explicit “transfer of cov-
erage” to a joining node from its neighbors before it can answer lookup requests. In the
formal model HaeberlenPastry, joining nodes are assigned different statuses from
“dead” to “ready”. Only “ready” nodes are allowed to deliver an answer to lookup
requests for a key. Several unexpected problems are discovered by formally analyzing
HaeberlenPastry as discussed in Section 3.2.4, which leads to further improvements
of the design of the Pastry protocol to IdealPastry and LuPastry. IdealPastry as-
sumes that no nodes leave the network and that nodes do not join concurrently between
two neighboring “ready” nodes. LuPastry relaxes these assumptions by only assuming
no departure of nodes, under which condition it is proved to satisfy the correctness prop-
erty CorrectDelivery in the presence of arbitrary concurrent joining of nodes. Ideal-
Pastry and LuPastry both realize the “dependable routing” correctness property of
Pastry mentioned in Castro et al. (2004).
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What does “dependable routing” formally mean? Does Pastry guarantee
dependable routing? If so, to what extent, and how? Is there any fundamental
design flaw in Pastry, in particular Castro et al. (2004), with respect to its
correctness properties, such as dependable routing? If yes, how does the problem
occur? If not, is there a formal proof?
This thesis formally describes dependable routing as correctness property CorrectDeliv-
ery of the system in Property 4.3.4. Unlike the original description stated in Castro
et al. (2004) and repeated above, the formal definition of CorrectDelivery specifies that
only “ready” nodes are qualified to answer a lookup messages for a key, which allows
joining nodes to be closer to the key than the “ready” node delivering the key. “Closer”
is formally defined as an ordering of the absolute distance between two nodes around
the ring. Modular arithmetic is used to define different notions of distances in Defini-
tion 4.1.1. In order to solve the problem of two nodes with the same absolute distance
to the key, Definition 4.1.2 defines asymmetric responsibility for a node w.r.t. some key
according to clockwise (right) or counterclockwise (left) distance from node to key.
The guarantee of dependable routing relies heavily on how message exchange and
updates of local states are implemented. As discovered in model checking analysis and
discussed in Section 3.2, CastroPastry does not provide consistent local views of
“ready” nodes in the presence of concurrent joins of new nodes between two “ready”
nodes leading to violation of CorrectDelivery . HaeberlenPastry suffers also from
the same difficulties with concurrent joining of many nodes within a closed region men-
tioned before. IdealPastry assumes that concurrent joining of new nodes between
two “ready” nodes does not occur and CorrectDelivery is shown to be guaranteed in
this case. Finally, LuPastry is verified to conform to CorrectDelivery all the time and
in the presence of all possible message interleavings and concurrent joins to arbitrary
configurations of “ready” nodes. However, none of the Pastry models introduced in this
thesis can guarantee CorrectDelivery when departure of nodes is allowed in general.
Are there other interesting properties of such a system implementing a DHT? Are
they interrelated?
Besides the safety property CorrectDelivery , other properties are analyzed in this thesis.
For example, the fundamental invariant for proving CorrectDelivery is NeighborClosest
(Definition 4.3.7), which guarantees a “ready” node will never ignore the existence of
another “ready” node between itself and its direct neighbors. Several other invariants
(Definition 6.5.2) are discovered to belong to the inductive invariant of LuPastry. In
the proof sketch illustrated in Section 6.5.2, these invariants are used as proof arguments
in the induction proof of IRN , which subsumes the invariant NeighborClosest by stating
that no “ready” node r can be closer to an arbitrary node i than i ’s immediate neighbor.
Some interesting hypothetical properties are discovered to be false, such as Symmetry
introduced in Property 5.2.3, which states that if a “ready” node has another “ready”
node in its leaf set, then the other node also has this node in its leaf set. This is violated
when a joining node is added by one “ready” node, but the notification message has not
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yet arrived at the neighboring “ready” node. During the process of searching for invari-
ants shown in Section 6.2.2, candidate invariants IncludeNeighbor and CrossNeighbor
were analyzed. They basically state that between any two neighboring nodes, no other
neighboring pair of nodes should exist, one of which is respectively inside or outside the
region between the original pair. Violation of these hypothetical properties is illustrated
in Figure 6.4, which shows how a node may have a right neighbor far away from it
ignoring the closer “ready” nodes because it considers the node from its left neighbor-
hood also as its right neighbor by the definition of RightNeighbor(ls) in Definition 4.1.2.
However, these candidate invariants are in fact too strong and therefore are abandoned
for the inductive proof of NeighborClosest .
Furthermore, it is also important to show that a system will eventually “do the
right thing”. Non-properties such as NeverDeliver , NeverJoin, ConcurrentJoin and
CcJoinDeliver are proposed in this thesis to be proven by contradiction in order to show
that Pastry is able to provide successful lookup, join, concurrent join, and lookup with
concurrent join.
8.2 Answers to Questions About Methodology
How to formally model Pastry? What is a proper abstract level of modeling?
In this thesis, Pastry is modeled as a transition system in TLA+, which provides the
primitives both for the data structures of the static model and rule/message-based ac-
tions of the dynamic model.
Data structures are modeled using the primitives provided by TLA+: e.g. node
identifiers as intervals of the natural numbers; leaf sets of nodes as functional mappings
from such intervals to records, where left and right leaf sets are modeled as sets of node
identifiers; the complex routing table is modeled as a mapping from positions to values
in a parameterized matrix; and messages are modeled as records.
The dynamic behaviors are modeled as actions, where timing-dependent actions
are modeled to occur non-deterministically in order to simplify the formal model for
tractability of model checking. However, message sending and receiving together with
the necessary message content are modeled in detail in order to analyze the effect of
all possible message interleavings in a network, which turns out to be crucial for the
CorrectDelivery property of Pastry which can easily be violated as a consequence of
message interleaving.
A formal specification of LuPastry is given in Chapter 4 and those of the other
formal models of Pastry (CastroPastry, HaeberlenPastry and IdealPastry) are
available online at VeriDis (2013).
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How to express the correctness properties of Pastry in TLA+? Is it at all feasible
to prove their invariance considering the intricacies of message interleaving and
complex data structures of Pastry, and how?
This thesis formally defines the correctness properties in Section 4.3 as theorems, in-
cluding the type correctness of the model and its safety property CorrectDelivery . The
invariance of the properties is expressed using a temporal operator provided by TLA+,
even though it is possible to prove it by induction.
The property CorrectDelivery is first reduced to NeighborClosest and HalfNeighbor
as shown in Section 6.1. Neither of them is an inductive invariant of HaeberlenPastry,
which was first chosen as our initial verification target.
HalfNeighbor is then extended to become an inductive invariant in Section 6.2.1
where it is also proved. NeighborClosest is then shown to be violated due to churn-
ing. The protocol design of HaeberlenPastry is therefore improved as shown in
Section 3.2.4 to IdealPastry.
The subtlest part of the theorem proving approach is to find and prove the proper
inductive invariant of the algorithm. Assumptions are made, as introduced before, that
no nodes leave the network and no nodes concurrently join the network between two
neighboring “ready” nodes. Under these assumptions, a formal proof of IdealPastry
is constructed with help of TLC and TLAPS in an interactive way. The methodology
of finding the proof is described in Section 1.2 on an abstract level and its challenges are
stated in Section 1.3.6. Then more theoretical details are introduced in Section 2.2.2 with
a flow chart in Figure 2.4. The methodology is finally explained in detail in Section 6.3
with a concrete example.
In the next step, assumptions of IdealPastry are relaxed and the design is further
improved to LuPastry. The proof for IdealPastry is partially reused for proving
invariance of NeighborClosest in LuPastry. However, the set of invariants and their
proofs require modification as explained in Section 6.4.4. Final invariants and an example
proof sketch are illustrated in Section 6.5.1, while a complete formal proof is available
online in VeriDis (2013).
To what extent can the formal verification of such a system be conducted
automatically?
Although the search for invariants and several important proof constructions must be
designed by hand (Section 6.2), TLC can help to validate proposed invariants by auto-
matically discovering counterexamples. TLAPS is used to interactively verify the proof.
In TLAPS, a human conducts the proof sketch and describes the proof obligation and
proof arguments, and postulates existence of a proof obtained by applying primitive
proof rules with back-end provers. In case the proof cannot be found automatically for
the postulated proof step, the proof obligation or arguments are modified, or the proof
is broken down into sub-proof steps according to a different proof structure.
The proportion of automation of the proof of inductive invariants depends heavily
on the power and reliability of the back-end prover. On one hand, a more powerful
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back-end solver can reduce the proof time and the size of the formal proof sketch. For
example, SMT solver is launched in more than 200 proof steps of the proof of invariants.
Each of the proof step is a simplification of multiple proof steps using other theorem
provers such as ZENON. On the other hand, only a proof proceeding in reliable small
steps can be trusted because the minimal rules system is more tractable for humans. For
example, TLAPS provides a feature for launching the core of ISABELLE to check the
proof provided by ISABELLE/TLA. However, it is not yet possible to check the proof
provided by an SMT solver in TLAPS.
When the complete proof sketch is iteratively verified, the whole proof can be checked
with a single click in TLAPS, which altogether takes 4 hours using a Dell laptop with
an Intel Core i3-2330M CPU at 2.2GHz with full usage of 8GB of memory.
8.3 Future Work
This thesis only considers safety properties of Pastry which guarantee the correctness
property. The availability of successful routing and joining can be formulated as a
liveness property, which can also be verified by discussing fairness conditions. Such an
approach will be possible after TLAPS is developed to support the proof of liveness
properties.
Node departure in Pastry may lead to network separation. Different proposals for
handling departure of nodes can be found in the literature, in particular the active
departure discussed in Section 7.2.2, by Lynch and Stoica (2004), Li et al. (2004) and
Risson et al. (2005). The protocol for active departure of nodes seems to be similar to the
concurrent join protocol, and it is not trivial to see if there can be any improvement of the
protocol which guarantees the safety property under concurrent departure of arbitrary
nodes (including those which are currently joining) together with concurrent joins.
The automated theorem provers at the back-end of TLAPS can be further improved
to handle many trivial cases in the formal proof, which are currently broken into sub-
proofs manually just because the formula is too complicated for the tools to provide a
proof in time. Several such proof obligations in the inductive proof for LuPastry are
automatically proved using SMT solvers, but there is no proof checker yet available for
checking the result. In order to improve the automation, the proof can be inspected to
find out which parts of the proof have the same pattern, that should be automatically
proven using encoded simplification rules.
A more general framework for verification of a DHT can be constructed by general-
ization of the current TLA+ model and its verification. As introduced in Section 7.3, the
Ph.D. thesis Ghodsi (2006) can be consulted and compared for further details about such
approach. Other approaches on Chord discussed in Section 7.2 can be formally modeled
using TLA+ and analyzed in a similar manner. The formal models CastroPastry,
HaeberlenPastry and LuPastry can serve as templates for verification of similar
distributed systems implementing a DHT and the general framework can be applied for
other verification tasks.
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